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TRUMPS, INVERSIONS, BALANCING,
PRESUMPTIONS, INSTITUTION PROMPTING,
AND INTERPRETIVE CANONS: NEW WAYS FOR
ADJUDICATING CONFLICTS BETWEEN LEGAL

NORMS
Carlos E. Gonzilez*

I.

INTRODUCTION

During the late summer of 2003, a news media firestorm
erupted over the fate of the much publicized national "do not
call" registry.1 The registry, a product of Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") regulations, prohibited telemarketers from
calling telephone numbers placed on a national "do not call"
list. 2 Weary of ceaseless telemarketing calls, Americans
placed over 50 million telephone numbers on the list.3 Much
to the dismay of the public, however, an Oklahoma Federal
District Court struck down the regulations as beyond statuto'Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Newark. B.A., University
of Michigan; J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Stanford University. The article was
written with the support of the Rutgers School of Law-Newark Dean's Research
Fund. The author would like to thank participants at the Santa Clara
University School of Law faculty colloquium who offered comments on an earlier
draft of the article. The author also thanks Melinda Waterhouse for her
assistance in research on the article.
1. A Westlaw search performed by the author revealed 238 articles and
editorials containing the phrase "do not call list" published in major U.S. newspapers during September 2003.
2. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. §§ 310.1-310.8 (2003) (FTC
regulation); Bloomberg News, Court Allows U.S. to Enforce No-Call Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at C6 (discussing and explaining do not call registry regulations); see also Dave Barry, Call Hating;Avast, Telemarketers, Ye Scurvy Dogs,
WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2003, at W40 (explaining details of the do not call registry
regulations).
3. James P. Miller, FCC to Enforce '"Do-Not-CalF:Agency Fares Better in
Court Than FTC, Has O.K to Carry Out Rules, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2003, at 1
(stating that the "do not call" registry is "hugely popular, with over 50 million
numbers registered").
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rily authorized agency regulatory powers just days before
they were to go into effect. 4 Two days later, a Colorado Federal District Court held that the regulations violated First
Amendment free speech rights.5 Luckily for the telemarketing-weary public, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
the regulations by finding that they did not go beyond the
scope of statutorily delegated regulatory power and did not
violate the First Amendment.'
Though the media and the public naturally focused on
whether the "do not call" registry would ultimately be implemented, the litigation turned on a cluster of understudied legal issues related to conflicting legal norms. Both district
court opinions found that the regulations stood in irreconcilable conflict with either statutes or the Constitution.7 The
Tenth Circuit found, however, no conflict between the regula-

4. U.S. Sec. v. F.T.C., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1291-92 (W.D. Okla. 2003)
(explaining that the FTC "assert[ed] ... jurisdiction to promulgate a do-not-call
registry" under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention
Act of 1994 ("Telemarketing Act" or "TCFAP") and holding that TCFAP statutory authority to regulate abusive telemarketing did not authorize "do not call"
registry regulations).
5. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160-68
(D. Colo. 2003) (holding that FTC "do not call" registry regulations violate First
Amendment free speech protections). Ironically, the District Court of Colorado
held that the "do not call" registry regulations were within the FTC's statutory
authority. Id. at 1168-70.
6. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1246, 1250 (10th
Cir. 2004) (holding that "do not call" registry regulations did not violate First
Amendment and were not beyond statutorily granted agency regulatory authority). Congress also played a role in saving the "do not call" registry regulations.
After the Oklahoma Federal District Court found the regulations beyond the
FTC's statutorily granted regulatory powers, Congress quickly passed the DoNot-Call Implementation Act ("Implementation Act"). The Implementation Act
definitively granted the FTC authority to create "do not call" registry regulations, and directed the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to coordinate its regulatory authority with the FTC in the creation of "do not call" registry regulations. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat. 557); Restrictions on Telemarketing and Telephone Solicitation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (c)-(e) (2003) (containing FCC regulations). The
statute eliminated any doubt over whether the FTC and/or FCC were empowered to promulgate the regulations. MainstreamMktg., 358 F.3d at 1250 (stating that new statute "erased" any doubt over scope of regulatory power). Still,
the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act did not resolve the issue of whether the
FTC had possessed statutory authority to promulgate the regulations under
then existing statutes or whether the regulations violated the First Amendment.
7. See Mainstream Mktg., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1151; US. Sec., 282 F.Supp.2d
1285.
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tions and the statutes or the Constitution.8 Taken together,
the opinions epitomize and illustrate three key elements present in all cases in which legal norms may be read as standing in irreconcilable conflict.
First, courts presented with these types of cases must decide whether two norms stand in conflict. This step involves
the familiar judicial task of norm interpretation. Whether
two norms stand in irreconcilable conflict frequently depends
on how broadly or narrowly a court interprets the norms. If a
court determines that no conflict exists, all of the legal norms
in question will remain in force. This was the outcome of the
"do not call" registry litigation in the Tenth Circuit. 9
If a court finds that two norms stand in conflict, a second
element comes into play. A set of rigid, formalistic axiomatic
legal principles operates to resolve the conflict by determining
which norm will be nullified."° These axiomatic principles dictate, for example, that a regulation always and without exception will be nullified by a conflicting statute or constitutional norm. In both of the district court opinions, the
axiomatic principles nullified the "do not call" registry regulations.
Third, the nature of the principles used to resolve conflicts between legal norms may influence or bias the way
courts interpret legal norms. The principles offer courts no
flexibility or discretion. Courts know that if they find two legal norms in conflict, the principles will inescapably nullify a
particular legal norm. Thus, if a court finds that a statute
and a regulation stand in conflict, the principles will dictate
that the statute inescapably trumps and nullifies the regulation. This rigid and discretion-denying feature can prompt
courts to manipulate whether a particular legal norm will be
nullified. Courts do this by manipulating the meaning of legal norms and whether legal norms stand in conflict.
In the "do not call" registry litigation, for example, the rigidity of the principles may have driven the Tenth Circuit to
find that the regulations did not stand in conflict with the
relevant statutes or the Constitution. Had the court found a
conflict between the regulations and the statutes or the Con-

8. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1246, 1250.
9. Id. at 1228.
10. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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stitution, the rigid principles would have nullified the regulations. Rather than allow the principles to strike down the
popular "do not call" registry, 1 the court may have used its
interpretive discretion to read the First Amendment and
relevant statutes in a way that avoided any conflict with the
regulations, thus ensuring the survival of the popular "do not
call" registry regulations. More to the point, the rigidity of
the axiomatic principles may have provoked the court to use
its discretion in interpreting legal norms to circumvent the
principles.12
11. After the district court rulings striking down the "do not call" registry
regulations were reported, the media was flooded with negative public reactions. See, e.g., Sick of Telemarketers? Call Judges' Homes, USA TODAY, Sept.
30, 2003, at A22 (letter to editor expressing "extreme displeasure" with district
court judges for striking down "do not call" registry regulations and urging citizens to call judges' homes at dinner time to voice displeasure over rulings); Bad
Calls, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30, 2003, at A18 (quoting President Bush
when signing the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act as stating that the American
people, Congress, and the Executive Branch have concluded that a "do not call"
registry is needed); Jim Hughes, Judges'Phones Ring Off The Hook Over NoCall Cases,DENVER POST, Sept. 28, 2003, at B2 (reporting that citizens annoyed
by district court rulings striking down the "do not call" registry regulations
called judges' chambers to complain to the point that judges had to turn down
ringers); Courts Are Not the Bosses, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 2003, at
B9 (letter to the editor reacting to district court rulings striking down the "do
not call" registry regulations by arguing that "[i]f the people want a "Do Not
Call" list, they can have it. Fifty-million Americans can tell the courts what
they want, not vice versa. I am getting very tired of the courts assuming they
run this country!").
12. We can never know for sure whether the Tenth Circuit's norm
interpretations were influenced by the desire to avoid nullification of the
popular "do not call" registry regulations. Close examination of the opinion,
however, does not inspire great confidence in the Tenth Circuit's interpretive
approach. The FTC claimed authority to create the regulations under the
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994
("Telemarketing Act") requiring that the FTC "prescribe rules prohibiting ..,
abusive telemarketing... practices." Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1) (2000); U.S. Security,282 F. Supp.
2d at 1291 (explaining that FTC "assert[ed] ...jurisdiction to promulgate a doThe main
not-call registry" under the Telemarketing Act of 1994).
congressional committee report on the Telemarketing Act reveals that Congress
contemplated a narrow meaning for "abusive" telemarketing practices, and did
not contemplate prohibition of telemarketing merely because recipients had
placed their phone numbers on a list. H.R. REP. NO. 103-20, at 8 (1993) (listing
as examples of "abusive telemarketing activities" subject to regulation: "threats
or intimidation, obscene or profane language, refusal to identify the calling
party, continuous or repeated ringing of the telephone, or engagement of the
called party in conversation with an intent to annoy, harass, or oppress any
person at the called number"). The Tenth Circuit did not reference the House
Report. With scant analysis and in a conclusory fashion, the Tenth Circuit held
that the Telemarketing Act's provision for regulation of abusive telemarketing
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Though all cases similar to the "do not call" registry litigation involve these three basic elements, legal scholars usually focus only on the first: judicial interpretation of norms.
This article will focus on the second and third elements: the
axiomatic principles and the potential influence or bias they
can exert on the way courts interpret legal norms. The article
explains the axiomatic principles, the justification for their
use, and the pathologies they foster.13 Most importantly, the
article compares the axiomatic principles with several alternative sets of principles or systems that could serve the same
function. 4 The goal of this article is to evaluate and compare
the strengths and weaknesses of the extant principles alongside the strengths and weaknesses of alternative sets of principles.
As will be further discussed, the principles that now govern conflicts between legal norms are plagued by serious
drawbacks. They are best justified by their tendency to produce outcomes that, in a narrow and particular way, enhance
or preserve the democratic legitimacy of law. 5 Yet the discretion-denying rigidity of the principles often can undermine16
this justification and lead to anti-democratic outcomes.
Moreover, as may have been the case with the Tenth Circuit's
treatment of the "do not call" registry litigation, the principles
can bias or influence the way courts interpret legal norms.
Rather than norm interpretations driven by applicable rules
of legal interpretation, norm interpretation may be driven by
the desire to avoid anti-democratic outcomes called for by the
principles, and then rationalized as the unbiased product of

sion for regulation of abusive telemarketing practices authorized promulgation
of the "do not call" registry regulations. Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1250
(holding that FTC had authority to promulgate "do not call" registry regulations). The problem with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Telemarketing Act is not that it is necessarily incorrect or implausible. The problem is that
the court fails to mention the evidence of legislative intent, which contradicts
the court's interpretation of the Act. This failure raises the distinct possibility
that the court was ends oriented in interpreting the scope of regulatory powers
granted by the Act. Ignoring the House Report enabled the court to hold that
the Telemarketing Act could reasonably be read as empowering the FTC to
promulgate the "do not call" registry regulations.
13. See discussion infra Parts II-III.
14. See discussion infra Part IV.
15. See discussion infraPart II.B.
16. See discussion infraPart III.A.
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applicable rules of legal interpretation. 7 The bias produced
by the extant principles, in short, can corrupt and contaminate the task of judicial norm interpretation.
However, possible alternatives to the extant principles offer no easy solutions. Some of the alternative principles or
systems for adjudicating cases involving conflicting legal
norms would be superior in some ways to the extant principles. Some alternatives would be superior because they
would be better at producing outcomes that enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy of law. 8 Some alternatives
could minimize the above mentioned bias effects on judicial
norm interpretation produced by the extant principles.1 9 Each
of the alternative systems discussed herein, however, suffers
serious problems. Some of the alternatives might fail to constrain judicial discretion. 0 Relatedly, some alternatives may
undermine the rule of law features of the current principles
and lead to legal instability and unpredictability.2 ' Other alternatives could unsettle traditional institutional roles and
relationships, and fail to protect separation of powers values.22 Still, other alternatives could ask courts to perform
tasks beyond their competence.23
Ultimately, no set of principles or system governing adjudication of conflicting legal norms can maximize along all
dimensions. Structuring a system for adjudication of cases
involving conflicting norms involves hard choices between
competing values and attributes. It is clear that the extant
principles present a host of serious problems. Alternatives to
these principles, however, would present other problems. The
optimal system depends on personal preferences for maximization of positive attributes and minimization of negative attributes. Much of this article elaborates on these fundamental
themes.
Part II of the article explains and summarizes the extant
principles governing adjudication of cases in which legal
norms are read as standing in conflict. 24 Part II will also ex17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See discussion infraPart III.B.
See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.3, IV.B.1, IV.B.2, IV.C, IVC.2.
See, e.g., infra Part IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.B. 1.
See discussion infra Part II.A, II.B.
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plain the peculiar democracy-reinforcing effect that the principles produce.25 Part III then examines the nature and scope
of the problems the principles produce.26 Part IV considers
several alternative systems for resolving conflict between legal norms. 7 Finally, Part V offers concluding remarks.2 8
II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ADJUDICATING CONFLICTS
BETWEEN LEGAL NORMS

Both rules of legal interpretation and extra-legal factors,
such as the ideology of a judge, can influence outcomes in
cases where legal norms might be read as standing in a posture of irreconcilable conflict.29 This article, however, focuses
on another set of factors important in these cases: the axiomatic principles, or axiomatic meta-norms, that govern adjudication once a court determines that two legal norms stand
in a posture of irreconcilable conflict. ° Part II.A briefly describes these meta-norms.3' Part II.B explores the tendency
of the meta-norms to produce outcomes that in a particular
32
way enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy of law.
A.

The Axiomatic Meta-Norms

To understand the axiomatic meta-norms, consider two
conflicting legal norms and how the meta-norms would re25. See discussion infra Part II.C.
26. See discussion infra Part III.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.
28. See discussion infra Part V.
29. Legal scholars have done much to understand the influence of both interpretive norms and extra-legal factors, such as ideology, on judicial decision
making. Regarding the influence of extra-legal factors, see Theodore W. Ruger
et al., The Supreme Court ForecastingProject:Legal andPoliticalScience Approaches to PredictingSupreme Court Decision Making, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1150, 1157 (2004) (describing scholarship advancing the "attitudinal" model and
idea that judges decide cases based upon ideological views and are not constrained by legal materials). For a review of the recent scholarship regarding
norms of statutory interpretation, see Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of a
Decade ofStatutory InterpretationScholarship on JudicialRulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU L. REV. 9, app. at 23-29 (2000) (appendix listing recent
law review articles on statutory interpretation). For a brief overview of constitutional interpretation scholarship, see Gerard J. Clark, An Introduction to
ConstitutionalInterpretation,34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 485 (2000).
30. Carlos E. Gonzilez, PopularSovereign Generated Versus Government
Institution Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does a Constitutional
Amendment Not Amend the Constitution, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 127, 138 (2002).
31. See discussion infra Part II.A.
32. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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solve the conflict. Assume that one legal norm prohibits vehicles from entering the park, while another legal norm permits
bicycle races in the park on the last Sunday of each month.
Further, assume that a court has interpreted "vehicles" to include bicycles, and that the prohibition on vehicles in the
park, therefore, encompasses a prohibition on bicycles. Finally, assume that the norm prohibiting vehicles in the park
(including bicycles) was created by a legislature, and that the
norm permitting "last Sunday of the month" bicycle races was
generated by an administrative agency. 3 Which of these two
irreconcilably conflicting norms will survive and which will be
nullified?
The outcome is obvious and inescapable. The statute prohibiting vehicles (interpreted to include bicycles) in the park
will trump and nullify the regulation permitting bicycle races.
The axiomatic meta-norms that make the outcome obvious
and inescapable, however, are themselves not at all obvious.
The meta-norms are four in number and can be stated as
follows:
1. The source axiom: Legal norms emanating from different norm-generating institutions or entities belong to different legal categories. Legal norms emanating from the same
norm-generating institutions or entities belong to the same
legal categories.
2. The hierarchic axiom: Legal categories populated by
legal norms emanating from norm-generating institutions or
entities of relatively greater democratic legitimacy are hierarchically superordinate to those legal categories populated by
legal norms emanating from norm-generating institutions or
entities of relatively lesser democratic legitimacy.
3.. The categoric axiom: Legal norms belonging to legal
categories of superordinate hierarchic status always and unconditionally trump irreconcilably conflicting legal norms belonging to legal categories of subordinate hierarchic status.
4. The chronologic axiom: Whenever two irreconcilably
conflicting legal norms belong to the same legal category, the
more recently created norm always and unconditionally
33. Such definitional conundrums are common. See, e.g., Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (determining that a motorized bicycle is not considered a motor vehicle for purposes of
insurance policy even though considered a motorized vehicle for purposes of
state vehicle and traffic code).
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trumps the preexisting norm 34
B. Application ofthe Axomatic Meta-Norms
How would the axiomatic meta-norms govern the "no vehicles in the park" illustration? First, apply the source axiom.
The two norms emanate from different norm-generating institutions. The first is the creation of a legislative body while
the second is the product of an administrative agency. Under
the source axiom the two norms would belong to different "legal categories." The first would be a member of the category
"statutory norms;" the second would be a member of the category "administrative norms."
Next, under the hierarchic axiom, the legal category
"statutory norms" (along with all members of that category) is
hierarchically superior to the legal category "administrative
norms" (along with all members of that category). This is so
because the members of the former category emanate from
legislatures, while the members of the latter emanate from
administrative agencies. Legislative bodies boast greater
democratic legitimacy than do administrative agencies. Thus,
the norm prohibiting vehicles (including bicycles) in the park
would belong to a category of norms that is hierarchically superior to the category including the norm permitting "last
Sunday of the month" bicycle races.
Finally, under the categoricaxiom the norm belonging to
the hierarchically superordinate category-the statute prohibiting vehicles (including bicycles) in the park-would
trump the norm belonging to the hierarchically subordinate
category-the administrative regulation allowing "last Sunday of the month" bicycle races in the park. If both norms
were instead statutes, the last step in the analysis would
change. Rather than the categoric axiom, the chronologic
axiom would apply. Where both norms emanate from a legislative body, both are members of the same category (source
axiom) and are of equal hierarchic status (hierarchic axiom).
Under the chronologic axiom the most recently created norm
will trump the preexisting norm.
If we cut through the formalities of the four axiomatic
meta-norms we see that they reflect the fundamental charac34. Gonzdlez, supra note 30, at 160 (cataloguing source, hierarchic, categoric, and chronologic axioms).
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ter of the American legal system's formula for managing
cases in which legal norms stand in irreconcilable conflict.
First, the system divides the universe of legal norms into four
different categories-constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law-depending on the four principal
sources of legal norms-We the People,35 legislative bodies,
administrative agencies, and common law courts. Next, the
system arranges the categories into a hierarchic layer cake,
with the norms created by more democratically legitimate institutions in the top layers and the norms created by less democratically legitimate institutions in the bottom layers. Finally, the system grants norms from a higher layer a trump
over conflicting norms from any lower layer, and grants
newer norms a trump over conflicting preexisting norms from
the same layer.
At this juncture two points must be stressed. First, the
axiomatic meta-norms are legal rules. No lawyer or judge
will cite them. They will not be discussed at oral argument.
They will not be found inscribed in a constitution, statute, or
regulation, or even in judicial pronouncements in reported
cases. They are not the result of any positivistic act of norm
creation of the sort that produces constitutions, statutes,
regulations, or common law rules. Despite their "invisible"
profile, the axioms count as secondary conduct regulating legal rules just as much as, for example, the statutorily codified
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the judicially developed
rules of statutory interpretation.
My point is that there exists a class of legal meta-norms
that are nowhere to be found in inscribed legal texts and that
indeed may not even be the result of positivistic acts of norm
creation. This special class of legal meta-norms has emerged
organically over time and become so deeply and invariably
ingrained into the unconscious background assumptions of all
members of the legal community that they have taken on the
character of inviolable legal rules. Precisely because they are
part of unconscious givens and assumptions, they are "invisible" on the surface of legal discourse.
Though somewhat similar to extra-legal factors which influence outcomes in litigated cases, the ideology of the judge,

35. Constitutional norms are conceived of as legal norms emanating from or
ratified by We the People. See Gonzalez, supra note 30.
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for example, the meta-norm axioms decidedly belong to the
legal, rather than extra-legal, universe. 6 Unlike the ideology
of a judge or other extra-legal factors, the axioms are internalized and ingrained in all members of the legal community.
When a set of principles has become so internalized and ingrained as to be hardwired into the conceptual framework of
all members of a legal community, those principles become
part of the legal framework in that legal community. The
four axiomatic meta-norms enumerated above exemplify this
phenomenon. There is no irregularity, dissent, argument, or
diversity regarding how the meta-norms impact outcomes. To
take the simplest example, no judge would seriously dispute
the chronologic axiom, the notion that between two conflicting
legal norms of the same kind, the more recent norm trumps
the preexisting norm. Given a particular case or circumstance, all judges will reflexively and unconsciously apply the
chronologic axiom in exactly the same unvarying way and
with the exact same impact on the outcome.
Compare the ideology of a judge. Ideology will vary from
judge to judge, with some being conservative and others liberal. This variation results in judges of different ideological
stripes reaching different outcomes in the same cases. 7 The
degree of influence ideology exerts will also vary from judge to
judge. For one judge ideology can be a major factor in how
the judge decides cases, while for another judge ideology
36. Like extra-legal factors, the meta-norm axioms impact outcomes and are
not directly memorialized or superficially evident in constitutional, statutory,
administrative, or common law legal texts. Nonetheless, crucial differences indicate that the axioms count as legal norms, rather than extra-legal factors
which influence outcomes. First, the presence or absence of inscribed words in
legal texts does not determine whether something counts as a legal rule. Such
inscribed words may provide evidence that a legal rule exists, but they are not
the sine qua non of the legal or non-legal nature of a factor influencing judicial
decision-making. Moreover, whether a factor impacts outcomes in litigated
cases is also not dispositive on whether that factor counts as law rather than an
extra-legal factor.
37. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction
and the Elusive Quest for NeutralReasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 24, 87-99, 125
(forthcoming 2005, available in SSRN) (recent empirical study finding that in
labor and employment cases conservative Supreme Court justices are likely to
join pro-business opinions while liberal justices are likely to join pro-employee
opinions, and arguing that neutral canons of statutory construction are deployed to reach ideologically motivated outcomes); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719
(1997) (empirical study of D.C. Circuit decisions finding that ideology of judges
affects outcomes in environmental law cases).
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plays only a minor role.38 These kinds of irregularities simply
are not present when we consider the four axioms. The axioms are universally and consistently applied by all judges in
the exact same way."
A second noteworthy point relates to the level of generality and abstraction at which the axioms are articulated. The
four enumerated meta-norms represent the most generalized
statements possible that can explain and predict outcomes of
cases involving irreconcilably conflicting legal norms. Abundantly familiar legal principles stated with less generality can
also explain and predict at least some cases where legal
norms stand in conflict. For example, all lawyers should easily recognize and accept that, as a matter of extant legal principle, a constitutional norm will trump and nullify a conflicting statutory norm. '
The categoric axiom is stated at a
higher level of generality than this easily recognizable principle. It encompasses more than the rule that constitutional
norms trump conflicting statutory norms. It also encompasses a range of more specific (and commonly recognized)
rules, such as the rule that a statute will trump a conflicting
administrative regulation and the rule that a statute will
trump a conflicting common law principle.4
38. See Ruger et al., supra note 29, at 1173-74 (suggesting by use of statistical analysis that votes of some current Supreme Court justices are more predictable than other current justices using the political ideology of the justices as
a metric, and that votes of ideological outlier Supreme Court justices are more
predictable using ideology as a metric than votes of centrist justices).
39. For example, when faced with a case in which two statutes stand in irreconcilable conflict, all judges will resolve that conflict in accord with the chronologic axiom in exactly the same way and without room for debate. All judges
will rule that the newer statute trumps the older statute. To be clear, judges
may differ on the meaning of legal norms and whether two norms stand in a
posture of conflict. Once two statutes have been interpreted as standing in a
posture of irreconcilable conflict, however, all judges will agree that the newer
statute trumps the older statute.
40. Though so fundamental that it need not be explicitly stated, courts
sometimes enunciate this rule. See, e.g., Cole v. Cent. States S.E. and S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, No. 00-11573, 2002 WL 31319656, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20033 (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2002) ("a statute cannot trump the requirements of the Constitution.... ."); Associated Contract Loggers, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (D. Minn. 2000) ("[It is axiomatic that a
statute cannot trump the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land.");
United States v. Ailemen, 893 F. Supp. 888, 904 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[In cases of
conflict, the Constitution always trumps statutes....").
41. The same analysis applies to the chronologic axiom. All members of the
legal community will recognize and acknowledge the notion than a new statute
trumps a preexisting conflicting statute.
See SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
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Stating the axioms at a higher level of generality than is
commonly used in everyday legal parlance brings particular
benefits. Most importantly, by stating the four axioms in the
most generalized terms possible, the essential features of our
system for managing cases in which legal norms irreconcilably conflict become abundantly obvious. The narrowly drawn
rules or
explanations, in contrast, obscure many of these fea42
tures.
How is this so? Return to the "no vehicles in the park" illustration. A statute prohibiting vehicles (including bicycles)
in the park will trump and nullify an administrative regulation permitting "last Sunday of the month" bicycle races. The
standard way to explain and understand this outcome is that
the first norm trumps the second norm because there is a familiar rule stipulating that statutory norms trump conflicting
43
More simply, the statutory norm
administrative norms.
§ 34.01, at 31 (5th ed. 1984) (recognizing general rule that statutes continue in force unless abrogated by a subsequent statute). Likewise, all
will recognize and acknowledge that a constitutional amendment will trump a
preexisting conflicting constitutional provision, and that a new regulation
trumps a conflicting preexisting regulation. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXI
(repealing Eighteenth Amendment); Nat'l Family Planning & Reprod. Health
Ass'n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("It is a maxim of administrative law that: 'If a second rule repudiates or is irreconcilable with [a
M).
prior legislative rule), the second rule must be an amendment of the first ....
The chronologic axiom embodies all such chronology-based rules.
42. In addition, general explanations are usually preferable over narrowly
drawn explanations, assuming that predictive power is not diminished. The
categoric and chronologic axioms explain and predict a broader range of events
(a broader range of case outcomes) than do the narrow rules, for example, that
constitutional norms trump conflicting statutory norms, or that between two
conflicting statutes the more recent statute will prevail.
Narrowly drawn explanations should not be ignored. Rather, one seeking to understand a given event should consider both general and narrowly
drawn explanations. The legal community already fully understands the narrow rule that constitutional norms trump conflicting statutory norms, or the
rule that between two conflicting statutes the more recent statute will prevail.
The more generalized categoric and chronologic axioms can only add to understanding by offering a new perspective which reveals previously obscured isCONSTRUCTION

sues.

43. The Chevron doctrine arguably can dilute the statute over regulation
ordering. Where a statute is ambiguous, a plausible agency interpretation will
trump the most likely (but not entirely certain) legislative command. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (elucidating Chevron doctrine under which courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes "[i]f...
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue"). One justification for this weakening of the statute over regulation ordering is that where a
statute is ambiguous, permitting expert administrators to fashion policy makes
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trumps the conflicting administrative norm because there is a
rule which demands just that."
An explanation based on the more generalized four axioms, however, forces one to see that much more than a rule
stipulating that statutory norms trump conflicting administrative norms is at work. In addition, our legal system divides legal norms into different legal categories; it places
those categories in a particular hierarchic ordering; and it
grants trumps to norms belonging to categories higher in the
ordering over conflicting norms belonging to categories lower
in the ordering. Rather than the limited issue of whether
statutory norms should trump conflicting administrative
norms, the more generalized explanation based on the axioms
brings forth an entirely new range of questions.
Consider a few of these new questions: Why should the
legal system divide the universe of legal norms into different
categories or kinds? If it should, why use the current categories--constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common
law -rather than some other possible categorization? Why
should the legal system arrange the different categories in a
rigid hierarchy rather than, as one possibility, a flexible continuum? Why should the hierarchic ordering be based on the
democratic legitimacy of the institution that creates a particular kind of legal norm? Why not instead base the hierarchic status of a given legal norm on the democratic legitimacy
of the particular legal norm? If we are to have a hierarchy,
why grant legal norms belonging to superordinate legal categories an unconditional trump over legal norms belonging to
subordinate legal categories? Why not instead offer legal

for better policy than adherence to judicial conjecture regarding the most probable legislative intent. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2086-90 (1990). A similar strain of thought
has recently emerged that implicitly challenges the constitutional norm over
statute ordering. Some argue that permitting the political branches of government a large role in the interpretation of constitutional norms will alleviate the
counter-majoritarian difficulty. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation,50 DUKE L. J. 1335, 1358-94 (2001) (advocating enhanced congressional power to interpret constitutional norms). Though not
necessarily formally overturning the Constitution over statute ordering, permitting political branches a role in constitutional interpretation would produce a
dynamically changing Constitution. Rather than conforming new statutes to

the Constitution, the possibility of conforming the Constitution to new statutes
would become a possibility. Id. at 1359-81.
44. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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norms belonging to superordinate legal categories nothing
more than a rebuttable presumption that they will trump
conflicting legal norms belonging to subordinate legal categories?
If we think on the level of everyday legal parlance, we are
stuck with, for example, the particularized rules that constitutional norms trump conflicting statutes, or that statutes
trump conflicting administrative regulation. Focus on the
particularized rules, in other words, obscures all of the novel
and interesting questions. Once it is apparent that the constitutional norm over statute and statute over regulation
rules, along with other similar particularized rules, are
merely part of a more universal and generalized set of axiomatic meta-norms, many interesting questions jump to the
fore.
We do not need the four meta-norms to predict how a
court would resolve the conflict presented by the "no vehicles
in the park" illustration. Obviously, the statute will trump
the conflicting regulation. We do need the four meta-norms
to expose a range of previously hidden foundational issues
and questions that deserve scrutiny.
C. The Democracy-ReinforcingJustification Undergirding
the Axiomatic Meta-Norms
The four axiomatic meta-norms constitute a coherent system governing the adjudication of cases where legal norms
have been interpreted to stand in irreconcilable conflict.
What justifies use of the extant system rather than some
other possible system? Because the system emerged organically, there are no well thought out rationales to justify its
use and perpetuation in official legal texts. 5 However, a
common justificatory theme underlying the various particularized rules that the axioms encompass can be detected.
Each of the particularized rules, as well as the extant system
as a whole, is best justified by a tendency to generate outcomes that, in a particular way, enhance or at least preserve
45. Justifications underlying legal norms are usually advanced by those
who advocate their adoption. However, no single grand architect (or even group
of architects) designed and pushed for promulgation of the extant system. Instead, the axioms emerged organically and are not the product of any discrete,
identifiable act of positivistic norm creation promulgating or adopting the axioms.
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the democratic legitimacy of law.46
The extant system produces this effect by preserving legal norms generated by entities of greater democratic legitimacy and nullifying conflicting legal norms generated by entities of lesser democratic legitimacy. The "no vehicles in the
park" illustration posits a conflict between a statute and an
administrative regulation. Legislatures, which are subject to
periodic electoral checks, claim greater democratic legitimacy
than do administrative agencies, which are only loosely controlled by democratically elected legislatures and chief executives.4 7 The extant system will preserve the legal norm created by the legislative body, the statute, over the legal norm
created by the administrative agency, the regulation.48
The extant system produces a similar effect in cases
involving conflict between other kinds of legal norms, such as
between constitutional and statutory norms. We the People,
the ultimate source of constitutional norms, command the
strongest possible claim to democratic legitimacy. The legislative stand-ins, creators of statutes, possess only a second

46. The particularized rules and the more generalized meta-norms produce
other salutary effects that might validate their use and perpetuation. The tendency to produce outcomes that can be seen as enhancing the democratic legitimacy of law, however, provides the justification for use of the extant system.
For example, the extant system enhances the stability of law and protects separation of powers boundary lines between norm-generating institutions. When
we compare the extant system to possible alternatives, however, we will see
that the tendency to produce democracy-enhancing outcomes is the paramount
justification undergirding the extant system.
47. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465,
1473 (D. Colo. 1988) (agency regulation in conflict with statute must be nullified
because "value judgments which amount to changes in a statute, which are
what the new regulations represent, should be made by the elected, accountable
Congress and not by the Executive branch [agencies]").
48. Consider again how the four axioms would produce this outcome. First,
under the source axiom, the two norms will be treated as different in kind or as
members of distinct legal categories. The norm emanating from the legislative
body will belong to the category "statutory norms." The norm emanating from
the administrative agency will belong to the category "administrative norms."
Second, under the hierarchic axiom, the category "statutory norms'" (and all of
its members) will be treated as hierarchically superior to the category "administrative norms" (and all of its members). Third, under the categoric axiom, the
norm belonging to the superordinate legal category will be granted a trump over
the norm belonging to the subordinate legal category. As a result, the legal
norm produced by the legislative body (the entity of relatively greater democratic legitimacy) will be preserved, while the conflicting legal norm produced by
the administrative agency (the entity of relatively lesser democratic legitimacy)
will be abolished.
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best claim to democratic legitimacy. 49 By privileging a constitutional norm over a conflicting statute, the extant system
preserves the norm created by the entity of greater democratic legitimacy.
The same holds true in a case of conflict between norms
of the same kind or category. In a conflict between two statutes, for example, the extant system would preserve the
newer statute and nullify the preexisting statute. Legislatures with a recent electoral sanction claim stronger democratic legitimacy than do long-retired legislatures whose electoral sanctions have long since gone stale.0 As such, the
extant system ensures the survival of the norm created by the
more democratically legitimate incarnation of the legislature,
thus reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of law.
We find evidence of the democracy-reinforcing theme not
as an explicit justification for the generalized axioms themselves, but as a series of uniform or parallel rationales for the
more particular and recognizable legal principles. Thus, the
superior democratic legitimacy of We the People over our legislative agents justifies constitutional norms trumping conflicting statutory norms.5 Similar rationales justify, for ex49. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 123 (Max Farand ed., Yale, rev. ed. 1937) (James Madison's notes) (James Madison at Philadelphia Constitutional Convention explaining that legislatures could not ratify
the Constitution in the name of We the People because legislative ratification
would not equal ratification by "the supreme authority of the people themselves"). See also Carlos E. Gonzilez, RepresentationalStructures Through
Which We the People Ratify Constitutions:The Troubling OriginalUnderstanding of the Constitution'sRatification Clauses,38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcom-

ing June 2005) (manuscript Section III, on file with author) (detailing historical
evidence on original understanding that legislatures could not ratify the Constitution in the name of We the People because legislatures are considered agents
of We the People rather than embodiments of We the People).
50. See Karen Petroski, Retheorizing the PresumptionAgainst Implied Repeals, 92 CAL. L. REV. 487, 488 (2004) (stating that "[L]egislature's most recent

enactments are more likely aligned with the electorate's current political preferences than are earlier enactments to the contrary").
51. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803) (holding
that a statute conflicting with the constitution is void and unenforceable); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing
that judicial review is justified when courts are enforcing constitutional norms
over statutory norms because constitutional norms emanate from We the People
while statutory norms emanate from a legislature); Thomas E. Baker, Exercising the Amendment Power to Disapprove of Supreme Court Decisions:A Proposal for a "Republican Veto," 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 325, 326-27 (1995)

(suggesting that under the Marshallian view, judicial review involves constitutional norms generated by the popular sovereign trumping conflicting statutory
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ample, the statute over regulation, statute over common law,
and regulation over common law rules. 2 A parallel justification is at work in cases involving conflicts between the same
kinds of legal norms. The superior democratic legitimacy of
the recent legislature over the long-retired legislature, for example, justifies a new statute trumping a preexisting conflicting statute. 3
The justifications behind each of these particularized and
commonly recognized rules are all variations on the same
democracy-reinforcing theme. This is not a coincidence. We
do not have a jumble of discrete and independent rules governing conflicts between different types of norms and new
and old norms of the same type. We instead have a single coherent system composed of four axiomatic meta-norms that
applies to all cases in which legal norms of any kind or any
vintage are interpreted as standing in conflict. This system
effectuates the single recurrent theme behind each of the
more familiar and particularized rules: the preservation of lenorms created by legislatures).
52. See, e.g., F.D.A, v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
190 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning whether "background canon"
policy should be made by democratically elected Congress rather than by unelected agency administrators applies in particular case); Chevron, 467 U.S. at
865 (holding that agency interpretation must prevail over common law-like judicial gloss on ambiguous statute because "j]udges ... are not part of either political branch of the Government" and policy choices are responsibilities of political branches of government); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers,
451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (stating that federal judicially developed common law
principles are "'subject to the paramount authority of Congress'") (quoting New
Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347,
351 (1979) ("[A] court is not free.., to substitute its judgment for the will of the
people ... as expressed in the laws passed by their popularly elected legislatures."); In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 1240 (3rd Cir. 1987) (recognizing
that statutes overrule common law precedent because "in a democracy the legislature may be the more appropriate branch to draw classifications based on
public policy. As a popularly elected body, the legislature is in a position to tap
the thinking of its constituency and has the resources to secure data generally
not available to the courts"); PlannedParenthoodFed'n ofAm., 680 F. Supp. at
1473 (agency interpretation in conflict with statute must be nullified because
'value judgments which amount to changes in a statute, which are what the
new regulations represent, should be made by the elected, accountable Congress
and not by the Executive branch").
53. In holding that a new statute trumps a preexisting conflicting statute,
courts rely on the greater democratic legitimacy of the newer legislature over
the earlier legislature. See Petroski, supra note 50, at 488 (stating that new
statutes trump or repeal preexisting conflicting statutes "because the legislature's most recent enactments are more likely aligned with the electorate's current political preferences than are earlier enactments to the contrary").
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gal norms created by entities of greater democratic legitimacy
over conflicting legal norms created by entities of lesser democratic legitimacy.'
III. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEMS GENERATED
BY THE EXTANT SYSTEM

Before reviewing possible alternatives to the extant system, it is important to understand the nature and scope of the
problems it produces. The problems fall into two main groupings. First, despite its democracy-reinforcing underpinnings,
the extant system can produce outcomes that arguably degrade the democratic legitimacy of the law. Second, in cases
54. Some Bill of Rights cases may at first glance appear not to fit the overarching democracy-reinforcing theme. In recent decades, the Supreme Court
has used interpretations of Bill of Rights clauses, which probably do not enjoy
majority support, to nullify sub-constitutional norms and government actions
that probably do enjoy majority support. First Amendment cases protecting flag
burning may exemplify this phenomenon. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (striking down state law prohibiting desecration of United States flag).
Modern justifications for such holdings center not on any pretense of enhancement of the democratic legitimacy of law, but rather on protection of minority
rights against majority tyranny. See Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132-33 (1991) (stating that "the Bill of Rights...
according to conventional wisdom, was (intended] to vest individuals and minorities with substantive rights against popular majorities" but arguing that
contrary to conventional wisdom, the Bill of Rights was intended more as a set
of norms to protect majority rights rather than a set of norms to protect individual or minority rights). Unpopular First Amendment free speech and press
protections have been justified as protecting the "rights of paradigmatically unpopular individuals or groups to speak out against a hostile and repressive majority." Id. at 1147. In other words, the outcomes in these kinds of cases have
been justified precisely because they are anti-majoritarian.
None of this is at odds with the notion that the extant system is justified
by its tendency to produce outcomes that, in a particular way, enhance the
democratic legitimacy of law. The extant system works to preserve legal norms
created by entities of greater democratic legitimacy over conflicting legal norms
created by entities of lesser democratic legitimacy. In the end, even if unpopular at a given moment in time, all parts of the Constitution are treated as emanating from We the People. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 324
(1816) ("The constitution of the United States was ordained and established ...
as the preamble of the constitution declares, by the 'people of the United
States'). When a court strikes down a popular statute because it is in violation
of an unpopular Bill of Rights provision, the implicit justification, as in any case
of judicial review, is that the Bill of Rights emanates from We the People, while
the conflicting statute emanates from Congress. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78,
supra note 51, at 525; Baker, supra note 51, at 326-27. Cases in which the Bill
of Rights is used to strike down currently popular sub-constitutional norms
highlights the limited and narrow way in which the extant system can claim to
enhance the democratic legitimacy of law.
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where the extant system threatens to produce outcomes of
suspect democratic legitimacy, it encourages unconscious and
conscious judicial bias, and even outright judicial dishonesty,
with a consequent lack of transparency in judicial opinions.
A. Problem One: The Failureto DeliverDemocracyReinforcingResults
As soon as we identify the democracy-reinforcing justification we can see it limitations. The extant system often fails
to produce the democracy-reinforcing outcomes that purportedly serve to justify its use and perpetuation. The problem
lies in the following: The extant system preserves legal norms
emanating from entities of relatively greater democratic legitimacy and nullifies conflicting norms emanating from entities of relatively lesser democratic legitimacy. The democratic legitimacy of a given norm-generating entity, however,
is but one of many factors and considerations relevant to assessing the democratic legitimacy of individuallegal norms.
As a result, the extant system regularly produces outcomes
that will be perceived as the very antithesis of democracyenhancing or -preserving. It, in other words, often nullifies
individual legal norms of perceived strong democratic legitimacy and preserves individual legal norms of perceived suspect democratic legitimacy.
The evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of legal
norms is contestable and complex. Does a particular legal
norm boast greater democratic legitimacy than another because the first emanates from We the People while the second
emanates from a legislature, an administrative agency, or a
common law court? Or does a particular norm boast relatively greater democratic legitimacy than another because it
better reflects current majoritarian sentiment (perhaps expressed in recent electoral contests) than some other norm,
regardless of which entities created the two norms? Or does a
legal norm boast strong democratic legitimacy when it closely
approximates the policy that would be favored by a majority
of the electorate if the electorate were well informed and
could fully deliberate on the underlying policy issues? Or is it
that one legal norm boasts relatively greater democratic legitimacy than another legal norm because the first conforms
to core values on which society has maintained strong consensus for a generation, whereas the latter reflects nothing
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more than an incongruent, transient, and uninformed majority impulse that has not yet stood the test of time?
Competing conceptions of democratic legitimacy waft
through our legal and political discourse.55 Different conceptions imply different admissible considerations for evaluating
the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms. The extant system, however, oversimplifies this complex question by
fixating on one factor alone, the democratic legitimacy of the
entities and institutions that create legal norms.
Due to its cramped focus on the entities that create legal
norms, the extant system will, for example, preserve a statute
providing narrow special interest benefits and nullify a conflicting administrative regulation that ameliorates those special interest benefits and better reflects current majority
preferences. Similarly, the extant system will preserve a new
special interest oriented statute, passed only because it was a
rider to a larger bill or part of a legislative logroll,56 and nullify a conflicting preexisting public-regarding statute that had
passed on its own merits with broad bi-partisan support and
which still reflects majoritarian preferences.
The justification in both instances would be that where
conflicts arise, the norms created by more democratically legitimate entities, either the legislature over the agency or the
recent legislature over the long-retired legislature, should
trump the norms created by entities of lesser democratic legitimacy. It is far from clear, however, that the special interest statute can rightly claim greater democratic legitimacy
than the regulation aimed at minimizing special interest
benefits. Likewise, it is far from clear that a new special interest oriented statute can rightly claim greater democratic
legitimacy than a preexisting public-regarding statute. Entities of relatively high democratic legitimacy regularly generate legal norms of suspect democratic legitimacy. Likewise,
entities of relatively low democratic legitimacy regularly pro55. Disagreement on the meaning of democracy manifests itself with regularity. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dimensions of Democracy, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1723, 1723-33 (2003) (explaining and comparing the standard
"one dimensional" conception of democracy based on majoritarianism and electoral results, the author's idea that democracy involves four elements apart
from majoritarianism and elections, and Professor Rubenfeld's notion that democracy requires adherence to commitments over generations).
56. For example, in exchange for a legislator's support on one bill, the
legislator might demand the inclusion of a pre-consent provision in another bill.
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duce legal norms of strong democratic legitimacy. The extant
system
incorporates no mechanism to accommodate this real57
ity.
The system's fixation on the sources of legal norms and
exclusion of other relevant considerations leaves it open to a
series of "yes, but.. ." rejoinders. Yes, legislatures are more
democratically legitimate than administrative agencies. But
in this particular case the legislature has passed a special interest statute, while the agency has promulgated a regulation
more in line with majoritarian preferences. Or yes, today's
legislature is more democratically legitimate than the legislature retired half a generation ago. But in this particular case
today's legislature has passed a statute at odds with current
majoritarian preferences, while the long-retired legislature
created a statute still sanctioned by broad public support. Or
yes, We the People are the more democratically legitimate
source of legal norms than legislative bodies, administrative
agencies, or courts. But in many cases, today's statutes,
agency regulations, or even common law norms possess
greater democratic legitimacy than do constitutional provisions sanctioned by We the People over two centuries ago.
Rational reasons explaining the extant system's fixation
on the democratic legitimacy of the sources of legal norms can
be found. It must be recognized, however, that narrow fixation on the sources of legal norms exacts a price: the periodic
preservation of individual norms of relatively low democratic
legitimacy and the concordant nullification of individual
norms of relatively high democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the

57. Relatedly, the extant system incorporates no mechanism for dealing
with the effect of time on the democratic legitimacy of legal norms. Even if, for
example, a statute enjoyed unimpeachable democratic legitimacy from all perspectives when first passed, over time its democratic legitimacy may vanish.
The majority coalition that favored the statute's policy may dissipate. Law or
social circumstances may change, leaving the statute's policy out of sync with
current sentiment. A recently created administrative regulation may more
closely approximate current majoritarian sentiment than does the antiquated
statute. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-7

(1982) (outlining dilemma of statutes that no longer command majoritarian
support but which are not likely to be repealed). The extant system fixates on
the democratic legitimacy of the sources of the conflicting norms alone and ignores the temporal element. As a result, the system will work to preserve an
outmoded statute carrying a claim to democratic legitimacy that has long since
expired over a conflicting administrative regulation of recent vintage that is in
line with current majority sentiment.
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price exacted runs contrary to the very democracy-enhancing
narratives that justify the use and perpetuation of the extant
system for resolving cases of conflict between legal norms.
B. Problem Two: The Incentive for Bias and Manipulation of
InterpretiveDiscretion
A second problem engendered by the extant system grows
out of the first. The extant system regularly presents courts
with a Hobson's choice:58 either interpretive honesty with consequent degradation of the democratic legitimacy of law, or
bias and dishonesty in interpretation allowing enhancement
or preservation of the democratic legitimacy of law.
As already discussed, the extant system can nullify individual legal norms of strong democratic legitimacy and concordantly preserve norms of weak democratic legitimacy."
For example, where a new regulation of strong democratic legitimacy stands in conflict with a special interest oriented
statute of weak democratic legitimacy, the extant system demands nullification of the former and preservation of the latter.6°
The rigidity of the axiomatic meta-norms leaves a court
facing such a case with two stark options: First, a court can
honestly admit that the two norms stand in irreconcilable
conflict. Because the rigid and exceptionless axioms afford
courts no discretion or flexibility, this path leads inexorably
to a problematic outcome: nullification of the regulation, the
norm of stronger democratic legitimacy. Second, aiming to
avoid this outcome, a court can use its interpretive discretion,
often in a biased or even consciously dishonest way, to preserve the regulation. Because the rigidity of the extant system denies courts a way to legitimately avoid the anti58. A commonly accepted definition of Hobson's choice is "the necessity of
accepting one of two or more equally objectionable things." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary of the English Language 1076 (Philip Babcock
Gove ed., Merriam-Webster Inc. 1993).
59. See discussion inifraPart III.A.
60. The remainder of this article relies heavily on examples involving statutes and regulations. Most of the points demonstrated using these examples
are also applicable to conflicts involving other kinds of legal norms. Thus, just
as a particular regulation may make a stronger claim to democratic legitimacy
than a particular conflicting statute, so too might a particular statute make a
stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than a particular conflicting constitutional norm. Similarly, a particular old regulation might make a stronger claim
to democratic legitimacy than some new regulation.
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democratic outcome, it produces strong incentives for courts
to deploy bias and dishonesty in norm interpretation.1
1.

An IllustrativeRegulation

To more clearly explicate the Hobson's choice and the incentive for dishonest application of interpretive discretion, I
will introduce a fictional but plausible chronicle of the birth
and possible death of an administrative regulation. The fictional regulation is inspired by the FTC's "do not call" registry regulations discussed in the introduction.6 2 Visualize the
following scenario: Hoping to bolster the President's position
leading into the next election cycle, the President's domestic
advisors decide to pursue, among several other domestic initiatives, controls on unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail,
commonly known as "spain" e-mail.' While no election will
turn on the spam issue, the President and his advisors correctly perceive that a new law substantially restricting spam
e-mail would be met with very strong popular approval.
The legislative route appears uncertain. Congressional
committees that have considered the spam e-mail issue have
focused on an "opt-out" policy similar to that of the national
"do not call" registry used to control unwanted telemarketing
solicitations. ' The opt-out policy would permit the sending of
spam e-mail unless the user of a particular e-mail address
61. Thus, when faced with the prospect of a special interest statute trumping a regulation of strong democratic legitimacy, no court can challenge the
categoric axiom and the statute over conflicting regulation ordering. A court,
however, can use and abuse its interpretive discretion to manipulate the meaning of the statute and regulation, whether the statute and regulation stand in
conflict, and therefore whether the statute will trump the regulation. If a court
interprets the norms such that the statute and regulation stand in conflict, the
statute will trump the regulation. If a court interprets the norms such that the
statute and regulation do not stand in conflict, the statute will not trump the
regulation.
62. See supratext accompanying notes 1-9.
63. Spain e-mail has been defined in various ways. See Bill Husted & Ann
Hardie, Spare Wars: Spam Q&A, ATLANTA J.

CONST., Dec. 14, 2003, at A12

(pointing to different definitions of spain e-mail); Bob Sullivan, Do Not Spare
Lists Won't Work, FTC Says, at http://www.msnbc.msn.con/id/5216554 (last
modified June 15, 2004) (on file with author) (providing various definitions of
spai e-mail). In this article I consider spain e-mail to be unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail.
64. The national "do not call" registry is a product of FTC and FCC regulations. The regulations prohibit telemarketers from calling phone numbers
placed on a national registry. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9 and notes
1-9.
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specifically opts out by placing his or her e-mail address on a
national registry. Most Internet analysts believe that the
opt-out strategy would be far less effective in the spain context than in the telemarketing context and would produce
only a minimal reduction in the volume of spam e-mail." Not
only would such a statute be ineffective, it could also preempt
more effective state laws regulating spam e-mail and foreclose adoption of an effective federal statute for the foreseeable future.'

65. See Saul Hansell, FTC. Rebuffs Plan to Create No-Spam List; N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2004, at C1 (discussing the FTC recommendation against creating a do-not-e-mail registry); Sullivan, supra note 63 (explaining that opt out
list would actually exacerbate problem since it would give spammers list of valid
e-mail addresses they could use to send more spam).
66. Preemption of more effective state anti-spam laws apparently came to
fruition in 2003 when Congress passed the CAN-SPAM Act in December of
2003. CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699, §§ 4-6
(2003) (codified in various sections of 15, 18, 28 and 47 U.S.C.). The CANSPAM Act preempts roughly thirty state anti-spain regulations, many of which
are fairly stringent. See CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707 (b) (Law.
Co-op. 2005) (preemption of state law provision of CAN-SPAM Act); Editorial,
CongressionalSpam Filter,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at A18 (explaining defects
in federal anti-spam legislation including preemption of state anti-spain laws).
The CAN-SPAM Act creates civil and criminal sanctions for the sending
of spam e-mail deceptive in source or content, and requires that spam e-mail
include mechanisms allowing recipients to opt out of further spam e-mail communications from the sender. CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117
Stat. 2699, §§ 4-6 (2003) (codified in various sections of 15, 18, 28, and 47
U.S.C.). The law authorizes enforcement by the FTC and other federal agencies, as well as by states and civil suits brought by Internet service providers.
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b) (Law. Co-op. 2005). Suits have
already been brought under the Act. See Mylene Mangalindan, Web FirmsFile
Spain Suit Under New Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2004, at B4 (describing four
major Internet service providers' suits against spammers as first major legal
action under CAN-SPAM); Mike Brunker, E-mail Giants Sue Alleged Sparn
Sender, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4496759 (updated Mar. 10, 2004) (on
file with author) (detailing lawsuits by major Internet service providers against
alleged violators of CAN-SPAM).
Most commentators believe that the CAN-SPAM Act regulatory approach will prove ineffective. See Editorial, Why FederalAnti-Spam Legislation
Wil FallShort:It's Up to Consumers to PressLawmakers, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 15, 2003, at Op.1; Mangalindan, supra, at B4 ("independent analysts say there is little evidence yet that the tough new federal law reduces
spain volumes"); Declan McCullagh, Spare Keeps Cookin'DespiteNew Laws, at
http://www.msn-cnet.com.com/2100-1024-5160.html?part'msncnet&subj'ns_5160503&tag'tg-home (last modified Feb. 17, 2004) (on file with
author) (FTC attorney stating that "Can-Spam is not going to solve the problem"); Brad Stone, Soaking in Spain, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 2003, at 66, 69 ("Almost everyone involved with the spam debate admits CAN-SPAM will do little"); Jennifer Wolcott, Will Spain Be Totally Canned, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

258

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

Vol: 45

Influenced by Internet advertising lobbyists, key congressional committee chairs have stalled efforts to consider fedSeeing the legislative path
eral anti-spam legislation.
blocked, the President's advisors focus on the administrative
level, where they have more influence and are less likely to
lose control of the process. Without delay, administration officials begin pushing the FTC to promulgate a new regulation
adopting a comprehensive regulatory framework.
The comprehensive framework includes three elements.
First, it incorporates an "opt-in" policy. Under an opt-in regulatory scheme, spam e-mail may not be sent to an e-mail address unless the user of the e-mail address has specifically
and knowingly opted in or consented to receipt of spam e-mail
communications from a particular sender. Consent may be
secured by mail, telephone, or face-to-face communications.
Those who send spam e-mail without securing consent are
subject to fines and civil damage suits. Second, the comprehensive approach institutes a very small fee to be paid on a
per recipient basis by any sender of commercial e-mail to
1,000 or more e-mail addresses. Because only a tiny fraction
of spam e-mails result in economic benefit to the seller, the
fee would make most spam e-mail communications economically non-viable." Finally, the comprehensive approach provides financial incentives to Internet access providers that
apply technological solutions to the spam e-mail problem.
The comprehensive approach would produce a more substantial reduction in the flow of spam e-mail than would the optout policy under consideration in Congress.'
MONITOR, Jan. 2, 2004, at 13 ("Critics of the CAN-SPAM Act say it's not tough

enough, as the law doesn't actually make it illegal to send spam"). One worrisome sign that CAN-SPAM will be ineffectual is that industry lobbyists supported its passage while consumer groups had hoped Congress would do nothing. See Editorial, Congressional Spain FYter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at
A18.
67. As the fee would only apply when unsolicited commercial bulk e-mails
are sent to a large number of recipients, it would not discourage the legitimate
and ordinary use of e-mail communications. It would, however, make spam email commercially non-viable. See Kevin DeMarrais, Updating the War on
Spam: E-mail Skeptic FindsReason for Optinsm,THE [BERGEN] RECORD, Feb.
29, 2004, at B1 (discussing the results of CAN-SPAM and other possible ways to
combat spam including a postage method proposed by Microsoft); Stephan
Parks, Editorial, What Spain Costs, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2003, at A22 (discussing the possibility of a postage stamp system for e-mail); Stone, supra note
66, at 66, 69 (discussing micro-payment strategy).
68. An opt-in policy alone would be ineffective. See Spain Unsolicited
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As three of the five FTC board members were appointed
by the President and are of the same political party, the
After an accelerated ruleagency responds accordingly.
making process, a comprehensive new anti-spam regulatory
scheme incorporating the opt-in strategy, fees, and financial
incentives is published in the Federal Register.
Upon promulgation, the regulation proves both effective
and extremely popular. Nonetheless, an e-mail marketing
industry group sues the FTC seeking to have the anti-spam email regulations declared null and void. The suit is based on
a twelve-year old statute passed at the behest of the telemarketing industry. The statute prohibits all but very limited
regulation of commercial communications transmitted over
phone lines or other wires. Like spam e-mail, telemarketing
has always been unpopular with the public. The telemarketing industry, however, used access to key legislators, plus a
healthy dose of congressional campaign contributions, to facilitate passage of protective legislation. Strategically well
placed campaign contributions to key committee gatekeepers
over the years have inoculated the statute against amendments allowing more vigorous regulation.
The statute states that "[t]he Commission [FTC] shall not
issue regulations pertaining to unsolicited commercial communications over telephone and other wires, except that the
Commission may issue regulations pertaining to intimidating
unsolicited commercial communications and to abusive unsolicited commercial communications."69 Though passed long
before e-mail communication existed in any meaningful commercial form, and passed with telemarketing in mind, the
text of the statute is broad enough to prohibit almost all regulation of spam e-mail. Like telemarketing communications,
spam e-mail travels "over telephone and other wires."7
Commercial E-Mail: HearingBefore the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, 108th Cong. (May 21, 2003) (statement of J. Trevor
Hughes, Executive Director of Network Advertisers Initiative) available at
(last
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=773&wit-id=2092
visited Mar. 5, 2005). A multifaceted approach including legislation and technological tools would be most effective. Id.
69. The fictional statute is comparable to the Telemarketing and Consumer
Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994, which grants the FTC power to promulgate rules prohibiting "deceptive" or "abusive" telemarketing practices. See
supranote 12.
70. RON WHITE, How COMPUTERS WORK 344 (1999) (explaining that data
commonly travels over the Internet through a modem connected to a phone line
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The record of legislative history demonstrates that Congress uniformly understood the statutory permission to regulate "abusive" communications as granting only the power to
regulate acts such as the number of telemarketing calls in a
given time period or the hours at which such calls could be
made. The permission to regulate "intimidating" communication was understood as allowing regulations that control the
use of the language associated with overzealous debt collection agencies. All other forms of regulation, and in particular
regulations constituting blanket prohibitions, were uniformly
understood to be impermissible.
In its suit against the FTC, the e-mail industry marketing group argues that the statute permits only regulation of
"intimidating" and/or "abusive" communications. The antispam e-mail regulations fall well outside these narrow categories because they do not seek to regulate the time, quantity,
or content of the communications. Instead, the regulations
broadly prohibit the sending of commercial bulk e-mail communications. In other words, even if not "abusive" in terms of
the number of communications sent to a particular recipient
or other similar factors, the regulations would both forbid and
impose cost prohibitive fees on most unsolicited e-mail communications.
2.

The Hobson g Choice:Anti-Democratic Outcomes and
Incentives for Bias and Manipulationof
InterpretiveDiscretion

How would a court respond to the suit? The answer illustrates the Hobson's choice precipitated by the extant system
governing adjudication of conflicting legal norms. If, as appears to be the case, the statute and regulation stand in irreconcilable conflict, straightforward application of the extant
system leads to nullification of the regulation. When two legal norms stand in conflict, the norm belonging to the superordinate legal category trumps the norm belonging to the
subordinate legal category. The rigidity of the axioms leaves
the judge facing conflicting legal norms with no flexibility or
room for judicial discretion.'
or cable connection to a network).
71. A court might also nullify the regulation by finding that it violates the
First Amendment. Current commercial speech doctrine offers enough leeway to
plausibly find either that the regulation is or is not an unconstitutional restric-
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Nullification of the new regulation, however, creates a
problem. Though promulgated by an agency, the anti-spain
regulation, as an individual legal norm, makes a strong claim
to democratic legitimacy. Simply stated, the regulation responds to a public consensus favoring meaningful limitations
on spam e-mail.12 But for the obstructionism of a few congressional committee gatekeepers, an effective anti-spam
statute could have been enacted as a statute.
The democratic legitimacy of the statute is comparatively
weak. To the extent that the statute prohibits meaningful
regulation of spam e-mail, it goes against clear public preferences. Moreover, initial passage of the statute and subsequent insulation from amendment have been the result of
special interest politics. The mere fact that the statute was
created by Congress, rather than an administrative agency,
hardly counterbalances these considerations.
If the statute trumps the regulation, the norm of substantially stronger democratic legitimacy will have been nullified. Most courts will not miss the trick. Regardless of the
entities that created the statute and regulation, courts understand that preservation and extension of the special interest
statute, and concordant nullification of the popular anti-spam
regulation, would degrade rather than enhance the democratic legitimacy of law. Courts also understand that a judicial
tion on First Amendment free speech rights. The key issue would center on
whether the regulation would constitute a "reasonably tailored means" of curbing unsolicited commercial bulk e-mail. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761
(1993) (applying intermediate scrutiny to hold ban on personal solicitation as
applied to Certified Public Accountants unconstitutional under the First
Amendment because not directly linked to objective of protecting consumers
from fraud and conflicts of interests); see also Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (applying intermediate scrutiny to hold that law
prohibiting advertising by utilities violated First Amendment because not directly related to the substantial government interest of energy conservation).
The national "do not call" registry has been held constitutional. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 358 F.3d 1228, 1246 (10th Cir. 2003).
Unlike the opt-out strategy of the national "do not call" registry, however, the
anti-spain regulation would prohibit the initiation of e-mail commercial communications unless recipients opt-in to the receipt of such communications. It
also would place a fee on spam e-mail communications. It is unclear whether
such a regulatory approach would pass constitutional muster.
72. See Dana H. Schultz, CAN-SPAM Really Be Stopped CAL. ST. B.J.,
July 2004, at 1 (citing study finding that eighty-three percent of respondents
dislike spam e-mail); Reuters, Survey: Americans Support "Do-Not-Spam"Registry,CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2003, at 4 (stating that three-fourths of those surveyed
supported Senator Schumer's plan for a do not spam registry).
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decision to nullify the popular regulation would be met with
public bewilderment. Why, the public would wonder, has an
unelected judge annulled such a popular new law?
There are ways around this undesirable result. Though
the regulation would seem to stand in clear conflict with the
applicable statute, a bit of judicial prevarication would allow
a court to avoid striking down the popular anti-spam regulation. Given the rigidity of the axioms, a court will have to
find that the statute and regulation do not stand in conflict.
If not in conflict, the axiomatic meta-norms (and their fixation on the democratic legitimacy of the sources of legal
norms) are not triggered and the regulation will remain intact.
To conclude that the statute and regulation do not stand
in conflict, the court must find that the sending of spam email without an opt-in by the recipient constitutes an "abusive" communication and therefore is subject to regulation
under the statute." Only judicial dishonesty, however, would
enable this interpretation of the word "abusive." The dishonesty does not involve the court's interpretation of the word
"abusive" per se. A spam e-mail communication without preapproval by the recipient could plausibly be construed as an
"abusive" communication. The dishonesty instead lies in the
inescapable deception needed to avoid the evidence of legislative intent demonstrating that the word "abusive" in the statute means something far narrower.
Recall that by allowing regulation of "abusive" and/or "intimidating" communications over telephone and other wires,
Congress intended only to permit regulations pertaining to
the timing, frequency, and content of commercial communications.74 Congress decidedly did not intend to allow regulations prohibiting the initiation of communications alto-

73. The national "do not call" registry cases dealt with a very similar issue.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-9. The FTC used its authority under the
Telemarketing Act to regulate "abusive" telemarketing communications to
promulgate regulations that do two things. First, the regulations create the national "do not call" registry. Second, the regulations prohibit calls to numbers
listed on the registry. See supra note 12; see also Mainstream Mktg. Servs.,
Inc. v. F.T.C., 283 F. Supp. 2d. 1151, 1155-58 (D. Colo 2003) (explaining history
of "do not call" registry regulations). Litigation challenged the FTC authority to
promulgate these regulations. See supratext accompanying notes 1-9.
74. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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gether.75 The anti-spam regulation, however, does just that.
The opt-in feature, in particular, prohibits the initiation of
bulk e-mail communications to most
unsolicited commercial
pm em
eeoon spai
potential reiins
recpnts.7 6 In adiin7h
addition, the fee
e-maili
constitutes a de facto prohibition.17 If the court consults evidence of legislative intent, it will have to find that the regulations and statute stand in conflict and will be forced to nullify
the popular regulations.
The key, therefore, is avoidance of legislative history.78 A
well-worn interpretive rule provides that courts may not refer
to legislative history when the text of a statute is unambiguous. 79 To avoid reference to legislative history, all the court
must do is cite this interpretive principle and then find that
the text of the statute, the meaning of the word "abusive," is
unambiguous."'
75. In fact, the intent was the opposite. Congress intended to protect commercial communications against prohibitions and almost all limitations. See
supratext accompanying notes 69-70.
76. See discussion supra Part III.B. 1.
77. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
78. Avoidance of legislative history would be easy for the handful of federal
judges who maintain that the record of legislative history is never, or almost
never, a legitimate resource when interpreting statutes. Justice Scalia is the
most vocal and prominent advocate of this approach to statutory interpretation.
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404-17 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the text of the statute should be the main inquiry of a statutory interpretation case); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATER OF INTERPRETATION 3-47

(1997) (offering a defense of textualism).
Justice Scalia's new textualist approach, however, has been largely rejected. When interpreting ambiguous statutes the vast majority of federal
judges will consider legislative history as evidence of legislative intent. See
Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (all then-sitting
justices except Justice Scalia rejecting interpretation of statutes without reference to legislative history); see also Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating
Corp., 818 F. Supp. 623, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Justice Scalia's "plain meaning'
theory of statutory interpretation is dangerous precisely because it can be used
to frustrate Congressional purpose"); see also Lawrence M. Solan, LearningOur
Limits.: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WiS. L. REV. 235,
263-70 (1997) (discussing rejection of new textualism and continued use of legislative history in interpreting statutes).
79. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (declining to
assess legislative history because statute is unambiguous); Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994) ("we do not resort to legislative history to
cloud statutory text that is clear"); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401 (1992)
("[A]ppeals to statutory history are well taken only to resolve 'statutory ambiguity.'"); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) ("The language of § 109 is not
unclear. Thus, although a court appropriately may refer to a statute's legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity, there is no need to do so here.").
80. This may have been exactly what happened in the litigation over the na-

264

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

Vol: 45

This last maneuver, of course, is the inescapable deception. The term "abusive" in the statute is undeniably subject
to multiple plausible interpretations. It might reasonably
take on the broad meaning advanced by the court's interpretation, but it might also take on the narrower meaning suggested by legislative intent. Only by indulging the fiction
that the term "abusive" is free of ambiguity (and then selecting one of several plausible readings), can the court avoid reference to legislative intent and thereby preserve the antispam regulation.8 '
The approach could be seen as dishonest in that the opinion will undoubtedly be written as opinions are almost always
written, as if the conclusion were determined by neutral rules
of legal interpretation and not by an exercise of judicial discretion aided by manipulation of interpretive principles.8 2
The court, in other words, will not, and indeed cannot, admit
that it has chosen to adopt the broad meaning of "abusive."
To the untrained or careless eye, it appears that the decision
is rule driven rather than judicial discretion driven. In reality, however, the opinion is more opaque and obfuscatory
than transparent and honest. The desire to avoid an antidemocratic outcome, not objective interpretive rules, motivates the outcome.
tional "do not call" registry regulations. See supra note 12 and accompanying
text.
81. Courts regularly avoid reference to legislative history with a questionable determination that the text of a statute is unambiguous. See, e.g., Sutton
v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 482, 497-99 (1999) (adopting interpretation of

ADA at odds with legislative intent and refusing to consult legislative intent on
ground that statute was unambiguous despite patent ambiguity and fact that
eight of nine circuit courts and three executive agencies had read statute con-

trary to supposedly unambiguous meaning adopted by Court). More generally,
courts often find that a statute is unambiguous when in fact subject to more
than one plausible meaning. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Systs., Inc. v. Cline,

124 U.S. 1236, 1248 (2004) (holding that the ADEA does not prohibit favoring
older workers over younger workers based on theory that statute was unambiguous, despite patently ambiguous statutory meaning and reasonable EEOC
interpretation to the contrary).

82. On rare occasions courts will admit that legal norms are subject to multiple plausible interpretations and that factors beyond the substantive and interpretative law in question dictate which interpretation a court adopts. See,
e.g., United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1331 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (admitting that meaning of ambiguous sentencing statute regarding

sentencing for sale of LSD is not determined by the legal material but should be
driven by pragmatic considerations of equal treatment).
however, is the exception rather than the rule.

Such frank honesty,
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The possibility of judicial deception, coupled with the unappealing anti-democratic outcome that would result from
straightforward application of the extant system, generates
value conflict. On the one hand, courts profess (and presumably at some level actually desire) to decide cases in accord with applicable legal principles. On the other hand,
courts know that straightforward application of the axiomatic
meta-norms will result in nullification of a legal norm that
enjoys solid popular support. The dissonance between these
competing considerations provokes the Hobson's choice: either
honestly preserve the statute of dubious democratic legitimacy or dishonestly preserve the regulation of presumably
stronger democratic legitimacy.
The straightforward and honest opinion would admit the
statutory ambiguity, refer to the record of legislative intent,
find the regulation in conflict with the statute, and then nullify the regulation. Many courts will stoically and straightforwardly apply the extant system to nullify the regulation
and leave the anti-democratic outcome to be repaired by Congress. In a case like the anti-spam regulation illustration,
however, congressional repair will not likely be forthcoming."
Other courts, however, will choose the path of benign dis83. Congress is not even aware of many statutory interpretation decisions.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION

STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 409 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing

disappointing results of "Corrections Day" process in House of Representatives
under which Congress may consider and correct major judicial statutory interpretations); see also John Copeland Nagle, CorrectionsDay, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1267, 1281-82 (1996) ("[M]any admitted statutory mistakes remain uncorrected.
Moreover, the corrections that do occur are often random, or conversely, dependent on who has the greatest access to Congress."); see alsoAbner J. Mikva,
How Well Does CongressSupportand Defend the Constitution, 61 N.C. L. REV.
587, 609 (1983) (arguing that "most Supreme Court opinions never come to the
attention of Congress"); see also Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 323-24 (1988) (arguing that congressional staff was unaware of most significant circuit court statutory interpretation decisions). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overiding
Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 341-44
(1991) (presenting evidence suggesting that Congress monitors statutory interpretations). Even if aware of the decision, for a variety of reasons, Congress often does not overturn statutory interpretation decisions. Id. at 343-53 (presenting evidence showing that Congress does override Supreme Court statutory
interpretation issues regularly, but also declines to override vast majority of
such decisions). Furthermore, in this case, committee gatekeepers have already

blocked efforts to enact statutes permitting regulation of spam e-mail.

The

same forces that produced this blockage would block any effort to respond to judicial pleas for congressional revision of the statute.
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dishonesty. Flexible and often contradictory interpretive
rules offer courts sufficient material from which to contrive
an opinion that avoids nullification of the popular regulation.
In cases where the extant system would instruct nullification
of norms of strong democratic legitimacy, the temptation to
exploit that flexible interpretive discretion grows strong.'
Rather than nullify a popular legal norm, a court can manipulate the meaning of norms and break interpretive rules in a
benign dishonesty aimed at preserving the norm of high democratic legitimacy.85
C, The Dimensions of the Problems:Big Issues in a Few
Cases
Most cases will present no real threat that a norm of low
democratic legitimacy will end up trumping a norm of high
democratic legitimacy. Most legal norms simply do not register one way or the other with the inattentive public.86 Even if
the public or segments of the public are attentive, most often

84. I do not posit courts as single-minded maximizers of the democratic
legitimacy of the law. Many factors influence judicial decision-making,
including the nature of the applicable legal rules and the social, political, and/or
legal ideology of the judge (which may include attitudes about rule-following).
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HOwARD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86-97 (2002) (leading publication supporting
attitudinal model thesis that ideology is primary determinant in judicial decision making). I only argue that avoidance of anti-democratic outcomes is one of
those factors. All other things being equal, many courts prefer not to nullify
popular legal norms.
85. Conscious judicial dishonesty in the form of twisting or breaking interpretive rules constitutes one extreme end of a spectrum. Lesser forms of manipulation at different points on the spectrum, however, can have the same effects. The desire to avoid nullification of a norm of relatively high democratic
legitimacy may produce conscious or unconscious biases in interpretation of
possibly conflicting legal norms. Courts may emphasize certain interpretive
principles and de-emphasize others in an attempt to preserve a preferred legal
norm. On this scenario, the court need not actually twist or break standing interpretive rules. Instead, the varied arsenal of interpretive rules available to
judges is applied selectively in order to reach some desired substantive outcome.
One interpretive principle may be helpful to achieving the desired substantive
outcome and another harmful. The desire to reach a certain substantive outcome consciously or unconsciously influences the Court's selection of interpretive principles. The dishonesty lies in deploying the helpful interpretive rule
while conveniently failing to apply or discuss the harmful interpretive rule.
86. See Ilya Somin, PoliticalIgnorance and the CountermajoritatianDifficulty: A New Perspective on the "CentralObsession" of ConstitutionalTheory,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1291, 1304-28 (2004) (pointing out that the public is often
ignorant of legal and political issues).
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there will exist no obvious differentiation in the democratic
legitimacy of two conflicting legal norms. One norm will be
favored by one set of interest groups, and the other favored by
another set of interest groups. No clear cut majority preference will emerge. In most cases, therefore, the extant system
will produce neither decidedly anti-democratic outcomes, nor
unusually strong incentives for judicial manipulation or bias
in application of interpretive discretion. In these cases, the
extant system operates adequately. Where the public is ignorant and/or indifferent, or where potentially conflicting legal
norms stand in a rough democratic legitimacy equilibrium,
preservation of the norm created by the entity of greater democratic legitimacy is not an entirely unsatisfactory outcome.
When the prospect of a truly and decidedly antidemocratic outcome does present itself, however, the problems precipitated by the extant system are quite serious. As
the anti-spam regulation illustrates, in these cases the extant
system is most likely to produce the Hobson's choice between
nullification of the more democratically legitimate legal norm
and dishonest manipulation of interpretive discretion aimed
at avoiding an anti-democratic outcome.
Moreover, because the extant system sometimes forces
courts into a Hobson's choice between two extremes, it produces substantial unpredictability. For some judges rulefollowing will prevail over the desire to enhance or preserve
the democratic legitimacy of law. Other judges place less
value on rule-following and more on reaching the "right" outcome, which in some cases will mean evading nullification of
norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy. These
judges will take advantage of the flexible and frequently contradictory nature of interpretive rules. They will exercise a
benign manipulation aimed at avoiding nullification of legal
norms that, regardless of source, bear the marks of strong
democratic legitimacy. Indeed, the same judge may vacillate
between straightforward and honest norm interpretation and
benign manipulation of interpretive discretion from one case
to the next.87
87. It is not uncommon for judges to vacillate from one interpretive approach to another from case to case. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), for example, reveals Justice Scalia joining an opinion driven exclusively by reliance on the record of legislative history and contradicted by clear statutory text. Id. at 125-61. In most cases, however, Justice
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The inevitable mix of approaches creates tremendous uncertainty. The problem is not only that the axioms encourage
the judicial white lie, but also that benign judicial prevarication is applied in a haphazard and uneven manner. Consequently, the outcome of a case in which two legal norms may
conflict ultimately depends not on the axioms governing such
cases, but rather on the attitude or approach of the judges deciding the case. Ex ante,88 the litigant can never really know
whether a court will handle a case by straightforward application of the extant system, or by interpretive manipulation
aimed at avoiding the discretion-denying rigidity of the extant system.
This creates an ironic situation. The very purpose of the
rigid and exceptionless axioms is to control judicial discretion.89 Yet the extreme discretion-denying rigidity of the axioms provokes courts to seize upon and manipulate their flexible interpretive discretion as a strategy aimed to frustrate
and defeat the axioms. Given that judges can use open-ended
interpretive discretion to circumvent the rigid formalism of
the axiomatic meta-norms, why bother with rigid formalism
in the first instance?
The failing of the extant system is not that it resolves the
majority of cases in an unsatisfactory manner. The failing of
the extant system is that when it matters most it performs at
its worst. A better system would allow courts to reach democracy-reinforcing outcomes without resort to obfuscatory manipulation of interpretive discretion and opacity in written
opinions. A set of rules for adjudicating cases involving con-

Scalia is a committed textualist and vocal critic of reliance on legislative history. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404-17 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (castigating Court's opinion for following indicia of legislative intent
over contrary clear statutory text). Likewise, in Brown and Wil'amson,Justice
Stevens joins a dissent that advocates interpretation of statute in accord with
clear text and rejection of contrary legislative history. Brown and Williamson,
529 U.S. at 161-92. In other cases, however, Justice Stevens frequently relies
on legislative history when interpreting statutes. See, e.g., W. Va. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 108-11 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (advocating interpretation of statute based on record of legislative history rather than text of statute).
88. Ex ante is an "assumption and prediction, on how things appeared beforehand, rather than in hindsight." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (8th ed.
2004).
89. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Forward:
The Justices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (stating
that rules bind decision makers and confine their discretion).
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flicting legal norms that will not force courts into a Hobson's
choice is needed. The rules should allow courts to avoid nullification of individual norms of relatively strong democratic
legitimacy within the rules rather than via interpretive manipulation aimed at subvertingthe rules.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS FOR MEDIATING CONFLICTS
BETWEEN LEGAL NORMS

The fundamental features of the extant system governing
adjudication of conflicting legal norms are deeply ingrained in
the unconscious conceptions of practicing lawyers. Yet the
extant system is not written in stone, nor is it sacrosanct or
unalterable. Alternative systems are easily imaginable."
Might a different system perform better than the extant system?
This Section discusses several alternatives to the extant
system governing adjudication of cases involving conflicting
legal norms. Some of the alternative systems are advanced
primarily for the purpose of highlighting certain features of
the extant system. Many of the proposed alternatives seek to
ameliorate the extreme rigidity of the extant axiomatic metanorms and/or broaden the narrow focus on the democratic legitimacy of the entities that create legal norms marking the
extant system. Some of these alternatives would significantly
alter traditional institutional roles and relationships.
It is possible to construct systems for dealing with irreconcilable conflicts between legal norms that perform better
than the extant system in terms of enhancement or preservation of the democratic legitimacy of law. It is also possible to
construct systems that do not force courts into a Hobson's
choice between democracy-enhancing outcomes and manipulation of interpretive discretion. It may even be possible to
construct systems with both of these salutary features. All
systems, however, entail both benefits and drawbacks. The
optimal system will depend upon which benefits one wishes to
maximize and which drawbacks one wishes to minimize.
90. The Athenian legal system, for example, did not involve the kinds of divisions and hierarchies that modern legal systems employ. Notably, while
Athenian law did come to include constitutional norms, the Athenian system
did not treat them as a separate category of higher order norms. MOGENS
HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF DEMOSTHENES
165 (1991).
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A. RadicalDeparturesfrom the Extant System
This section begins with a trio of alternative systems that
would work radical changes to the extant system. Though it
is hard to imagine adoption of these radical systems, they offer lessons on the extant system and on the most desirable
characteristics of more probable alternatives.
1.

The Purely ChronologicSystem

One possible alternative system would base adjudication
of cases involving irreconcilably conflicting legal norms on a
variant of the chronologic axiom. This system would eliminate the source, hierarchic, and categoric axioms. There
would exist no practical differences between kinds of norms,
no hierarchy of kinds of norms, and no trump of norms belonging to superordinate categories over norms belonging to
subordinate categories. Under what I will call the purely
chronologic system, whenever two norms are found in a posture of irreconcilable conflict, the norm created later in time
would trump the norm created earlier in time.
The correlation between the democratic legitimacy of
sources and the democratic legitimacy of the particular norms
they create is often weak.9 If chronology is a more accurate
indicator of democratic legitimacy than source, a purely chronologic system could do better at preserving norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy than the extant sourcecentric system.92 The link between chronology and democratic
legitimacy is often quite strong in cases involving conflicts between constitutional provisions and statutes.
Recently
passed statutes frequently manifest, from most perspectives,
91. Thus, while legislatures in general may score relatively high on the
democratic legitimacy scale, in any given particular instance the statutes
passed by legislatures may score very low on that scale. A legislative body, for
example, sometimes will pass a special interest oriented statute that goes
against majoritarian preferences, or what would be majoritarian preferences
were the public well informed and able to deliberate on the issues. In other instances, a statute that may have scored high on the democratic legitimacy scale
early in its existence may, over time, have grown outmoded and out of sync with
present majority preferences. See supra note 57.
92. In the anti-spam regulation illustration, for example, the recency of the
norm better correlates with the democratic legitimacy of the norms than does
the source that generated the norms. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
Contrary to the extant system, a purely chronological system would demand
preservation of the popular anti-spain regulation and nullification of the conflicting special interest oriented statute.
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greater democratic legitimacy than do antiquated constitutional provisions.93 Because the purely chronologic alternative would incorporate no hierarchy of kinds of legal norms, it
would, for example, work to preserve recent statutes and nullify (or modify) conflicting old constitutional provisions. In so
doing, the purely chronologic system arguably would, over the
run of cases, tend to preserve norms of greater democratic legitimacy more often than does the source-centric extant system.
Consider the Commerce Clause and the countless federal
statutes passed under its authority. Assume that, as some
scholars argue, the original Commerce Clause offered Congress a relatively restricted zone of legislative power.94 If this
assumption were correct, a lot of modern federal legislation
would stand in conflict with the original Commerce Clause.
The Commerce Clause emanated from We the People, while
the statutes in question emanated from Congress, the legislative agent of the principal People. Thus, under the extant
source-centric system, vast swaths of statutory law created in
recent decades establishing national policies on everything
from economic, product, and workplace safety regulations, to
environmental protection, would be at risk of nullification.
Abolition of these statutes would produce the classic antidemocratic dead hand of the past problem: ancient and no
longer majoritarian constitutional norms frustrating modern
statutes that better reflect current majority preference. The
purely chronologic system would completely eliminate this
93. This phenomenon gives rise to the counter-majoritarian difficulty. See
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT

ALEXANDER

AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962) (discussing counter-majoritarian nature of

judicial review).
94. See Randy Barnett, New Evidence of the OriginalMeaning of the Com-

merce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003) (presenting evidence supporting thesis that original intent of Commerce Clause was to grant Congress narrow
power to regulate only trade and exchange); Randy Barnett, The OriginalMeaning ofthe Commerce Clause,68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001). The notion that the
original Commerce Clause granted narrow legislative powers is not without
controversy. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the
Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695 (2002)
(disputing narrow meaning of original Commerce Clause); Grant S. Nelson &
Robert J. Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles

to Uphold FederalCommercial Regulations but Preserve State Controlover Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1999). Justice Thomas has advanced the narrow
original meaning of the Commerce Clause in his opinions. See, e.g., United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1985) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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problem. Under such a system, recent statutes embodying
current majoritarian preferences would trump conflicting old
and no longer majoritarian constitutional provisions, such as
the original Commerce Clause. The will of the current generation, expressed in modern statutes, would trump that of a
generation dead for over two centuries, expressed in ancient
constitutional provisions.
Courts operating under the extant system, of course,
have blunted the dead hand of the past problem via judicial
revision of constitutional norms. Returning to the Commerce
Clause, the Supreme Court in the 1930s could have straightforwardly applied the extant axiomatic meta-norms and continued striking down federal statutes as beyond the scope of
narrow Commerce Clause powers.9" This path, however,
would have entailed the democratically illegitimate prospect
of an unelected Supreme Court nullifying statutes embodying
policies endorsed by elected officials on the winning side of
landslide elections in 1934 and 1936.96 Rather than continue
along what would most likely have been perceived as an antidemocratic path, starting in 1937, the Court began to supplant the narrow Commerce Clause with a spacious judicially
reinvented Commerce Clause.97 In other words, rather than
an outcome that would have been perceived as anti95. This is exactly what the Court did until 1937. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936) (striking down Bituminous Coal Conservation Act because regulation of coal mining not within scope of Commerce
Clause powers); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546
(1935) (holding regulation of poultry operation by National Recovery Industrial
Act beyond scope of Commerce Clause powers); United States v. E.C. Knight,
156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (holding Sherman Antitrust Act inapplicable to sugar
manufacturers because regulation of manufacturing was not within scope of
Commerce Clause powers).
96. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 289-90,
306-11 (1998) (explaining that the landslide mid-term congressional elections of
1934 and the presidential election of 1936 signaled overwhelming popular support for expanded regulatory powers of the federal government and rejection of
traditional constitutional limits on federal government power).
97. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120-28 (1942) (upholding Agricultural Adjustment Act on the theory that the Commerce Clause grants Congress
power to regulate even negligible impacts on interstate commerce); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-15 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards
Act on theory that Commerce Clause grants Congress power to regulate shipment of manufactured goods); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act on theory that Commerce Clause grants Congress power to regulate activities burdening or obstructing commerce).
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democratic, the Court eventually opted for the arguably lesser
evil of judicial reformulation of a constitutional provision.9 8
The final outcome obtained under the extant system was
no different, and no less in conformity with the will of the
then-current generation, than that which would have resulted
under a purely chronologic system. The purely chronologic
system, however, would not have required resort to judicial
modification of the original Commerce Clause. A Supreme
Court operating under the purely chronologic system could
have acknowledged that New Deal statutes stood in conflict
with the narrow Commerce Clause and still held that the recently passed statutes (which better reflected modern majoritarian sentiment than the narrow Commerce Clause)
trumped the narrow and outdated Commerce Clause.99 The
Commerce Clause, for all intents and purposes, would have
been modified by the passage of statutes, or in other words,
by legislative action. Certainly this is unorthodox. On the
other hand, as history played out, and as it often plays out,
the modification was effectuated via Supreme Court reinvention of the meaning of the Commerce Clause.'0 0 Between al98. I make no statement on whether judicial reformulation constitutes a
positive or negative, or a legitimate or illegitimate event. Given the apparent
preferences of the electorate for a more energetic federal government, however,
judicial reformulation of the Commerce Clause is certainly defensible. As Bruce
Ackerman has argued, judicial reformulation of the Commerce Clause was not
an instance of a loose canon court acting alone to alter the Constitution. It instead was the final step in an extended political process involving electoral
processes and the political branches of government. The judicial reformulation
of the Commerce Clause was more an instance of the Court lagging behind the
electorate and the political branches. See ACKERMAN, supranote 96, at 279-382
(defending judicial reformulation of the Commerce Clause by arguing that judicial revision was part of larger multi-step pattern involving other branches of
government and electoral processes which demonstrated that We the People
sanctioned such revision).
99. Of course it must be recognized that under any system the pre-1937 Supreme Court may very well have sought to manipulate its interpretive discretion in order to perpetuate a narrow reading of the Commerce Clause. The majority of the Court, in other words, may have been more motivated by a desire to
effectuate certain economic, federalism and congressional power policies than
any desire to either enforce the original Commerce Clause or bend the law to fit
the popular will of the time. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 243 (2d ed. 2002) (observing that pre-1937 Commerce
Clause decisions were produced by justices committed to laissez-faire economic
theory and opposed to government economic regulation). If Professor Chemerinsky is correct, the purely chronologic system might not have stepped the
Court from perpetuating a narrow Commerce Clause.
100. The Supreme Court's alteration of the Commerce Clause is not unique.
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teration of constitutional norms by legislative action or by judicial reformulation, the former may be more palatable.' °
The Commerce Clause example underscores the possibility that a purely chronologic system might (1) better promote
outcomes perceived as democratically legitimate than the extant system, and (2) might in turn reduce the need or incentive for dishonest judicial manipulation aimed at avoiding
anti-democratic outcomes. Despite these benefits, several caveats apply.
First, the chronologic system would at best make marginal improvements on the extant system. The purely chronologic system, like the extant system, focuses on only one
indicator of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms. The extant system fixates on the sources of legal norms. The purely
chronologic system fixates on the chronology in which norms
are created. Any system that centers on only one indicator is
bound to produce abundant false positives-instances where
the indicator wrongly indicates that a given legal norm possesses greater democratic legitimacy than some conflicting legal norm. 1°' Whether chronology or source is a better indicator of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms is an empirical
question to which no definitive answer exists. If chronology is
better, it is only marginally better. Both chronology and
source are exceedingly crude instruments by which to assess
a puzzle as complex and multifaceted as the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms. Both the entity that created a given legal norm, and the chronology of its creation,
plus a host of other factors, will usually be germane. Reduction of such a complex question to any single metric is thus
bound to produce frequent false positives.
Similarly, a shift to a chronologic system would at best
Constitutional change via judicial reinterpretation is far more common than
constitutional change via formal Article V amendment. David A- Strauss, The
Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1459-62
(2001) (arguing that the Constitution has been informally amended by Supreme
Court decisions more than by formal Article V processes).
101. See Katyal, supra note 43, at 1358-94 (advocating enhanced congressional power to interpret constitutional norms).
102. The extant system ends up favoring, for example, an outdated or a special interest statute contrary to current popular will over a regulation that happens to reflect current majoritarian sentiment. Likewise, the chronologic system would end up favoring, for example, the new special interest statute
contrary to current popular will over an old constitutional norm which, despite
its age, coincides with current majoritarian preferences.
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produce a minor reduction in the incentive for dishonest judicial bias and manipulation. The purely chronologic alternative would be as rigid and exceptionless as the extant system.
Just as under the extant system, courts placing comparatively low value on rule-following could resort to dishonest
manipulation of interpretive discretion to avoid nullification
of norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy.
A chronology-based system, for example, would call for
preservation of a recently created special interest oriented
regulation and corresponding nullification of an old, but still
majoritarian, conflicting statutory norm. Just as under the
extant system, manipulation of flexible interpretive discretion
would be the only way to avoid such an outcome. At least
some courts would attempt to pick and choose among available interpretive rules, or to subtly and covertly manipulate
interpretive rules, in order to find that the more democratically legitimate statute does not stand in conflict with the
new special interest driven regulation. In short, the Hobson's
choice between interpretive honesty and democracyreinforcing outcomes would still be present.
Another possibly problematic feature of a purely chronologic system relates to stability of existing law. One feature of the extant system is that it makes alteration or abolition of existing law relatively difficult. It accomplishes this
by permitting alteration or abolition of existing legal norms
only by the entities that created those norms or by superordinate entities. For example, a statute can be altered or abolished only by the passage of a conflicting statute by Congress
or the ratification of a conflicting constitutional amendment
by We the People. An administrative agency, in contrast,
may not alter an existing statute by promulgating a new conflicting regulation."'
The purely chronologic system, in contrast, would permit
any norm-generating entity to alter or abolish existing law
simply by creating a new conflicting legal norm. Congress
could alter a constitutional norm by passage of a new statute.
An agency could abolish an existing statute by promulgation
of a new conflicting regulation. By allowing all norm103. Of course, existing statutes, or other forms of existing law, can always
be altered via judicial manipulation or reinterpretation. This method of alteration, however, operates not as part of or within the extant meta-norms, but as a
way to subvert them.
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generating entities to alter all kinds of legal norms, the
purely chronologic system would make alteration of existing
law far easier than at present. Multiple avenues would be
open to any interest group wishing for change in the state of
the law."M Those seeking change in the law would seek the
path of least resistance by focusing their efforts on the entity
most likely to respond to a plea for change. The end result
would be an accelerated pace of legal change, and far less stability than prevails under the extant system.
Moreover, the dynamic of creating and changing law
would be completely altered in a way that would systematically favor entities that can most easily create new legal
norms. There appears to be a reverse correlation between the
democratic legitimacy of a norm-generating entity and the
ease with which that entity may create new legal norms. At
the top of the hierarchy, it is nearly impossible for We the
People to ratify new constitutional norms."°5 At the bottom of
the hierarchy, creation of a new common law rule can be as
easy as announcing it in a judicial opinion."° In the middle
range of the hierarchy, passing statutes and promulgating
new regulations is easier than ratifying constitutional
amendments but harder than announcing new common law
rules. Moreover, assuming an equal institutional will to cre104. Thus, in a world governed by a purely chronologic system, a change in
existing statutory law would not require running the gauntlet of the legislative
process, but rather prompting an administrative agency to promulgate a new
conflicting regulation or a court to issue a new common law rule.
To some extent such prompting already occurs under the extant system.
Rather than seek a statutory amendment, for example, an interest group seeking to alter existing statutory law may try to convince a court to issue a new and
more favorable interpretation of the existing statute. Or the interest group may
pursue the promulgation of a new favorable regulation that is based on a new
administrative reinterpretation of the statute. Still, there are limits as to how
far the bounds of judicial or administrative reinterpretation of existing statutes
can or will be stretched. Under a purely chronologic system there would be no
such limits.
JOHN R. VILE,
105. Thousands of amendments have been proposed.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS,
AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-1995 app. 362 (1996) (appendix listing number of
proposed constitutional amendments by decade). Only twenty-seven, however,
have become part of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amends. I-XXVII.
106. Whether a newly created common law rule spreads to other jurisdictions, however, is another question. While an appellate court can easily establish a new common law rule within its own jurisdiction, it will have no power
over whether that new rule becomes dominant via adoption in most other jurisdictions.
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ate a new legal rule, it is usually easier to push a new regulation through the rule-making process than it is to push a new
statute through the gauntlet of multiple committees, both
chambers of Congress, and Chief Executive approval." 7
Thus, under the purely chronologic system, Congress,
with its cumbersome processes, would operate at a tremendous disadvantage in comparison with agencies and the
courts. Given the relative ease in the promulgation of new
regulations and announcement of new common law rules,
more often than not it would be relatively easy for agencies
and courts to impose their policy preferences over those of
Congress. Moreover, Congress would find it comparatively
difficult to overrule the regulations and common law rules
created by agencies and courts.0 8
In light of the above considerations, the risk-benefit calculus disfavors the purely chronologic system. The prospect
for an increase in outcomes that enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy law, and a reduction of incentives for judicial manipulation of interpretive discretion, are both uncertain and minimal. The risks inherent in unstable law and
disturbance of the dynamics of legal change are considerable.
Nonetheless, consideration of the purely chronologic system
has yielded some important insights. First, the extant system
is not the only system that will preserve legal norms of lesser
democratic legitimacy and nullify conflicting legal norms of
greater democratic legitimacy. The purely chronologic system
would also produce this result. Any system that relies on
overly simplistic metrics for assessing the democratic legitimacy of legal norms will suffer this weakness. Second,
though preservation of the democratic legitimacy of law con107. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 83, at 66-67 (discussing legislative
process as a series of "vetogates" and hurdles).
108. If passing new statutes were not substantially more difficult than
promulgating new regulations or establishing new common law norms, the
purely chronologic system might produce another disturbing phenomenon: a
never ending cycling of legal rules. An agency could freely alter an existing
statute by promulgating a new conflicting regulation. Congress could then
overrule the new regulation by passing a new conflicting statute re-imposing
the original rule. The courts could then overrule the statute by announcing a
new and conflicting common law rule. Because any norm-generating entity
would be empowered to alter any kind of existing legal norm, there would be
little to stop a constant battle between Congress, agencies, and the courts over
the composition of the law. The extant system's limits on avenues for alteration
of existing law works to discourage the emergence of the cycling scenario.
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stitutes the centerpiece of the extant system, a measure of legal stability counts as an important side benefit. Any viable
alternative should maintain an appropriate degree of legal
stability and avoid undue disturbances in the dynamics of legal change.
2.

The Inverted System

Thus far this article has discussed how the extant set of
axiomatic meta-norms governing adjudication of conflicting
legal norms is justified by its (imperfect) tendency to enhance
or at least preserve the democratic legitimacy of law. The extant system, however, has a secondary purpose and rationale:
enforcement of separation of powers values. This Section
aims to demonstrate how the extant system enforces separation of powers values, and why enforcement of separation of
powers is only of secondary import to the extant system. A
second alternative system, the inverted system, illuminates
these separation of powers issues.
a.

How the Extant System Enforces Separation of
Powers

Fundamentally, separation of powers requires that different parts of government be responsible for different tasks
or functions. °9 We the People ratify constitutional norms,"
legislatures pass statutes,1 1' agencies promulgate regula113
tions, 1 2 and courts announce common law doctrinal rules.
Taken together, the source, hierarchic, and categoric axioms
have the effect of protecting the separation of powers bound-

109. See JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE
CONSTITUTION 457 (1999) (stating that the Constitution secures separation of

powers by requiring that "the legislative executive and judicial branches of the
federal government exercise different powers"); Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating Line Item Veto Act on grounds that it permitted
the Chief Executive to exercise legislative powers).
110. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304,

324 (1816) ("The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established . . . as the preamble of the constitution declares, by 'the people of the
United States.'").
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
112. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 109, at 31 (explaining that administrative
agencies promulgate regulations with the force and effect of law); CORNELIUS M.
KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE

POLICY 4 (1994) (explaining that agencies make rules).
113. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

2005

ADJUDICATING CONFLICTS

279

ary lines separating the four principal norm-generating entities.
The way that the extant system safeguards separation of
powers boundary lines is a bit more subtle than it may first
appear. Legal norms created by different norm-generating
entities are treated as different in kind or category."' Formal
distinctions between kinds of legal norms, however, are insufficient to safeguard separation of powers boundary lines. For
these boundary lines to have any real consequence the kinds
ofnorms that each norm-generatingentity createsmust differ
in meaningful practicalways. This is exactly the effect that
the extant system produces and exactly how it protects separation of powers values.
To understand this point, return to the purely chronologic system, which quite obviously does not protect separation of powers boundary lines.115 Under that system, there
would be no meaningful difference between each of the four
formally distinct kinds of legal norms. The norms created by
the four norm-generating entities could be given different
names: constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and common
law. Beyond nomenclature, however, all four kinds of norms
would have the exact same practical consequence. All would
have the power to trump any conflicting preexisting norm regardless of source. Accordingly, there would be no meaningful division of norm-generating tasks among norm-generating
entities. We the People, Congress, administrative agencies,
and the federal courts would all be assigned the task of creating what, for all practical intents and purposes, would constitute a single kind of legal norm. An administrative agency,
for example, that promulgates a legal rule labeled a regulation would be doing something essentially indistinguishable
from a legislature that passes a legal rule called a statute.
Both would create legal norms with the power to trump any
and all preexisting conflicting legal norms. Any talk of assigning Congress the task of passing statutes, or assigning
administrative agencies the task of ratifying constitutional
provisions, would be completely void of substantive practical
difference or consequence.
114. This is the result of the source axiom. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
115. For those who view separation of powers as an independent value, this
feature will count as another strike against the purely chronologic alternative.
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Working in conjunction, the extant system's four axioms
produce the exact opposite effect. The extant system preserves separation of powers boundary lines by ensuring that
each of the four principal kinds of legal norms differ not only
formally, but also in terms of their practical consequences.
This, in turn, makes the assignment of different normgenerating tasks to different norm-generating entities a phenomenon with real, tangible, and practical (as opposed to
merely nominal) consequence. The extant system accomplishes this by granting norms a trump only over conflicting
norms that are subordinate in kind or of the same kind.
Stated more generally, the extant system differentiates
norms by ensuring that norms possess dissimilar trumping
powers. The statutory norm differs from the regulatory norm,
for example, in that the former will trump conflicting regulations, common law rules, and preexisting statutes, while the
latter will only trump conflicting common law rules and preexisting regulations.
By enabling dissimilar trumping powers, and thereby
creating real as opposed to merely nominal differences between types of norms, the extant system ensures real differences in the norm-generating tasks of each of the four normgenerating entities. Thus, an administrative agency which
promulgates something called a regulation does something
very different than a legislature which passes something
called a statute. The agency creates a legal norm capable of
trumping conflicting common law norms and preexisting
regulations. The legislature, in contrast, creates a legal norm
capable of trumping not only conflicting common law norms
and regulations, but also preexisting statutes. The end result
of the extant system is that any given norm-generating entity
creates something genuinely different
from that which all
116
other norm-generating entities create.
Obliterate the difference in practical impacts of legal
norms, and you will have obliterated the separation of powers
assignment of distinct norm-generating tasks to distinct
116. Thus, We the People are assigned the task of ratifying the norms that
trump all other conflicting norms. Congress is assigned the task of passing the
norms that trump regulations and common law rules. Administrative agencies
are assigned the task of promulgating the norms that trump conflicting common
law rules. The federal courts are assigned the task of announcing common law
rules that trump no other kind of legal norm.
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norm-generating entities. This is what the purely chronologic
system would do. Create some mechanism for preserving
meaningful practical differences in the consequences of different kinds of norms, and you will have preserved a separation of powers that goes beyond empty formality. This is
what the extant system does.
b.

The SecondaryImportance of Separationof
Powers Elements

Though unmistakably present, the elements of the extant
system aimed at protecting the separation of powers are of
secondary importance. In other words, the (imperfect) democracy-reinforcing tendencies serve as the paramount justification for use and perpetuation of the extant system. A second alternative to the extant system, the inverted system,
will demonstrate the primacy of democratic legitimacy over
separation of powers enforcing ends.
The inverted system would make only one minor modification to the extant system. This small modification, however, would produce radically unconventional outcomes. The
extant system's hierarchic axiom ranks the different categories of legal norms in a rigid hierarchy corresponding with the
democratic legitimacy of the entities that generate legal
norms.117 The norms sanctioned by the entity of greatest relative democratic legitimacy, We the People, sit at the top of the
ordering. Statutes, regulations, and common law rules, each
generated by entities of decreasing democratic legitimacy, occupy descending positions in the ordering.
Under the inverted system this ordering would be reversed. Common law rules would sit at the top of the hierarchy and trump all other kinds of conflicting legal norms.
Regulations would occupy the second rung and would trump
conflicting statutes and constitutional norms. Statutes would
come next and would trump conflicting constitutional norms.
Constitutional norms would come to rest at the bottom of the
hierarchy and trump no other kind of legal norms. Other
than this single modification, the inverted system would work
exactly the same as the extant system.
Obviously, the inverted system is utterly unacceptable.
The reason that it is unacceptable, however, is the interesting
117. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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information. First, there is nothing awry in the inverted system's treatment of separation of powers boundary lines. Just
as much as the extant system, the inverted system would protect the assignment of different norm-generating tasks to different norm-generating entities. Just like the extant system,
the inverted system would give each kind or category of legal
norms different trumping powers. And, just as under the extant system, each norm-generating entity would be charged
with the task of creating, in very real and practical terms, different kinds of legal norms. In short, as far as protecting
separation of powers boundary lines is concerned, the inverted system is the equal of the extant system.
The problem with the inverted system lies not in any
failure to protect separation of powers. The problem is that it
would be indefensible in terms of democratic legitimacy. To
garner and hold respect, the legal system must offer losing interests defensible rationales for outcomes and decisions.
Consider the consolation offered to losing interests under the
extant system in the anti-spam regulation illustration."8 A
court that straightforwardly and without interpretive manipulation applies the extant system will strike down the
popular anti-spam regulation.
The losing interest-the public-will not be pleased with
the outcome. At least, however, the court operating under the
extant system can offer a reasonable justification. The justification begins along separation of powers lines: Legislatures
make statutes. Agencies make regulations. When in conflict
the former trumps the latter. If regulations could trump
statutes, agencies would be empowered to create norms that
are in essence no different than the norms created by Congress." 9 The justification then takes a democracy-reinforcing
118. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
119. When refusing to strike down or modify popular or problematic statutes
courts regularly evoke the separation of powers rationale. See, e.g., Lamie v.
U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 543 (2004) (when interpreting statutes "[i]t is beyond our province to ... provide for what we might think ... is the preferred
result. This allows both of our branches to adhere to our respected and respective, constitutional roles." (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985) (refusing to correct apparent statutory drafting error on
grounds that Court may not "soften the clear import of Congress' chosen words
whenever a court believes those words lead to a harsh result"); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1980) (stating that statute did not
make for "a sensible means of conserving energy" but refusing to invalidate or
alter statute because "it is up the legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wis-
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turn: Statutes trump conflicting regulations because statutes
are created by the elected Congress (of relatively strong democratic legitimacy), while regulations are created by unelected agencies (of relatively weak democratic legitimacy).
In a case like the anti-spain regulation illustration, the more
democratically legitimate norm (the popular regulation) will
have been nullified, but at least the more democratically legitimate entity, Congress, has prevailed. 120 While not the
ideal outcome for the losing interests, at least the losing interests are offered a justification of plausible persuasive
power.
Compare the completely unsatisfactory justification that
would be offered by a court operating under the inverted sysdom and utility of legislation" (internal citation omitted)); T.V.A. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978) (enforcing statute requiring halt of construction of
multi-million dollar dam to save snail darter on grounds that "in our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental
for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords
with 'common sense and the public weal."' (internal citation omitted)); Mobile
Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (arguing that though the
Court could do a better job than disputed statute, the Court cannot alter statute
because it has no authority to substitute its views for the view of Congress expressed in statute); United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941)
("[I]t is not [the Court's] function to engraft on a statute additions which we
think the legislature logically might or should have made"); Walls v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 507-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that courts cannot legislate additional private causes of actions no matter how good a policy
choice it may be).
120. The democracy-reinforcing aspect of the justification is almost always
implicit and understood. Sometimes, however, courts spell it out. See, e.g.,
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) ("[A] court is not free ... to substitute its judgment for the will of the people... as expressed in the laws passed by
their popularly elected legislatures."). When interpreting statutes
the court weighs the words of elected legislators to resolve their meaning. This court must go wherever the language and intent of the statute take us. Should our interpretation cause public discomfort or impose undesired burdens, it is to the source of the enactment, Congress,
that those who are discomforted or burdened must turn for relief.
Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 1203, 1213 (10th Cir. 2000). See
also In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1987) (recognizing that
statutes overrule common law precedent because "in a democracy the legislature may be the more appropriate branch to draw classifications based on public
policy. As a popularly elected body, the legislature is in a position to tap the
thinking of its constituency and has the resources to secure data generally not
available to the courts"); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F.
Supp. 1465, 1473 (D. Colo. 1988) (holding that agency interpretation in conflict
with statute must be nullified because "value judgments which amount to
changes in a statute, which are what the new regulations represent, should be
made by the elected, accountable Congress and not by the Executive branch").
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tem. Reverse the polarity of the anti-spam regulation illustration and assume that Congress acts in accord with majoritarian sentiment while the agency is responsive to antimajoritarian special interests. Prompted by strong majoritarian desires and resisting special interest lobbying, Congress passes a new statute requiring the FTC to promulgate
comprehensive anti-spam regulations. Captured by Internet
advertising special interests, however, the FTC promulgates
a diluted set of regulations that end up protect spammers by
imposing trivial fines, disallowing private suits for money
damages, and authorizing token agency enforcement resources. The regulations stand in conflict with the statute. A
court operating under the inverted system will (if acting
straightforwardly and without interpretive manipulation)
nullify the popular and democratically legitimate anti-spam
statute and preserve the unpopular special interest-favoring
regulations.
Again, the losing interest-the public-would not be
pleased with the outcome. Worse than under the extant system, however, the rationale would offer no meaningful consolation. The justification would rely solely on separation of
powers arguments and would lack the democracy-reinforcing
turn that underlies the extant system: Agencies make regulations. Legislatures make statutes. The laws that agencies
make trump conflicting laws made by legislatures (or at least
they do in the anti-matter world governed by the inverted
system). In short, the rules are the rules. Deal with it.
There is no democracy-reinforcing rationale, not even an imperfect one, to justify the regulation over statute ordering.
When it comes to justifying outcomes in individual cases
involving conflicting legal norms, the separation of powers
argument only goes so far. The argument that a statute must
trump a conflicting regulation because Congress is superior to
administrative agencies really is not a satisfactory justification. It is closer to a restatement of the statute over regulation rule than a satisfactory justification for that rule. The
notion that a statute must trump a conflicting regulation because Congress, the creator of the statute, possesses greater
democratic legitimacy than the agency, the creator of the
regulation, begins to sound like a viable justification. The extant system advances both separation of powers and democracy-reinforcing ends. The inverted system would be its equal
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in terms of enforcing separation of powers, but would completely lack the democracy-reinforcing component. Comparison of these two systems demonstrates that the democracyenforcing element, rather than the separation of powers protecting feature, is what really does the work of justifying the
outcomes produced by the extant system.
The extant system is structured to protect separation of
powers boundary lines. It, in other words, is structured so
that different norm-generating entities create norms of different trumping powers. More importantly, however, the extant
system is structured so that the norm-generating entities of
greatest democratic legitimacy are charged with creating the
norms of greatest trumping powers, and vice versa. This crucial feature, and not the separation of powers feature, does
the work of justifying the outcomes the extant system produces. The extant system's tendency to enhance or at least
preserve the democratic legitimacy of law is not perfect. As
the inverted system demonstrates, however, an imperfect
democracy-reinforcing justification is preferable to no democracy-reinforcing justification at all.
3.

The Multi-FactorSystem

Though different in many ways, the extant system and
each of the two alternatives discussed earlier are rule-based
This Section introduces an alternative system
systems.
which would depart from the rule-based tack by sweeping
aside the axiomatic meta-norms. 21 Rather than adjudicating
conflicting legal norms under a set of axiomatic rules, this alternative would call on courts to adjudicate such cases by directly assessing the democratic legitimacy of individual conflicting legal norms. Courts would perform this assessment
with the assistance of a list of relevant factors or considera-

121. Because rules are over- and under- inclusive relative to their purposes,
rule-based decision making periodically produces outcomes at odds with underlying purposes.
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN

Resolution of conflicts between legal norms in a way that
enhances or preserves the democratic legitimacy of the law is the primary goal
of the extant system. The extant system's rules, however, regularly produce
outcomes which do the exact opposite. One way to improve the performance of
rule-based decision making is to refine the rules with an eye towards minimizing their over- and under-inclusiveness relative to their purposes. Another
strategy involves discarding rule-based decision making altogether.
LIFE 31-34 (1991).
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tions. 122 As is usually the case with multi-factor analysis, the
list of factors would serve as a guide rather than a narrowly
constraining command. While courts would be obliged to consider the entire list of factors, no specific formula or method
for applying the factors would exist. The norm judged to possess greater democratic legitimacy would be preserved and
the norm judged to be of lesser democratic legitimacy would
be nullified.
One drawback with the use of a multi-factor alternative
is that, like the purely chronologic and inverted alternatives,
it would fail to protect separation of powers boundary lines.
Under the multi-factor system the trumping powers of constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law norms
would not differ in any meaningful way. A regulation of high
democratic legitimacy, for example, could trump a statute of
low democratic legitimacy (and vice versa). As such, the
norm-generating tasks assigned to each of the four normgenerating entities would also be undifferentiable. Each entity would create legal norms possessing equivalent trumping
powers.
A second problem with the multi-factor alternative is
that it would fail to constrain judicial discretion in any meaningful way. As with any pliable multi-factor analysis, a court
that so desires could attain a pre-selected outcome by emphasizing certain factors and deemphasizing others. However,
this objection may not substantially differentiate the multifactor alternative from the extant system. The multi-factor
alternative would not tightly constrain judicial discretion.
The extant system, however, also fails to constrain judicial

122. This assessment would open up an entirely new form of legal discourse.
Under the extant system legal discourse revolves exclusively around norm interpretation and whether two norms do or do not stand in a posture of irreconcilable conflict. Once a court interprets norms and finds them to stand in a posture of irreconcilable conflict, the four axiomatic meta-norms produce conclusive
and unquestionable results. There can be no argument over whether a norm of
superordinate kind trumps a norm of subordinate kind, or whether a newer
norm trumps an older norm of the same kind.
Under the multi-factor alternative, however, courts would entertain two
distinct lines of argument. As always, courts would be charged with determining whether two legal norms stand in conflict. Once two norms are determined
to stand in conflict, however, the absence of the four axioms would force courts
to decide which of the two norms ought to prevail. Under the extant system the
four axiomatic meta-norms conclusively resolve this issue.
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discretion. 123 Rigid, formalistic, and rule-based as it may be,
there is little to prevent a court operating under the extant
system from controlling substantive outcomes via manipulation of flexible interpretive discretion. 124 On this score, the
would not be significantly inferior to
multi-factor alternative
25
the extant system.

Putting aside the separation of powers and judicial discretion issues, would the multi-factor alternative more consistently and more often than the extant system prevent norms
of suspect democratic legitimacy from trumping norms of
solid democratic legitimacy? The multi-factor alternative
would not strap courts with a rigid and overly simplistic rule123. Though neither the extant system nor the multi-factor alternative can
constrain courts from exercising discretion aimed at selecting substantive outcomes, the multi-factor system would channel legal discourse in useful ways.
Courts operating under the multi-factor alternative would be forced to publicly
address and apply the factors relevant to assessing the democratic legitimacy of
competing legal norms. Under the extant system, in contrast, when a purposeful court seeks to manipulate the substantive outcome, it does so under the
cover of neutral legal interpretation. In its public justification a court need not
reveal its thinking on the democratic legitimacy of the norms involved.
124. Courts that desire to can use their interpretive discretion to evade the
discretion-denying rigidity of the extant system. In some cases, of course, legal
norms may be too tightly drawn to permit judicial interpretive manipulation.
Yet a similar phenomenon would also occur under the multi-factor alternative.
In some cases, courts operating under the multi-factor alternative would find it
exceedingly difficult to back into outcomes via manipulation of the relevant factors. Where one of two conflicting legal norms obviously possesses far greater
democratic legitimacy than the other, a judicial ruling that overturns the rule of
greater democratic legitimacy would be easily detected and revealed as judicial
manipulation.
125. Perhaps the most significant difference would lie in the location of exercises of judicial discretion. Under the extant system courts exercise discretion
only in the interpretation of legal norms. In the context of the anti-spain regulation illustration, the purposeful court wishing to preserve the popular regulation simply interprets the statute and/or the regulation such that they do not
stand in conflict.
Judicial manipulation under the multi-factor alternative would work in
a different way. First, as under the extant system, courts could manipulate the
meaning of legal norms and whether two norms stand in conflict. Indeed, because courts always must determine whether two legal norms stand in conflict,
almost any imaginable system for dealing with conflicting legal norms will be
subject to this kind of judicial manipulation. Second, however, courts could manipulate the factors guiding assessment of the democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal norms. Turning again to the anti-spain regulation illustration, a court
ideologically opposed to government regulation might wish to nullify the antispam regulation. To reach this result, it could place greater emphasis on certain factors and less on others to find that the regulation does not possess
greater democratic legitimacy than the statute.
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based approach. It would instead offer courts a flexible set of
factors they could use on a case-by-case basis to select norms
of relatively strong democratic legitimacy for preservation.
For this reason, the multi-factor alternative could be superior
in performance. However, a closer examination reveals the
drawbacks of the multi-factor system which would outweigh
any advantages it might have over the extant system.
The principal problems with the multi-factor alternative
grow out of the difficulties that courts would face in determining which of two legal norms possesses greater democratic legitimacy. The multi-factor alternative would require courts
to engage in a form of analysis that lies outside their traditional areas of expertise. Courts are expert in interpreting
and applying legal norms. They possess no special expertise
in evaluating the democratic legitimacy of individual legal
norms.
Although this appears to create a problem, it is a small
one at best. First, pointing to the imperfections or limitations
of courts is but half of the analysis. The relevant question is
not whether courts are good or bad at evaluating the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms. The relevant question is whether they are better at that task than the sourcecentric and highly simplified method used by the extant system. Courts may not possess any special expertise in evaluating the democratic legitimacy of legal norms. In many cases,
however, special expertise is probably not needed to outdo the
extant system.
Second, courts are institutionally well positioned to make
comparatively impartial evaluations of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms. Conventional wisdom maintains that
the entities closest to an electoral connection are better at detecting majoritarian sentiment than the unelected federal
courts. 126 Often, however, Congress and agencies lack incen126. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 718 n.30 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that nondelegation doctrine is based on idea that "the most fundamental decisions will
be made by Congress, the elected representatives of the people, rather than by
administrators"); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S.
235, 258 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("It is the Congress, not this Court, that
responds to the pressures of political groups, pressures entirely proper in a free
society. It is Congress, not this Court, that has the capacity to investigate the
divergent considerations involved in the management of a complex national labor policy. And it is Congress, not this Court, that is elected by the people. This
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tives to reform legal norms of suspect democratic legitimacy,
or even the ability to identify norms of suspect democratic legitimacy. Legislators often have little incentive to alter or repeal special interest statutes that may benefit their reelection."' Agencies that have been captured by the particular
groups within their regulatory jurisdiction are also not likely
to modify regulations favoring narrow interests. 128 Similar
problems affect non-governmental institutional actors. Organized public interests opposing extant constitutional, statutory, and regulatory norms have a strong incentive to point
out the suspect democratic legitimacy of the norms they oppose. Because they are organized interests, however, their
assertions may be viewed as untrustworthy and can easily be
painted as efforts to advance their own narrow antidemocratic interests. The same logic applies to political parties that point to the anti-democratic nature of legal norms
that run contrary to the party line. Only the federal courts
are sufficiently independent to engage in disinterested
evaluations of the democratic legitimacy of legal norms.'29

Court should, therefore, interject itself as little as possible into the law-making
and law-changing process."); CBS Inc. v. Prime Time 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d
1217, 1227 (11th Cir. 2001) (arguing for adherence to the text of a statute over
legislative history because "[w]hen a statute is passed by Congress, it is the text
of the statute ... that has been voted on and approved by the people's elected
representatives for inclusion in our country's laws"); Allman v. Eastern Co., No.
87-3322, 1988 WL 60729, at *5 (6th Cir. June, 14 1988) (unpublished table decision) ("policy questions of this sort are not to be decided, under our form of government, by an unelected judiciary. Our task is to apply the laws that the peopie's elected representatives have actually adopted; we are not here to pass laws
that Congress has failed to pass"); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 184 (2d Cir.
1978) ("Congress is the elected voice of the people" and "presumptively has
popular authority for the value judgment it makes") (quoting Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring and dissenting)), vacatedby439 U.S. 974 (1978).
127. See JOHN L. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING,
CONTRIBUTIONS AND INFLUENCE (1995) (explaining disproportionate influence
of interest groups in Congress); William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of
Individuals' Rights in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 981
(1996) (discussing that political pressure of organized interest groups prevents
legislative revision of obsolete statutes).
128. See Thomas Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts.- 1967-1983, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1039, 1050-53 (1997) (discussing theory of agency capture);
Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1684-85 (1975) (explaining that agencies act in ways "unduly favoring organized interests").
129. To say that courts are better positioned to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of legal norms than other available institutional actors is not to say
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Third, courts are very familiar with multi-factor analysis.
Whether in common law, statutory, or constitutional areas,
courts are constantly required to apply multi-factor tests. 3 '
Uneven or unintentional misapplication of a multi-factor test
for assessing the relative democratic legitimacy of individual
legal norms would be no more problematic than it is when
courts apply multi-factor tests in other contexts.
Admittedly, the analysis required of courts by the multifactor approach would pose unique challenges. In most instances where courts perform multi-factor analysis, courts
must make determinations and judgments that are legalistic
in nature.' The factors courts would apply under the multifactor alternative, in contrast, lie outside the legal realm.
Courts may be familiar with multi-factor analysis. But are
they equipped to adequately perform this particular kind of
multi-factor analysis? It would appear that the answer is yes,
but only sometimes.
In order to address this issue in greater depth, the specifics of the configuration of the multi-factor alternative must be
examined. The article has thus far hinted at various factors
relevant to assessing the democratic legitimacy of legal
norms. These factors are not an exhaustive enumeration of
the factors that might be part of a multi-factor system. 32 Use
that courts would perform that task perfectly. As always, idiosyncratic ideological biases, uneven assessments of legal norms, and even manipulation of discretion would affect their judgment. These problems, however, will exist under
any alternative and already exist under the extant system. There is nothing in
the multi-factor system that would exacerbate these issues.
130. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age ofBalancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 964-65, 971-72 (1987) (arguing that constitutional law has become dominated by balancing tests).
131. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs certification of class
actions, is typical. It asks courts to weigh legalistic factors such as whether the
class representative's claims are typical of the class members' claims, and
whether individual litigations would create a risk of inconsistent outcomes.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. On the other hand, when applying multi-factor or balancing
tests, courts are sometimes asked to weigh factors that are not legalistic in nature. The well-known Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test for determining
whether sufficient administrative process has been afforded, for example, asks
courts to consider the fiscal cost of additional procedural safeguards. Matthews

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
132. Devising such an enumeration is not a goal of this article. The extant
system is so crude that even a highly imperfect multi-factor system could yield
vast improvements. Courts do not need to know with great precision exactly
what it means for a particular legal norm to possess or lack democratic legitimacy, or exactly which factors are relevant to assessing the democratic legiti-
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of the factors can, however, provide a sense of the kinds of
judgments that courts operating under a multi-factor system
would have to make. The factors mentioned thus far include:
1. The popularity or current majoritarian support (or
lack thereof) for a given legal norm or for the policy effectuated by a legal norm."'
2. What most likely would be the majoritarian sentiment
for a given legal norm or for the policy effectuated by a legal
norm given sufficient information and public rumination and
discourse."M
3. The compatibility of a particular legal norm and the
policies it effectuates with the consensus values and views of
the current generation.
4. The democratic legitimacy of the entity that created a
particular legal norm."'
Are courts equipped to evenly and accurately predict and
determine the current majority position regarding particular
legal norms, or even more difficult, what the majority sentiment would be given sufficient information and public discourse? Are they prepared to identify the social consensus of
the current generation?
In truth, courts are already somewhat familiar with
these kinds of non-legal issues. Courts are not blind to factors beyond formal legal rules. Most courts are attuned to a
variety of extra legal factors, including possible public perceptions of their rulings.'36 When they come up against a legal
macy of individual legal norms. All they need is a set of factors that allows
them to make a more precise estimation than is possible under the highly imprecise extant system.
133. In assessing majoritarian support, it may be permissible to consider
only the portion of the public that has formed an opinion. For example, a very
large portion of the electorate is aware of and has formed an opinion on certain
issues, such as spain e-mail. Schultz, supra note 72, at 1 (citing study finding
that eighty-three percent of respondents dislike spain e-mail). On other issues,
however, only small constituencies of the electorate may be affected and only
that portion will form any opinion.
134. This factor could be relevant when there is no discernable majoritarian
position on a given law or the policy it effectuates, or when there is a discernable majoritarian position but where that majoritarian position results from
limited public information and/or discourse.
135. In isolation this factor is a crude predictor of the democratic legitimacy
of individual legal norms. Nonetheless, it is relevant to assessing the democratic legitimacy of legal norms.
136. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2596, 2606-09 (2003) (reviewing empirical data indicating that courts
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norm of suspect democratic legitimacy, a special interest
statute or a no longer popular constitutional provision, they
will usually recognize the problem. Courts regularly employ
a seat of the pants, informal, unregulated judgment regarding
the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms in such
cases. In a sense, therefore, the multi-factor alternative
would merely formalize and regularize an informal and concealed137 multi-factor analysis that many courts already perform.
That courts may already be familiar with (informally) assessing the democratic legitimacy of legal norms, however,
does not necessarily mean that they perform that task well.
Ultimately, whether courts could competently apply a multifactor system depends more on the nature of the cases at issue than the nature of judicial abilities.
Cases in which legal norms stand in conflict are divisible
into two principal groups. First, there are the easy cases. By
easy cases I do not mean cases where the meanings of the legal norms are easily discernable and beyond reasonable dispute. I instead mean cases in which it is easy to discern a
marked difference in the democratic legitimacy of the norms
involved. The anti-spam regulation illustration presents the
paradigmatic easy case. The statute was enacted and perpetuated at the behest of narrow special interests. If honestly
and straightforwardly interpreted, the statute prohibits not
only very popular telemarketing regulations, but also popular
anti-spam regulations. The anti-spam regulation, in contrast,
is immensely popular with a strong majority of the public.'38
At the other extreme lie the hard cases. By hard cases I
do not mean cases in which the meaning of the legal norms
involved is difficult to discern or stands open to reasonable
disagreement. I instead am referring to the cases in which it

tend to reflect public opinion and that "mood swings in the general public are
mirrored in the output of the Supreme Court"); Michael J. Gerhardt, The End of
Theory, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 283, 311 n.137 (2001) (mentioning concept that "federal courts often track majoritarian sentiments" and asserting that "some Justices have even acknowledged the relevance of consulting majoritarian sentiments in interpreting the Constitution").
137. Moreover, even if courts currently lack special expertise in evaluating
the democratic legitimacy of legal norms, it is at most a short-term transition
problem. Once operating under the multi-factor alternative, courts would develop the necessary expertise to apply and use the multi-factor analysis.
138. See, e.g., supra note 3 (discussing the popular "do not call" registry).
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is difficult to discern any significant discrepancyor difference
in the democratic legitimacy of the legal norms involved
Whether a case involving two conflicting legal norms is an
easy case or a hard case (as I use those terms) is the key factor determining whether courts would competently and
evenly apply a multi-factor alternative, and more broadly
whether the multi-factor alternative would perform better
than the extant system.
The extant system performs at its worst in easy cases,
such as the anti-spam regulation illustration. As demonstrated by the anti-spam regulation illustration, in the easy
cases the extant system regularly calls for nullification of the
all-things-considered more democratically legitimate legal
norm. Knowledge of this possibility provokes biased and maTo avoid, the antinipulative interpretive strategies.
democratic outcome, many courts will manipulate interpretative rules to find that no conflict is present between the
norms at issue. The easy cases, in other words, are most
likely to produce the Hobson's choice between interpretive
honesty and nullification of the more democratically legitimate norm.
The multi-factor alternative, in contrast, would perform
quite well in easy cases. It permits judges to apply a comparatively subtle analysis (almost any list of factors would be
more subtle than the extant system) permitting preservation
of norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy. Most
courts facing the anti-spam regulation illustration would be
more than capable of applying a multi-factor analysis to correctly determine that the regulation possesses substantially
stronger democratic legitimacy than the conflicting statute.
Moreover, because courts could legitimately preserve
norms of strong relative democratic legitimacy, the multifactor alternative would generate minimal incentive for dishonest judicial manipulation. The artifice and opacity encouraged by the extant system would be unnecessary. Judgment as to whether the two legal norms stand in conflict
would not be colored by extraneous factors and considerations.'39 Judicial opinions would include frank and direct factor-by-factor analysis of the relative democratic legitimacy of
the norms in question.
139. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.

294

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

Vol: 45

However, in cases where it is hard to differentiate conflicting norms in terms of degrees of democratic legitimacy,
the performance of the two systems is reversed. Some cases
are hard cases because they offer no clear answers to the
questions presented by the enumerated factors. Thus, in
many instances the public will not have formed any discernible will regarding particular legal norms or the policies they
embody, and there will be no way of confidently predicting
majoritarian preferences given adequate information and
public discourse. In these cases two conflicting legal norms
do not really register one way or another on any comprehensive measure of relative democratic legitimacy. Any attempt
to appraise or compare degrees of democratic legitimacy
makes little sense. In this kind of case, use of the multifactor system would force courts to concoct distinctions in degrees of democratic legitimacy where none exist.
Other cases are hard because the two conflicting norms
at issue present roughly equal claims to democratic legitimacy. What should a court operating under the multi-factor
alternative do when two factors suggest that one norm is of
greater democratic legitimacy, while the other two factors
suggest the opposite? The multi-factor approach offers no
clear solution. Where the relative democratic legitimacy of
two conflicting legal norms boils down to an all-thingsconsidered toss-up, the multi-factor approach would produce
an unacceptable level of unpredictability and uneven adjudication. One court may decide that one conflicting norm possesses (slightly) greater democratic legitimacy, while the next
court may find the opposite.
Under either hard case scenario the multi-factor approach would be problematic. The inability of the judicial
system to adequately address the hard cases, however, would
not stem from any lack of special expertise or training. It
would instead stem from the reality that in hard cases neither norm can make a substantially stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than the other. Courts are sufficiently competent to apply a multi-factor approach and will usually get
the "correct" result in the easy cases. At the very least, courts
operating under the multi-factor alternative would do a better
job evaluating the easy cases than they can under the extant
system. The problem for the multi-factor alternative is that
most cases are hard cases, at least in terms of determining
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which norm possesses greater democratic legitimacy. Thus,
in most cases of conflicting legal norms the multi-factor alternative would produce great uncertainty and instability of outcomes.
The extant system remains problematic for both the easy
and hard cases. It is least problematic, however, in the hard
cases where it is difficult to discern any meaningful difference
in the democratic legitimacy of two conflicting norms. It is
least problematic in these cases because the threat of an antidemocratic outcome is minimal. The possible outcomes in
these cases could be classified as neutral with regard to democratic legitimacy.
Though overly simplistic and unidimensional, the source-centric extant system cannot work
too much damage. Indeed, where two conflicting norms make
roughly equal claims to democratic legitimacy, it makes sense
to resolve the conflict by preferring the norm created by the
more democratically legitimate entity.
In discussing the multi-factor alternative, the main objective has been to present the polar opposite of the extant system. While the extant system is comprised of extremely rigid
and formalistic rules, the multi-factor system is based on
open-ended standards. Comparison of the two systems presents the age-old 'rules versus standards' debate in its starkest form. 4 ° Both extremes imply certain drawbacks and benefits. The extreme rule-based extant system (purportedly)
denies courts discretion and thereby produces both suboptimal outcomes and an incentive to avoid sub-optimal outcomes via dishonest manipulation of open-ended interpretive
discretion. 4
The extreme standards-based system would
breed unpredictable and uneven application in many cases or
would simply not make much sense in an entire range of hard
cases." Criticism of the multi-factor approach does not sug140. See Sullivan, supra note 89, at 57-70 (discussing the rules versus standards debate).
141. See id. at 58.
A legal directive is "rule"-like when it binds a decision-maker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts. Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere ... the rule's force as a rule is that decisionmakers follow it,
even when direct application of the background principle or policy to
the facts would produce a different result.
Id.
142. See id. at 58-59, 62.
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gest that courts cannot play a productive role in weeding out
anti-democratic legal norms. However, asking courts to do so
by a straight out judgment on the relative democratic legitimacy of two conflicting legal norms, even if assisted by a defined set of relevant factors, could lead to significant problems.
B. Moderate Modificationsto the Extant System
This Section introduces alternatives to the extant system
that retain many or most of the features of the extant system
but make key modifications. Most of the modifications are
aimed at improving the ability to resolve conflicts between legal norms in ways that enhance or at least preserve the democratic legitimacy of law. The previously discussed ancillary considerations-protection of separation of powers
values, stability and predictability, and sound performance in
both easy and hard cases-will be addressed as well.
As we have seen, rigidity and uni-dimensional focus on
the democratic legitimacy of the sources of legal norms hamper the extant system. Swinging to the opposite extreme of
great flexibility, multi-factor analysis of the relative democratic legitimacy of legal norms offers no panacea. The alternatives discussed in this Section are all attempts to balance
the various values at play. Relatively moderate adjustments
to the extant system may bring significant improvement in
terms of outcomes that enhance or preserve the democratic
legitimacy of law. Moreover, relatively moderate adjustments
to the extant system may not significantly degrade separation
of powers, stability and predictability, and performance in
both hard and easy cases.

A legal directive is "standard"-like when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or
policy to a fact situation. Standards allow for the decrease of errors of
under- and over-inclusiveness by giving the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules ....
The argument that rules are fairer than standards is that rules require decisionmakers to act consistently, treating
like cases alike. On this view, rules reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias by preventing decisionmakers from factoring the parties' particular attractive or unattractive qualities into the decisionmaking calculus.
Id. at 58-59.
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The PresumptionSystem

One promising alternative, which I will call the presumption system, would combine the extant system, the multifactor system, and a pair of rebuttable presumptions. Under
the categoric axiom, when two conflicting norms belong to different legal categories, the norm from the higher order category always and unconditionally trumps the norm from the
lower order category. Likewise, under the chronologic axiom,
when two conflicting norms belong to the same legal category,
the newer norm always and unconditionally trumps the older
norm.
Under the presumption system, however, rebuttable presumptions would modify the chronologic and categoric axioms. When two conflicting norms belong to different legal
categories, the presumption would be that the norm from the
higher order category would trump the norm from the lower
order category. Likewise, when two conflicting norms belong
to the same legal category, the presumption would be that the
newer norm would trump the older norm. Upon a sufficient
evidentiary showing, however, these presumptions could be
rebutted. Courts would use a multi-factor analysis similar to
that discussed in Section III.A.3 to determine whether the
presumptions have been rebutted. When rebutted, courts
would nullify the legal norms determined to possess relatively
weaker claims to democratic legitimacy.
To see how the presumption alternative might work in
practice, return to the anti-spam regulation illustration.
Upon determining that the regulation and statute stand in
conflict, a court would assess the democratic legitimacy of
both norms. The assessment would include the taking of evidence relevant to an inventory of predetermined factors for
assessing the democratic legitimacy of legal norms. If a court
were to find that the regulation and statute both make solid
claims to democratic legitimacy, the court would resolve the
conflict between them by applying the standard categoric
axiom. Thus, in the anti-spam illustration, the superordinate
statute would trump the subordinate regulation.
If, however, a court were to find that the regulation possesses a substantially stronger claim to democratic legitimacy
than the statute, the court could rule that the normal
presumption that statutes trump conflicting regulations has
been rebutted. Once the categoric axiom and its statute over
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regulation ordering has been rebutted, the court would be
free to uphold the regulation and nullify that portion of the
statute standing in conflict with the regulation. A similar
process would be used with conflicting norms of the same
kind. Thus, if a new and a preexisting statute stand in irreconcilable conflict, and the preexisting statute possesses a substantially stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than the
new statute, the court could hold that the presumption favoring application of the chronologic axiom has been rebutted
and could then nullify the newer statute.
The presumption alternative combines the most beneficial aspects of the extant and multi-factor systems. The extant system would operate unchanged in cases where the presumptions in favor of the categoric and chronologic axioms
are not rebutted, or in other words, in cases where the discrepancy in the democratic legitimacy of the conflicting norms
is not substantial. In the cases where the discrepancy in the
democratic legitimacy of the conflicting norms is substantial,
however, the presumptions would be rebutted, and multifactor analysis would govern which of the two conflicting
norms will survive.
The presumption system promises democracy-enhancing
or -preserving outcomes at a higher rate than that produced
by the extant system, and a consequent reduced incentive for
judicial dishonesty, artifice, and opaque reasoning in written
opinions. Moreover, unlike both the extant system and the
multi-factor alternative, the presumption system would perform well in cases where it is easy to determine which of two
conflicting norms possesses greater democratic legitimacy, as
well as those where such determinations are quite difficult.
The potential gains in terms of democracy-enhancing or preserving outcomes would be realized in cases such as the
anti-spam regulation illustration, where it is fairly obvious
that a lower order norm exhibits greater democratic legitimacy than a conflicting higher order norm. The extant system performs at its worst in these cases. Its rigidity locks
courts into the Hobson's choice between honest and straightforward application of the extant axioms versus benign dishonesty aimed at avoiding anti-democratic outcomes. When
courts opt for honest and straightforward norm interpretation, the extant system nullifies the norm of stronger democratic legitimacy.
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In cases similar to the anti-spam regulation illustration,
however, courts operating under the presumption system
could preserve norms of strong democratic legitimacy without
resort to interpretive artifice. Manipulation of meaning and
whether two legal norms stand in conflict would be unnecessary. Instead, in appropriate cases courts would consult the
relevant factors for assessing the democratic legitimacy of two
legal norms and hold that the normal categoric and chronologic presumptions have been rebutted. This possibility, in
turn, would dissipate much of the impetus for interpretive
bias and subterfuge engendered by the extant system's discretion-denying rigidity.
The presumption alternative would also produce a salutary effect on legal discourse and justification. Under the extant system an informal and sub rosa evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of competing legal norms can bias norm
interpretation. Yet the surface of legal discourse does not reflect this evaluation. The presumption alternative would
force courts to make a threshold determination on whether a
substantial disparity in the democratic legitimacy of two conflicting legal norms is present. In attempting to convince a
court that the categoric and chronologic axiom presumptions
should or should not be rebutted, litigants would brief and
argue the various factors relevant to assessing the democratic
legitimacy of individual norms. Hidden motives and artifice
in judicial opinions would be replaced with open and public
analysis on the democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal
norms. This may be the most important benefit of the presumption alternative.'"
The potential benefits of the presumption alternativereduction in anti-democratic outcomes, reduction in incentives for dishonest judicial manipulation, and enhanced
143. Sub rosa is something which is "confidential; secret; not for publication."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1468 (8th ed. 2004).

144. Thus, the real difference between the extant and presumption systems
might lie not in outcomes, but rather in the stated reasoning behind outcomes.
The benign dishonesty used to circumvent the rigidity of the extant system
pushes many of the considerations truly motivating judicial decisions out of
written opinions and legal discourse. Courts operating under the extant system
write opinions as though neutral and objective interpretive rules both dictate
the meaning of legal norms and determine whether those norms stand in conflict. Beneath the surface, however, an unstated desire to reach a certain substantive outcome, avoiding anti-democratic outcomes, biases judicial choice, use,
and misuse of interpretive rules.
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transparency in judicial opinions-are no different than the
potential benefits of the multi-factor alternative. Unlike the
multi-factor alternative, however, the presumption system
would not run into problems when dealing with cases where
it is hard to differentiate the democratic legitimacy of two
conflicting legal norms. In cases where neither conflicting legal norm clearly possesses greater democratic legitimacy than
the other, the multi-factor alternative would force courts into
hair-splitting exercises.. In cases where norms simply do not
register one way or another on the democratic legitimacy
scale, the multi-factor alternative would force courts to conjure up differentiations in relative democratic legitimacy
where none exist.'45 The presumption system, in contrast,
would deal well with both kinds of hard cases because in the
hard cases the categoric and chronologic axiom presumptions
would not be rebutted and would therefore operate exactly as
the extant system operates. In hard cases default to the
chronologic and categoric axioms constitutes a reasonably satisfactory solution consistent with democracy-reinforcing ends.
So far the presumption alternative looks like a system
It promises more democracywith no real drawback.
enhancing outcomes, less impetus for dishonest judicial manipulation or bias, greater transparency in legal reasoning,
and an ability to deal well with both hard and easy cases.
There are, however, several caveats.
One area of concern relates to predictability of outcomes
in individual cases and stability of existing law.'46 The flexibility of rebuttable presumptions may constitute an invitation
to judicial manipulation or at least a recipe for unintentional
but nonetheless radically uneven judicial application. One
court might freely allow rebuttal of the chronologic axioms,
while the next court might permit rebuttal of the presumption only in the most extreme cases. This unpredictability
could lead to an erosion of the stability of existing law. If
some courts generously permit rebuttal of the categoric and
normsubordinate
presumptions,
axiom
chronologic
generating entities would have incentives to create new
norms that conflict with preexisting norms created by su145. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
146. As we have already seen, negative effects on the predictability and stability of law could plague the purely chronologic and multi-factor alternatives.
See discussion supraPart V.A.1, A.3.
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perordinate entities. 147
On the other hand, any concern over an erosion of predictability and stability under a presumption alternative
should not be overinflated. First, under the extant system
the unpredictability of outcomes may already erode the stability of existing law. Just as courts operating under the presumption alternative might unevenly apply the presumptions
or even manipulate them, courts operating under the extant
system may be uneven and manipulative in their application
of interpretative rules. 148 It is unclear that outcomes would be
much less predictable or that law would be much less stable
under the presumption alternative than they now are under
the extant system.
Moreover, even if the presumption alternative would diminish predictability and stability, this may be a positive development. Do we really want a system that perpetuates
predictability of anti-democratic outcomes and stability of
anti-democratic legal norms? Because the categoric and
chronologic axiom presumptions would be rebutted only in
cases where it is easy to detect a marked difference in the
democratic legitimacy of two norms, the presumption alternative would weed out only existing legal norms that are comparatively very weak in terms of democratic legitimacy. In all
other cases-the hard cases-the categoric and chronologic
axioms would operate exactly as they do under the extant
system, and predictability and stability would remain unchanged.
Another caveat relates to separation of powers values.4 9
147. Using the anti-spam regulation illustration, the administrative agency
would recognize the inconsistency of court decisions on rebuttal of presumptions
favoring the axioms. The possibility that a new regulation in conflict with the
existing statute might land in a court that frequently rebuts the presumption in
favor of the categoric axiom may prompt the agency to promulgate such a regulation, thereby altering the contours of existing law.
148. Using the anti-spam regulation illustration, the agency is aware that,
despite the clear meaning of the statute's text and legislative intent, a court
may use its broad interpretive discretion to find that the regulation and statute
do not stand in conflict. The agency, therefore, may promulgate the new regulation in the hope that it will be tested in a court willing to use interpretive subterfuge to uphold it against an arguably conflicting statute.
149. As we have seen, the extant system protects separation of powers
boundary lines by insuring that the different kinds of norms possess different
trumping powers. See discussion supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
This insures that each of the four principal norm-generating entities is charged
with creating norms that differ in terms of substantive trumping powers. The
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In the easy cases the presumption system would permit
norms belonging to nominally subordinate categories to take
on the same trumping powers as norms belonging to nominally superordinate legal categories. What this means for
separation of powers is that a normally subordinate normgenerating entity may create norms with trumping powers
ordinarily associated with the norms created by a superordinate norm-generating entity. Again, consider a regulation
and statute example. If the presumption in favor of the categoric axiom is rebutted, a regulation will take on the trumping powers normally associated with statutes-the power to
trump common law and regulatory norms as well as existing
statutes. Under the extant system only Congress creates
norms with the power to trump nothing more and nothing
less than conflicting common law rules, regulations, and preexisting statutes. Under the presumption system agencies
also would create norms with the power, at least in the easy
cases, to trump conflicting common law rules, regulations,
and preexisting statutes. Permitting an agency to create
norms with the trumping powers ordinarily associated with
statutes blurs the sharp separation of powers boundary lines
maintained by the extant system.
Similar to concerns over predictability'and stability, however, concerns over blurring of separation of powers boundary
lines should not be overstated. First, in hard cases the extant
system would operate as normal and there would be no
blurring of separation of powers boundary lines.
This
differentiates the presumption alternative from the purely
chronologic alternative. Second, even in the easy cases, any
blurring of separation of powers boundary lines would not differ greatly from what already informally occurs under the extant system. Indeed, subordinate norm-generating entities
operating under the extant system may already find ways to
informally trump the norms created by nominally superior
entities through judicial manipulation.
To see the point, imagine a case involving a constitutional norm that has been given a settled doctrinal reading
but can no longer make a credible claim to strong democratic
purely chronologic and multi-factor alternative would all but erase separation of
powers boundary lines. Under those alternatives, whether labeled constitutional, statutory, administrative, or common law norms, all legal norms would
possess the same trumping powers.
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legitimacy. Further, imagine that Congress passes a new
statute of strong democratic legitimacy which, in the eyes of
most expert observers, stands in conflict with the settled doctrinal reading of the constitutional norm. A straightforward
and honest interpretive approach under the extant system
would result in nullification of the statute. It would surprise
absolutely no one, however, if a court facing such a scenario
were to save the statute from nullification by reshaping the
contours of the constitutional norm more narrowly (or with
more exceptions and/or more expansive exceptions) than had
previously been the case.15 ° This strategy would avoid any
conflict between the statutory and constitutional norms and
thereby preserve the statute.
In this kind of case, the practical difference between constitutional amendment via Article V15 and de facto legislative
and judicial collaboration to reshape the contours of extant
constitutional provisions is less than might be imagined.'5 2
Under the extant system, congressional passage of a statute
in conflict with the extant doctrinal construction of a constitutional provision operates as an informal legislative request for
judicial reshaping of that constitutional provision. When the
federal courts respond to that request by altering the contours of the constitutional norm to accommodate the new
statute, the Constitution, for all intents and purposes, has
been modified. Prior to passage of the statute the constitutional provision in question had one meaning. After passage
of the statute and judicial consideration the constitutional
provision is reshaped to have a new meaning. The formal distinctions between the law creating tasks assigned to We the
People, Congress, and the federal courts remain intact. However, passage of the statute, coupled with judicial reshaping
of the constitutional norm, amounts to a legislative and judi150. Similarly, posit an older statute that from most perspectives boasts high
democratic legitimacy and a recently passed statute that alters the older statute, but which reeks of special interest politics. No one would be surprised if a
court operating under the extant system were to narrowly construe the more
recent statute, thereby limiting the impact of the anti-democratic legal norm.
Indeed, if the newer statute did not contain specific language requiring partial
repeal of the preexisting statute, it would be unsurprising if a court were to find
no conflict between the older and newer statute.
151. U.S. CONST. art. V.
152. See Strauss, supra note 100, at 1469-74, 1493 (arguing that the Constitution has been informally amended by Supreme Court decisions more than by
formal Article V processes).
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cial collaboration to engage in an informal law creating task
formally assigned to We the People, alteration of the Constitution.'53
Under the presumption alternative the same outcome
would be achieved by more open and honest means. Passage
of a statute in conflict with a no longer democratically legitimate constitutional norm would cause a court to directly and
publicly evaluate the democratic legitimacy of the statutory
and constitutional norms in question. If the court were to determine that the statute makes a substantially stronger claim
to democratic legitimacy than the conflicting constitutional
norm, the court would (1) find that the presumption in favor
of the categoric axiom has been rebutted and (2) would accordingly trim back the contours of the constitutional norm in
order to preserve the statute fully intact.
In short, a shift to the presumption system may do little
more than place an imprimatur of legitimacy and formality
on the irregular and informal blurring of separation of powers
boundary lines that already occurs under the extant system.
Still, formal appearances matter. The formally legitimized
transgressions of separation of powers boundary lines permitted by the presumption system would constitute a considerable impediment to its adoption. Some may be willing to admit that an informal erosion of separation of powers boundary
lines already occurs under the extant system, yet may also be
hesitant to endorse a formal legitimization and institutionalization of that erosion via the presumption alternative.'5
153. A similar informal blurring of the boundary lines between legislatures
and agencies takes place when an agency promulgates a new regulation that
contradicts and replaces a preexisting regulation. A court could strike down the
new regulation as arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n.
of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 463 U.S. 29, 56 (1983) (striking down
new regulation replacing preexisting regulation because agency failed to sufficiently explain the change with "reasoned analysis"). If, however, a court upholds the new regulation, the end effect is an agency and court informally cooperating to alter the contours of existing law. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. F.C.C., 682
F.2d 993, 998-1004 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that new regulation properly replaces conflicting preexisting regulation); see also Meriden Cmty. Action Agency
v. Shalala, 880 F. Supp. 882, 886-88 (D.D.C. 1995). Though statutory law remains formally unchanged, the effect on regulated entities is no different than if
Congress had amended the statute. Under the preexisting regulation the
agency had interpreted the statutory requirements to have a certain meaning.
Under the new regulation the agency (with the approval of a court) has interpreted the statutory requirements to have a completely different meaning.
154. Moreover, there is some risk that the difference between the extant and
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Though not related to separation of powers values, a
similar caveat applies to cases involving conflicting norms
created by the same entity. Rebuttal of the presumption in
favor of the chronologic axiom would permit older legal norms
to trump newer legal norms of the same kind. In a case involving two statutes, for example, the preexisting statute
(and the long-retired Congress that passed it) would trump
the new statute (and the current or more recent Congress
that passed it).
As with cases of conflicting norms of different kinds,
something very similar already occurs in cases involving
norms of the same kind under the extant system. Consider a
new statute providing special interest benefits and a preexisting statute that, despite its age, is public regarding and still
boasts strong democratic legitimacy. When evaluating these
two norms, a court operating under the extant system will
surprise no one if it narrowly construes the new special interest statute, thereby avoiding any possible conflict with the
preexisting statute of high democratic legitimacy. 5 Though
the older statute does not formally trump the newer statute,
the practical effect is as though it had done just that.'5 6 The
presumption systems would go beyond apparent or psychological impact and
bring about a substantial change in substantive outcomes.

Transgressions of

separation of powers boundary lines may fall under the category of things that
operate best if not formally or officially acknowledged. Under the extant system, subordinate norm-generating entities may find ways to formally respect

but informally subvert separation of powers boundary lines. So long as formal
violations of those boundary lines are forbidden, the informal violations are kept
to a minimum. Allowing formalized and legitimized violations of separation of

powers boundary lines under the presumption alternative, in contrast, might
lead to far more frequent transgressions of the boundary lines than currently
occurs. Once formally legitimized by adoption of the presumption alternative,
courts might be emboldened to permit norms of subordinate kind to trump
norms of superordinate kind at a far higher rate than what they permit infor-

mally under the extant system's nominal prohibition on such phenomenon. In
short, keeping the phenomenon informal and extra-legal may keep subversion of
separation of powers boundaries to a minimum. Formal recognition and legal-

ity, in contrast, might lead to a huge increase in this practice.
155. Thus, a court concerned about full or partial repeal of the preexisting
statute of high democratic legitimacy might be particularly demanding in re-

quiring an unequivocally clear statement of legislative intent to repeal in the
new statute. See Petroski, supra note 50, at 497-99 (pointing out that courts

will adopt strained statutory interpretations in order to give effect to older statutes that seemingly stand in conflict with new statutes).
156. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (most cited federal

case for presumption against implied repeals in which Court adopts strained
reading of Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 in order to preserve In-
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presence of the preexisting statute of high democratic legitimacy prompts the court to shape the contours of the new special interest statute more narrowly than it would if not facing
possible nullification of a statute of high democratic legitimacy.
A shift to the presumption alternative would yield the
same outcome via a different path. Rather than acting to bias
norm interpretation, a substantial disparity in the democratic
legitimacy of the old and new statutes would lead to a rebuttal of the chronologic axiom. In the end, the practical trumping power of newer and older norms probably would not differ
all that greatly under the extant and presumption systems.
Whether prompting a court to narrowly shape the contours of
the new norm (subversion of extant system) or formally
trumping the new norm (presumption system), the older
norm has the ultimate effect of eclipsing the new norm. 57
A final caveat relates to judicial competence. The presumption alternative, like the multi-factor system, would require courts to analyze the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms. As with the multi-factor alternative, there
will be concern that courts are not well equipped to perform
One key advantage of the presumption system,
this task.'
however, is that it makes this task as simple as possible.
Unlike the multi-factor system, the presumption alternative
would require a dispositive judicial determination on the democratic legitimacy of legal norms in only the easy cases, or
in other words, in the cases where the difference in democratic legitimacy between two conflicting legal norms is sub-

dian Reorganization Act of 1934).
157. As with rebuttal of the categoric axiom and separation of powers issues,
formal recognition and legitimization of inversions of the new norm over old
norm axiom constitutes a considerable impediment to implementation of the
presumption alternative. Realizing that older norms can prompt courts to
emasculate new norms to the point where the new norms are, for all intents and
purposes, fully or partially nullified is one thing. Granting old norms a formal
legitimized power to trump new norms is altogether different, if not in terms of
outcomes, then certainly in terms of psychological impact.
Moreover, as with rebuttal of the categoric axiom, it is possible that the
extant system suppresses the frequency of informal inversions of the chronologic principle. The formally legitimized inversions of the chronologic axiom
permitted by the presumption alternative might embolden courts and result in
a much higher rate of older norms trumping newer norms than now occurs. See
supra note 144.
158. See discussion supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
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stantial. The hard cases would be adjudicated under the
categoric and chronologic axioms. Courts operating under the
presumption alternative would never have to make the finegrained distinctions regarding the democratic legitimacy of
conflicting legal norms that would be required by the multifactor alternative. Instead, they would be called on only to
engage in a simple comparative analysis: Does one norm possess substantially greater democratic legitimacy than another? Comparative analysis between significantly incommensurate objects is far easier and less conducive to error
than the sort of fine-grained analysis required by the multifactor alternative.
Though the presumption alternative greatly simplifies
the task, courts could and would still make errors. The important issue, however, is whether courts operating under the
presumption system are more likely to make correct determinations regarding the democratic legitimacy of legal norms
than courts operating under the extant or the multi-factor
systems. In the cases where conflicting norms are hard to differentiate in terms of democratic legitimacy, the extant system performs acceptably and so too would the presumption
system. The multi-factor system, in contrast, would perform
poorly in the hard cases. In cases of clear and substantial
imbalance in the democratic legitimacy of two conflicting legal norms, on the other hand, it would not be hard for courts
system to outdo the peroperating under the presumption
159
formance of the extant system.

The chief advantage of the presumption system is that it
would work well in both easy and hard cases. In cases like
the anti-spam regulation illustration, the presumption alternative would allow a more subtle and multi-faceted analysis
of the relative democratic legitimacy of legal norms than is
159. Moreover, any judicial evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms would be embedded in a larger process involving other normgenerating entities. The presumption alternative does not envision courts as
open-ended inquisitorial boards unilaterally plucking norms from the sky to
pass judgment on their democratic legitimacy. Courts would be asked to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of legal norms only when two legal norms stand in
conflict. This means that only the action of a coordinate norm-generating entity
would open the door to judicial evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of legal
norms. For example, in order for a court to determine that a new regulation
possesses substantially greater democratic legitimacy than a preexisting conflicting statute, an agency must have first determined that the statute was of
suspect democratic legitimacy and have promulgated the new regulation.
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currently possible under extant system. The potential gains
include fewer anti-democratic outcomes, less incentive for judicial dishonesty or bias, and more transparency in judicial
opinions. In cases where the relative democratic legitimacy of
legal norms is a closer call, however, the presumption system
would work exactly as does the extant system. This feature
avoids the pitfalls of the multi-factor alternative.
Against these substantial advantages weigh the various
caveats. Perhaps most importantly, many reasonable minds
will conclude that the presumption alternative would greatly
enhance the power of the judiciary, of subordinate norms and
norm-generating entities, and older norms and long-retired
norm-generating entities."6 However, a shift to the presumption alternative would not radically transform the practical
power of subordinate or older norms and norm-generating entities. In particular it would not substantially amplify the
160. If this line of thinking is correct, the caveats are of great weight. However, for those who believe that the presumption alternative grants subordinate
norms, preexisting norms, and courts too much power, the system could be configured to provide additional safeguards against frequent rebuttals of the presumptions in favor of the categoric and chronologic axioms. One possibility
would be to grant the categoric and chronologic axioms super-strong presumptions of applicability. Another possibility would be to require more than a substantial disparity in the democratic legitimacy of two conflicting legal norms.
Rebuttal of the categoric and chronologic axioms might also require a showing
that the norms of superordinate category or the newer norm makes an exceedingly weak claim to democratic legitimacy. These additional requirements
would limit rebuttals of the two axioms to those cases where their ordinary application would result in a flagrantly anti-democratic outcome.
Of course, the additional requirements would come at the cost of a
higher rate of anti-democratic outcomes and a stronger incentive for resort to
judicial manipulation aimed at avoiding anti-democratic outcomes than would
otherwise be the case. There exists a value trade off between preservation of
separation of powers boundary lines and achieving outcomes that enhance or
preserve the democratic legitimacy of law. The harder it is to rebut the presumptions in favor of application of the categoric and chronologic axioms, the
more likely that norms of relatively superior democratic legitimacy will be nullified by norms of relatively low democratic legitimacy.
The extant system in effect operates with an irrebuttable presumption
that norms belonging to higher order categories and newer norms are more democratically legitimate than norms belonging to lower order categories and
older norms. It always insures that separation of powers boundary lines remain
at least formally intact. In so doing, however, the extant system is forever condemned to produce a relatively high rate of anti-democratic outcomes, instances, for example, where a norm of relatively high perceived democratic legitimacy belonging to a lower order legal category is nullified by a conflicting
norm of relatively low democratic legitimacy belonging to a higher order legal
category.
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power of the courts.
The reason for this is simple. Both the extant and presumption systems afford courts broad discretion. Under the
extant system judicial discretion is channeled through biased
and manipulated application of free-ranging interpretive discretion. In contrast, under the presumption alternative, discretion would be channeled (at least in the easy cases)
through factors for assessing the democratic legitimacy of
conflicting legal norms. Though the locus of judicial discretion is different, the presumption alternative would not give
courts substantially more discretion than courts operating
under the extant system already exercise. In other words, the
presumption alternative would grant courts, subordinate
norms and the entities that create them, and older norms and
the entities that create them, certain powers that they do not
now formally possess. Often, however, these powers already
may be expressed in informal and irregular ways under the
extant system.
Though outcomes and judicial power might not differ substantially under the extant and presumption systems, the
presumption alternative likely would engender greater judicial honesty and greater transparency of reasoning in judicial
opinions than does the extant system. Under the extant system, courts that seek to avoid nullification of norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy via benign interpretive
dishonesty or interpretive biases leave important reasons motivating outcomes out of written opinions. Courts operating
under the presumption alternative, in contrast, would have
reason to state, confront, and publicly discuss the democratic
legitimacy concerns motivating outcomes in their written
opinions. Honesty and openness in the justification of judicial
decisions is always to be preferred over opaque obfuscation.
This honesty, however, comes at a price. Formally legitimized transgressions of separation of powers boundary
lines, inversions of chronologic orderings, and exercises of judicial power make for formidable psychological barriers to
adoption of the presumption alternative. It is difficult to
imagine courts proclaiming for themselves a formal power to
trump regulations and statutes that they find democratically
suspect. It is equally hard to imagine Congress seeking a
formally recognized power to alter the Constitution without
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recourse to We the People. 6 ' Though informal practices may
not be so different, the unorthodox features of subordinate
norms trumping superordinate norms, older norms trumping
newer norms, and judicial power determining when these
events take place, almost certainly would provoke concentrated opposition.
2.

The Institution PromptingSystem

The previous Section suggested that a legislature may informally invite courts to reshape a constitutional norm by
passing a statute at odds with the standing doctrinal meaning of a constitutional norm.162 Sometimes, however, the tables are turned. Courts may informally invite legislative reformulation or even repeal of a statute. In these cases, a
court will enforce a statute despite troubling features, but include in the text of an opinion a written plea for legislative
reconsideration." This informal judicial signaling appears to
have provoked legislative reform in at least some cases." A
second alternative system would retain most features of the
extant system but would regularize and expand this informal
judicial practice of inviting Congress to engage in legislative
change.
Under what I will call the institution prompting alternative, courts adjudicating cases involving conflicting legal
norms would identify norms of suspect democratic legitimacy
and would formally invite or even compel reconsideration of
those norms by the entities that created them. The system
responds to the concern that the presumption system would
grant too much power to subordinate norms, older norms, and
the federal courts.
The key to the institution prompting alternative lies in a

161. A constitutional amendment would be needed for Congress to exercise
such a formally recognized power. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 432 (2000) (holding that Congress does not have the power to alter procedural rules required by the Constitution).
162. See supra p. 305-06.
163. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2503 (2004)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (acceding with holding that federal ERISA statute
preempts claims allowed by state law but encouraging Congress to "revisit what
is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime").
164. See Eskridge, supra note 83, at 337-38 (presenting evidence suggesting
that Congress sometimes alters statutes in response to Supreme Court constructions).
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formal process used to notify coordinate norm-generating entities that a court has identified a situation where the extant
system will produce nullification of a norm of relatively
strong democratic legitimacy. Once provided formal notice,
the entity that created the suspect norm would have the opportunity to engage in two tasks. First, it could eliminate any
conflict between the two norms by altering or abolishing the
norm of suspect democratic legitimacy. Second, it could leave
the suspect norm unchanged.
Offering the entity that created the norm of suspect democratic legitimacy the opportunity to alter or abolish the
norm, or to leave the norm unchanged, would recast the roles
of the various institutional players. First, unlike what would
occur under the presumption system, courts would be relieved
of unilateral or monopoly power to determine when the categoric or chronologic axioms should be discarded. Instead,
courts would function primarily as identifiers of norms of
suspect democratic legitimacy and as signalers to coordinate
norm-generating entities. Second and relatedly, the institution prompting alternative would give the norm-generating
entities that created norms of suspect democratic legitimacy a
substantial role in the resolution of conflicts between legal
norms.
Consider how the system would operate in the context of
the anti-spam regulation illustration. Faced with a difficult
to avoid conflict between the popular regulation and the special interest statute, a court would first apply multi-factor
analysis to assess the relative democratic legitimacy of the
two legal norms. If the court finds that the disparity in democratic legitimacy between the statute and the regulation is
not too pronounced, the court would apply the categoric axiom
and nullify the regulation. If, however, the court finds the
disparity in democratic legitimacy between the subordinate
regulation and the superordinate statute sufficiently substantial, it would refrain from applying the categoric axiom.
At this point, the presumption system would permit a
court to simply uphold the regulation and nullify the suspect
statute. Under the institution prompting alternative, however, the court would be required to formally inform Congress, the entity that created the statute of suspect democratic legitimacy, that the court has identified a conflict
between a statute of apparently questionable democratic
165
legitimacy and a regulation of solid democratic legitimacy.
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gitimacy and a regulation of solid democratic legitimacy.16
After receiving formal notice, Congress could amend or
repeal the suspect statute in order to preserve the regulation,
or could leave the statute unchanged, thereby nullifying the
regulation. 16 Either way, the ultimate responsibility for resolution of the statute-regulation conflict would lie not with a
court, but rather with the entity that created the norm identified as suspect in terms of democratic legitimacy. The judicial role would shift from
ultimate decision-maker to that of
167
signaler and prompter.
Notice the altered dynamic that would prevail under the
institution prompting alternative. Under the extant system,
a legal norm of suspect democratic legitimacy can be formally
altered only by the entity that created the norm or a superordinate entity, or informally altered by a court willing to
deploy interpretive manipulation. This state of affairs leaves
many legal norms of suspect democratic legitimacy invulnerable to elimination or alteration. The same special interests
that achieved passage of a special interest statute, for example, can often prevent its alteration.'6 Moreover, courts may
be either unable or unwilling to deploy interpretive manipu165. The formal notice envisioned would take the form of an official judicial
decree and would be transmitted to appropriate personnel within the entity that
created the norm of suspect democratic legitimacy. In this case, for example,
the system might require that formal notice be delivered to the chairperson and
ranking minority member of the House and Senate legislative committees responsible for passage of the statute of suspect democratic legitimacy.
166. Presumably, acceptance of the new regulation and consequent full or
partial repeal of the conflicting statute would require approval of both chambers
of Congress as well as approval by the Chief Executive. Any other formula
would require a Constitutional amendment or modification in the doctrinal interpretation of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses. See I.N.S. v.
Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that bicameralism and presentment must
be satisfied to create new statutory law).
167. Thus far the article has discussed the institution prompting system
within the context of statutes and regulations. The system could be adapted to
apply to cases involving other types of legal norms as well. Consider cases involving conflicts between statutes and constitutional norms. Thus, an agency or
Congress could create legal norms in conflict with a constitutional norm. If a
federal court was convinced that the new regulation or statute possesses substantially greater democratic legitimacy than the constitutional norm, the issue
could somehow be referred to We the People. One possibility would be to refer
the new regulation or statute to Congress for compulsory consideration of a constitutional amendment that would eliminate any conflict between the Constitution and the regulation or statute.
168. Even without the intervention of special interests, legislative inertia
may result in the perpetuation of the special interest-oriented statute.
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lation aimed at eviscerating the special interest statute. Facing these realities, an agency may be hesitant to expend time
and resources promulgating a new regulation that will be at
odds with a special interest statute.
The institution prompting alternative offers a set of institutional arrangements that could break this impasse. It offers courts a device for provoking congressional reconsideraEven if
tion of the suspect special interest statute.
of the
alteration
or
in
repeal
result
reconsideration does not
special interest statute, the system would obligate Congress
to examine the conflicting statutes and therefore accept ultimate responsibility for the result. The possibility that Congress could be forced to confront the special interest statute it
created would, in turn, encourage an administrative agency
to promulgate a public-regarding regulation in conflict with
the special interest statute.
Moreover, the institution prompting alternative would
generate less incentive for judicial manipulation of interpretive discretion than does the extant system. Courts operating
under the extant system know that in some cases, but for interpretive manipulation, norms of suspect democratic legitimacy will nullify norms of strong democratic legitimacy. Under the institution prompting alternative, in contrast, courts
will know that partial or even full responsibility for an antidemocratic outcome will fall to a coordinate norm-generating
entity. By offering courts the option of referring norms of
suspect democratic legitimacy back to the promulgating entity, the institution prompting alternative reduces the temptation for courts to engage in interpretive subterfuge and manipulation.
An institution prompting alternative could be configured
in several different ways. At one extreme the system could
involve nothing more than a compulsory formal judicial notice
requesting reconsideration of a norm of suspect democratic
legitimacy by the entity that created the norm. The entity
that created the norm, however, would not be required to respond in any official way to the formal notice. If configured in
this fashion, the system would closely resemble current informal practices. The key difference between current practices and the proposed system, of course, would be the requirement that courts undertake a signaling function by
issuing formal notice to the norm-generating entity. Any in-
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formal judicial signaling that now occurs is irregular and
haphazard. Some courts may be highly attuned to the democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal norms, while others may
completely ignore the issue. Some courts may habitually include an informal plea for reconsideration of norms of suspect
democratic legitimacy in their written opinions. Other courts
may never use informal signaling. Institution of a formalized
notice requirement would substantially reduce, if not eliminate, this inconsistency. It would direct all courts to be cognizant of norms of suspect democratic legitimacy and would
require that they signal coordinate norm-generating entities
in appropriate cases.
Moreover, a shift from informal to formal signaling would
ensure that the intended recipients, the norm-generating entities, pick up the signal. Any informal signaling that now
takes place depends upon the active surveillance of judicial
opinions by Congress, regulatory agencies, and interest
groups.'69 The formal notice process envisioned by the institution prompting alternative, in contrast, demands no action on
the part of norm-generating entities or interest groups.
Rather, the notice would be directed to key persons within
norm-generating entities and therefore could not be missed.
Perhaps most importantly, a shift from informal to formally required judicial signaling would alter the atmospherics surrounding norms of suspect democratic legitimacy. Currently, any informal signaling that courts undertake is in the
form of dicta and is thus easy to ignore. Issuance of a formal
notice, however, would carry more weight, perhaps similar in
gravity to the exercise of judicial review. Though recipient
entities would not be required to respond, the fact that a
court has taken the serious step of issuing such a notice
would make ignoring the matter more difficult than is now
the case.
Another configuration of the institution prompting system could require any norm-generating entity receiving a
formal notice to respond in some official way. Such a requirement might demand that the recipient entity decide
whether the suspect norm should remain unchanged, or
should be repealed or altered. Alternatively, the system could

169. See Eskridge, supra note 83, at 341-43 (discussing congressional monitoring of statutory interpretation decisions).
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merely require that the recipient entity explain why it should
not reconsider the suspect norm. If the recipient entity were
to offer reasons why reform or abolition of the suspect norm is
unnecessary, it will have extended its blessing to judicial determination of the issue in accord with the extant axiomatic
meta-norms. On the other hand, if the recipient entity were
to respond by directly addressing the suspect norm by nullifying or modifying the suspect norm or by specifically rejecting
the need for nullification or modification, the court will have
been relieved of sole power and responsibility for the ultimate
outcome.
Either way, the effect would be to shift more of the ultimate responsibility for the outcome of cases involving conflicting legal norms away from courts and onto superordinate
norm-generating entities. Whatever action the superordinate
entity might ultimately take, the judicial role would be limited to identifying the likely anti-democratic outcome and
prompting another norm-generating entity to address the
problem. Those other norm-generating entities, in contrast,
would take on either full or partial responsibility for ultimately determining which of two conflicting norms ought to
prevail. Under the extant system, the courts often end up as
the only entity practically capable of preventing the nullification of a norm of relatively strong democratic legitimacy.
Under the institution prompting alternative, courts could
shift this burden onto coordinate and superordinate normgenerating entities.
Another variable in configuring an institution prompting
system relates to the impact of inaction by the entity that
created a norm identified as suspect in terms of democratic
legitimacy.17 ° When a court has decided that it must issue a
formal notice to a coordinate norm-generating entity, and the
recipient entity fails to take any official action, what should
the institution prompting system permit a court to do?
170. In cases where a court issues notice to a coordinate norm-generating entity, and the recipient entity takes some official action, that action would determine the issue. Thus, in the context of the anti-spam regulation illustration,
if a court were to issue a formal notice and finding to Congress claiming that the
statute is of suspect democratic legitimacy, and if Congress were to officially decide to leave the statute unchanged, the statute would trump the regulation.
Conversely, if Congress were to decide that the statute should be repealed or
amended to eliminate any conflict with the regulation, the regulation would
survive.
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One option would be to require a court to apply the categoric or chronologic axiom. This configuration works minimal
change to the extant system because, as under the extant system, the court would be denied formal power to disregard the
categoric and chronologic axioms.'7 1 The other option, of
course, would be to permit courts to disregard the categoric
and chronologic axioms. Under this configuration, a court
could disregard the categoric axiom and provisionally nullify
the suspect statute, for example, if it were to find that a popular regulation possesses substantially greater democratic legitimacy than a special interest statute. The court would
then formally notify Congress that it has found the statute
problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy and that it has
provisionally nullified the statute. Congress would then have
the opportunity to reaffirm the suspect statute and thereby
reverse the court's provisional nullification of the statute. If,
however, Congress were to fail to respond to the notice, the
provisional judicial ruling would stand and the suspect statute would be nullified.
The key difference between these two options lies in the
consequences of inaction by the entity that has created the
norm identified as suspect in terms of its democratic legitimacy. Under the first configuration, inaction leaves the suspect norm in place. At least, however, the process creates an
opportunity for a court to formally identify a norm as suspect
and a mechanism that pressures the entity that created the
suspect norm to address the issue. Under the second configuration, inaction results in judicial nullification of the suspect
norm. The judicial nullification, however, occurs in an environment where the entity that created the suspect legal norm
is given formal notice and an opportunity to "correct" or reverse the preliminary judicial nullification of that norm."'
Regardless of the different configuration options, the essence of the institution prompting alternative lies in assigning courts two roles. First, courts would take on an active
171. Thus, in the context of the anti-spam regulation illustration, if Congress
were to completely ignore a formal judicial notice, the court would be required
to rule that the statute trumps the conflicting regulation.
172. Another configuration question centers on which courts would be
granted the power to issue formal notice to coordinate norm-generating entities.
One option would empower any federal court to issue formal notice. Another
option would limit the notice power to appellate courts, or even the Supreme
Court, with district courts limited to a fact-finding role.
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role in designating norms as suspect or lacking in terms of
democratic legitimacy. Second, courts would play a role in
prodding coordinate norm-generating entities to face and/or
address the norms of suspect democratic legitimacy that they
have created or allowed to persist."'a Unlike the presumption
system, however, the institution prompting alternative would
not grant courts a formally legitimized monopoly power to determine when the categoric or chronologic axiom should be
ignored.174 Instead, it would set in motion a process under
which courts, coupled with subordinate norm-generating entities, could stimulate superordinate norm-generating entities
to address the norms of suspect democratic legitimacy that
they have created.
Thus, against the persistence of a statute of suspect democratic legitimacy that Congress has failed to amend or repeal, a court and an administrative agency could cooperate to
spur congressional action. First, an administrative agency
would promulgate a regulation of solid democratic legitimacy
designed to stand in conflict with the statute. Next, the
courts enter the process. If a court were to find the statute
173. As with the multi-factor and presumption alternatives, the institution
prompting alternative would cast courts in a new role. Rather than mere interpreters of legal norms and deciders of individual cases, courts operating under
the institution prompting alternative would also be assessors of the democratic
legitimacy of legal norms. All of the pros and cons associated with this new role
covered in the discussions of the multi-factor and presumption alternatives apply to the institution prompting alternative as well.
The institution prompting alternative, however, would be less problematic on this front than the multi-factor and presumption alternatives. Any erroneous judicial determinations would be of lesser consequence under the
institution prompting alternative than under the multi-factor and presumption
alternatives. Rather than inversions of the categoric axiom and reversals of the
chronologic axiom by judicial fiat, under the institution prompting alternative
misguided judicial assessments of the democratic legitimacy of individual legal
norms would merely result in issuance of formal notices to coordinate normgenerating entities. The coordinate norm-generating entities would bear all or
most of the ultimate responsibility for the nullification or preservation of legal
norms identified by courts (rightly or wrongly) as suspect in terms of democratic
legitimacy.
174. Even if configured so that inaction would permit a court to disregard the
axioms, the court alone does not have the power to ignore the axioms. First, it
could only act in cases involving conflicting norms. This means that some other
norm-generating entity must have created a norm of substantially greater democratic legitimacy than the suspect norm in question. See supra note 159.
Second, the court could ignore the categoric and chronologic axiom if the entity
that created the suspect norm fails to act and thereby gives tacit consent to judicial resolution.
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and regulation in conflict, but also find that the disparity in
democratic legitimacy between the statute and the regulation
is not too substantial, the court would simply apply the categoric axiom. In short, if the court does not agree with the
agency, the subordinate regulation would be nullified by the
superordinate statute, as under the extant system. If, however, the court were to agree with the agency and find that
the regulation makes a substantially stronger claim to democratic legitimacy than the suspect statute, the court would
issue a formal notice memorializing its finding to Congress.
The important point is that only concurrence by two subordinate norm-generating entities, the agency and the court,
could result in judicial notice aimed at stimulating action by
the superordinate entity, Congress.175
The institution prompting alternative promises many of
the advantages of the presumption system but offers greater
protection for separation of powers boundary lines and an
automatic check on judicial power. Recall that the presumption alternative could result in a blurring of the separation of
powers boundary lines maintained under the extant system.
In cases where a court determines that the presumption in
favor of application of the categoric axiom is rebutted, a sub-

175. A similar sequence would play out in cases involving old and new norms
of the same kind. Consider a new special interest statute in conflict with a preexisting statute of solid democratic legitimacy. If the disparity in democratic
legitimacy between the new and the old statute were not too substantial, the
court would apply the chronologic axiom, and the new statute would fully or
partially repeal the old statute. If, however, the court were to find the disparity
between the democratic legitimacy of the old and new statutes sufficiently substantial, the court would issue formal notice of the finding to Congress.
176. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. Under the multi-factor and presumption alternatives, any legal norm would have the potential to trump any other
legal norm. An administrative regulation, for example, could trump a conflicting statute whenever a court finds that the former possesses greater (multifactor alternative) or substantially greater (presumption alternative) democratic
legitimacy than the latter. Under the institution prompting alternative all four
kinds of norms would retain their distinct trumping powers. A regulation would
never have the power to trump a conflicting statute. At most, the entity that
created the statute would have the power to alter the statute so that it does not
nullify a conflicting regulation, and the power to explicitly or implicitly consent
to nullification of the statute by a regulation of substantially stronger democratic legitimacy. There is a significant difference between permitting a regulation to trump a statute and permitting Congress to consent to permitting a
regulation to trump a statute. In the former case, the regulation itself possesses
the power to trump the statute. In the latter case, the regulation possesses no
such power. The power instead lies with the entity that created the statute.
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ordinate norm takes on the trumping powers possessed by a
superordinate norm. A new regulation of solid democratic legitimacy, for example, would be permitted to trump a conflicting statute of suspect democratic legitimacy.
The same blurring of separation of powers boundary lines
scenario would also be possible under the institution prompting alternative. Any blurring, however, would hinge not exclusively on a judicial determination, but rather on a judicial
determination followed by explicit or implicit (depending on
the configuration chosen) consent by the entity charged with
creating the norm of superordinate kind. In the regulationstatute context, the regulation could trump the conflicting
statute, but only if Congress has explicitly or implicitly acquiesced to such an outcome. In short, many of the concerns
over separation of powers values implicated by the presumption system are allayed by the fact that the institution
prompting alternative would not give courts the last word.
The institution prompting alternative is not without limitations and drawbacks. First and foremost, it would not always save norms of relatively strong democratic legitimacy
from nullification by conflicting norms of suspect democratic
legitimacy. The addition of formal mechanisms aimed at forcing norm-generating entities to confront the suspect norms
they created or allowed to persist cannot force those entities
to abolish or amend those norms. In many instances, therefore, the special interest statute would still nullify the popular public-regarding regulation.
Moreover, there may exist incentives deterring subordinate norm-generating entities from even setting the wheels of
an institution prompting alternative in motion. Consider incentives facing an agency operating under powers delegated
by a special interest oriented statute. Under the institution
prompting alternative, the agency could promulgate a conflicting public-regarding regulation. Such a regulation could
cause a court to issue formal notice to Congress finding the
statute to be of suspect democratic legitimacy. Before setting
these wheels in motion, however, the agency would have to
consider the realities of its institutional place and the realities of congressional oversight. If the agency were to promulgate such a regulation, Congress might retaliate by limiting
growth of the agency's budget or even by stripping the agency
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of jurisdiction over certain matters.'77 In at least some instances, the balance of incentives would deter the agency
from promulgating a public-regarding regulation designed to
prompt congressional reexamination of a special interest
statute.
Of course, these limitations do not mean that the institution prompting alternative would be without merit or consequence. The issuance of judicial notice under the institution
prompting alternative would not force entities to reform the
norms of suspect democratic legitimacy that they have created. In many cases, however, notice would create the opportunity and therefore the possibility of reform, and in other
cases actually prompt such reform. There is no doubt that
subordinate entities would refrain from setting the wheels of
the institution prompting alternative in motion under certain
circumstances. Still, in other circumstances, subordinate entities would set those wheels in motion.
No system could obtain results that enhance or preserve
the democratic legitimacy of law in all cases. The question,
however, is one of comparison. Considering all of the above
factors, would the institution prompting alternative operate
better than the extant system, the presumption alternative,
or the other alternatives? Ultimately the answer may depend
upon one's preferences. For those inclined to place high value
on eradication of norms of suspect democratic legitimacy, the
presumption alternative may work best. For those inclined to
favor eradication of norms of suspect democratic legitimacy,
but also concerned about granting courts too much formal
power, the institution prompting alternative may function
best. For those who place less value on eradication of norms
of suspect democratic legitimacy, but high value on simplicity,
continuity, and maintenance of traditional institutional roles,
the extant system may suffice.
C. Minor Modifications to the Extant System
The final two alternative systems are aimed at addressing the problems of anti-democratic outcomes and the
Hobson's choice produced by the extant system, while simultaneously minimizing disruption to traditional institutional
177.

See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS §

3.1, at 42-43 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing congressional oversight of agencies).
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roles. The first of these final two alternatives modifies the institution prompting alternative discussed in the previous Section. The second would leave the extant system unchanged
but would add a pair of norm interpretation canons to assist
courts facing norms that might be read as standing in irreconcilable conflict.
1.

The Institution Option System

The institution prompting alternative permits two
subordinate norm-generating entities to collaborate in
prompting a superordinate entity to reconsider legal norms of
suspect democratic legitimacy. One possible concern with
this arrangement is that it would unsettle traditional
institutional roles and upset the primacy of superordinate
Sticking with the
entities over subordinate entities. 178
regulation and statute illustrations, though offering Congress
the last word, the institution prompting alternative gives
subordinate courts and agencies license to provoke
Rather than merely appliers and
congressional action.
interpreters of legislative commands, agencies and179 courts
would become legitimized critics of legislative output.
The next alternative responds to this concern by changing the timing and authority to decide whether institution
prompting steps may be undertaken. Under what I will call
the "institution option" alternative, the power to decide
whether institution prompting processes may occur would be
taken away from subordinate entities and placed in the hands
of superordinate entities. Moreover, the timing of that decision would be shifted from some point after a given legal
norm has been in force to the time that a given norm is created. Entities would either grant or deny pre-consent to application of institution prompting processes to that legal
norm. For example, when passing a statute Congress would
have the option of including a clause expressly permitting an
178. See supranote 160 and accompanying text.
179. The same sort of difficulty arises in cases involving norms other than
statutes and in cases in which the norms in question are of the same kind. For
example, where a new special interest statute stands in conflict with a preexisting statute of strong democratic legitimacy, the institution prompting alternative would permit what amounts to a collaboration between the congress that
passed the preexisting statute and a court that would prompt the current congress to reconsider the more recently created statute. This arrangement upsets
the normal primacy of today's congress over long-retired congresses.

322

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

Vol: 45

appropriate agency to promulgate regulations in conflict with
the statute. 18' The express permission could include limiting
requirements, such as a requirement that the agency make
specific findings establishing that the statute lacks a solid
claim of democratic legitimacy, or findings establishing that
the new regulation makes a substantially stronger claim to
democratic legitimacy than the statute.'81
Assuming that Congress has given consent, the institution option system would operate just as would the institution
prompting alternative. Thus, if an agency has promulgated a
regulation that stands in conflict with a statute of suspect
democratic legitimacy, a court would then make an independent assessment of the democratic legitimacy of the statute
and the regulation. If the court were to determine that, despite the agency finding, the new regulation does not possess
substantially greater democratic legitimacy than the statute,
the regulation would be vacated and the statute would continue unchanged. If, however, the court were to agree with
the agency determination, the court would issue a formal notice to Congress of its finding, thus providing Congress with
an opportunity to reconsider the statute. As under the institution prompting alternative, Congress could then either reject the new regulation, or accept it and modify the statute.'8 2
180. Clearly, adoption of this system would necessitate a constitutional
amendment or modification of existing separation of powers doctrine. See generally A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(holding that Congress may not delegate legislative powers); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
181. Similarly, a constitutional amendment could include a clause permitting
future modifications to the amendment via legislation, or a new regulation could
include a clause permitting judicial modification, if it appears that the amendment or regulation no longer can make a strong claim to democratic legitimacy.
182. All of the configuration permutations at play with the institution
prompting alternative are also possible for the institution option alternative.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.2. Thus, the institution option alternative could
either permit or require a response when an entity is formally notified that a
norm of its creation has been identified as suspect in terms of democratic legitimacy. Also, the effect of no response could be either that the standard categoric and chronologic axioms will govern the case or that the axioms may be ignored.
In addition, however, another important configuration choice arises. On
one configuration, subordinate norm-generating entities would be prohibited
from undertaking actions, provoking reconsideration of legal norms by the entities that created them, unless the entity that created the norm had explicitly
consented. Thus, where Congress creates a statute that does not specify
whether subordinate entities are permitted to undertake institution prompting
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The key point is that the institution option alternative
would give norm-generating entities greater control over the
norms they create than would the institution prompting alternative. The institution prompting alternative would give
subordinate norm-generating entities unfettered authority to
undertake an institution prompting process. In contrast, under the institution option alternative, subordinate normgenerating entities could undertake institution prompting activities only when a superordinate entity has pre-consented.
Simply stated, the institution prompting alternative would
give superordinate entities the last word, while the institution choice alternative would give them both the first and the
last word regarding the fate of legal norms of arguably suspect democratic legitimacy.
The pre-consent feature should defuse criticism that
some might level against the institution prompting alternative. If, for example, Congress has pre-consented to a process
under which agencies and courts can take steps to provoke
congressional reconsideration of statutes of suspect democratic legitimacy, concerns over unsettling the primacy of Congress over agencies and courts are diminished. Similarly,
reservations over whether courts are up to the task of evaluating the democratic legitimacy of legal norms would be ameliorated by the pre-consent feature. If Congress were to offer
pre-consent, presumably the thinking would be that courts
(and also agencies) are capable of assessing the democratic
legitimacy of the particular norm in question.
The institution option alternative, however, may throw
the baby out with the bath water. In an effort to minimize
and cabin any unorthodox role for courts and other subordinate norm-generating entities, much of the potential for improvement on the performance of the extant system might be
lost. In the first instance, pre-consent may be a rare occurrence. One would expect that in the vast majority of situations norm creating entities would prefer that the norms they
activities, agencies and courts would be forbidden to undertake those activities.
On the other configuration, the default rule could be set in the opposite direction. Subordinate norm-generating entities would be permitted to undertake
actions provoking reconsideration of legal norms unless the entity that created
a norm explicitly so prohibits it. Thus, where Congress creates a statute and
does not specify whether subordinate entities are permitted to undertake institution prompting activities, agencies and courts would be permitted to undertake those activities.
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create not be subjected to institution prompting scrutiny by
subordinate norm-generating entities. Usually, those pushing for the creation of a new legal norm prefer to entrench the
norm as much as possible against future nullification or revision. Pre-consenting to institution prompting actions works
against entrenchment because it permits subordinate normgenerating entities to unleash a process that may prompt alteration or nullification of the norm in question.
In the legislative context, for example, assembling a
minimum winning coalition and navigating the legislative
labyrinth to secure passage of a new statute is usually extremely difficult.1" Those pushing for passage of a new statute would usually prefer to entrench the statute against alteration. Pre-consent to formally legitimized agency and
court questioning of the democratic legitimacy of the statute,
however, exposes that statute to alteration by coordinate
branches of government. The same logic holds for constitutional and administrative norms. In most cases, therefore,
pre-consent to institution prompting actions would be denied,
and conflicts between legal norms would be adjudicated under
the extant axioms. Most of the problems of anti-democratic
outcomes, incentives for bias and dishonest judicial manipulation, and opacity in judicial opinions, would remain.
Still, the institution option alternative could constitute
an improvement over the extant system. The extant system
offers no options. When a norm-generating entity creates a
legal norm it knows that it can be formally altered only by
that same entity or by a superordinate entity. The institution
option alternative, in contrast, would at least offer a choice.
In some instances norm-generating entities would choose to
subject the norms they create to formally legitimized scrutiny
by subordinate entities. For example, Congress sometimes
might actually prefer pre-consent to institution prompting
processes over the probable alternative-informal judicial
and agency manipulation. The former allows subordinate entities to merely pressure Congress to reconsider its own
norms when they are of suspect democratic legitimacy. Congress, however, retains the last word. The latter results in
subordinate entities manipulating and reshaping legal norms

183. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supranote 83, at 66-67 (discussing legislative process
as series of vetogates and hurdles).
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when they are of suspect democratic legitimacy."M In other
instances, inclusion of pre-consent to institution prompting
alternatives might be needed to assemble a minimum winning coalition in Congress for passage of a statute. Undecided legislators might be persuaded to vote for a bill only if
courts and agencies are authorized to prompt legislative reexamination of the statute at some future date. Provisions
pre-consenting to institution prompting might also become a
chip deployed in legislative bargains and logrolls. For example, in exchange for a legislator's support on one bill, the legislator might demand the inclusion of a pre-consent provision
in another bill.'8 5
Overall, the institution option alternative probably promises less improvement on the performance of the extant system than some of the other alternatives discussed earlier. On
the other hand, it would not unsettle the primacy of superordinate norm-generating entities over subordinate normgenerating entities as much as some of the other alternatives.
Whether one finds the institution option alternative appealing will depend on the strength of one's preferences for improved performance versus tolerance for novel and unorthodox institutional relationships.
The Interpretive Canon Alternative
A final alternative would leave all four extant axioms
completely unchanged but would add two related canons of
2.

184. It is also possible that pre-consent to institution prompting will lessen
incentives for judicial manipulation of the meaning of legal norms. Under the
extant system courts recognize that they alone can prevent nullification of a
norm of relatively strong democratic legitimacy via manipulation of interpretive
discretion. This creates a strong incentive for resort to interpretative manipulation. When pre-consent to institution prompting has been extended, in contrast,
courts will know that ultimate responsibility will lie with a superordinate normgenerating entity. This may lessen the incentive for courts to resort to interpretive manipulation.
185. The issue of pre-consent to institution prompting would operate as an
issue over which legislative gate-keepers bargain and logroll. Proponents of a
bill struggling to assemble a minimum winning coalition in Congress might offer a clause consenting to institution prompting as a way to convince fence sitters to vote for the legislation. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast,
The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the
1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1433-35,
1439-43 (2003) (discussing how passage of legislation requires coalition building
and bargaining and how "pivotal legislators" may demand concessions in exchange for support of bill).
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interpretation. One canon would instruct courts to interpret

norms, when possible, to avoid conflict if conflict would result
in nullification of the norm of substantially greater democratic legitimacy. A second canon would instruct courts to interpret norms, when possible, to embrace conflict if conflict
would result in nullification of the norm of substantially
lesser democratic legitimacy."6 The first canon would signal
courts to identify and protect norms of strong democratic legitimacy and to use their interpretive discretion to ensure
that norms of strong democratic legitimacy are not nullified.
The Second canon would signal courts to identify and strike
down norms of suspect democratic legitimacy and to use their
interpretive discretion to ensure that norms of weak democratic legitimacy are nullified. The proposed canons may be
reduced or simplified to a presumption against norm interpretations that would substantially diminish the democratic
legitimacy of law.
For the most part, the proposed canons of interpretation
would not stand out as oddities among the existing stock of
norm interpretation rules. We already have dozens of interpretive canons that, for one reason or another, instruct courts
to adopt norm interpretations that diverge from the most
natural textual meaning and/or most probable legislative intent."7 The well-known rule of lenity, for example, instructs
courts to interpret ambiguous criminal law statutes with a
bias that favors criminal defendants. 8 A lesser-known substantive canon instructs courts to interpret ambiguous statutes with a bias favoring the rights of Native Americans." 9
These are just two of many interpretive rules that direct
courts to favor particular substantive outcomes over the most
natural meaning and most probable intent when interpreting
186. Courts could be required to apply a predetermined multi-factor analysis
similar to that discussed previously when determining whether a norm of
strong democratic legitimacy stands at risk of nullification by a legal norm of
substantially lesser democratic legitimacy. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
187. See William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term, Forward:Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, app. 97-108 (1994)
(appendix listing canons of legal construction used by the Rehnquist Court).
188. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980) (leading federal case for
rule of lenity under which ambiguous criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor of lenity towards the defendant).
189. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) ("Statutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit..
").
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legal norms."'
The proposed two canons strongly resemble existing coherence-oriented interpretive rules and canons. One such
canon instructs courts to avoid conflicts between statutes.
Even where the most natural reading of the text and/or intent
of two statutes would suggest a conflict, courts are instructed
to select plausible interpretations that avoid conflict.'9 '

An-

other canon instructs courts to avoid reading legal norms in a
manner that would result in conflict with a constitutional
norm. Thus, rather than read a given statute in accord with
its most natural textual meaning or most probable legislative
intent, the so-called avoidance canon instructs courts to adopt92
an interpretation that avoids conflict with the Constitution.
A third analogous principle, the Chevron doctrine, instructs
courts to find no conflict between statutes and regulations so
long as the
regulation adopts a plausible interpretation of the
193

statute.

Consider how the proposed canons would work in a case
involving a new special interest statute (suspect democratic
legitimacy) and preexisting public-regarding regulations
(strong democratic legitimacy). Assume that the preexisting
regulations establish product safety standards of broad public
benefit. The record of legislative history, however, indicates
that in passing the new statute Congress intended to provide
special interest benefits by exempting certain manufacturers
from the regulations. The text of the statute is open textured
and compatible with contradictory interpretations. It could
plausibly be read as congruous with the intended exemptions,
but also could be read as not permitting any exemptions from
the public-regarding safety regulations.
On this scenario, the proposed canons of construction
would instruct a court to bend the meaning of the norms to

190. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 83, app. B at 21-23 (listing substantive
canons of statutory construction).
191. This is the well known rule of statutory construction which imposes a
rebuttable presumption against full or partial repeal of the preexisting statute
by a new statute. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (most cited federal
case for presumption against implied repeals).
192. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 83, app. B at 20-21 (listing "continuity in
law" canons of statutory construction and other canons, such as canon calling
for interpretation of same terms in similar way).
193. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (holding
that courts must uphold agency statutory interpretation if reasonable).
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avoid conflict between statutes and regulations, thereby preserving the public-regarding regulations. To achieve this end
a court would ignore the record of legislative history and seize
upon a plausible reading of the statutory text that would not
permit any exemptions to the public-regarding regulations.
This exercise would not differ in essence from what courts often do when applying the rule against implied repeal of statutes, the avoidance canon, or the Chevron doctrine rule requiring courts to uphold reasonable agency interpretations of
statutes. In all such instances, courts embrace not the most
natural textual or most likely intended interpretations of legal norms, but instead embrace the interpretations that avoid
conflicts between norms. Courts do this even if the chosen interpretation is located on or even beyond the outer edges of
plausible meaning."
In other cases, however, the proposed canons of interpretation would direct courts to do something that the existing
"coherence" rules do not dictate: bend the meaning of legal
norms to embrace conflicts between legal norms. Reversing
the polarity of the previous example illustrates this point.
Assume that an agency captured by the industry it regulates
issues a set of weak product safety regulations. The regulations fail to provide meaningful protection to the public and
instead provide substantial benefits to the regulated industry.
If aware of the lax nature of the regulations and the benefits
to the regulated industry, the public would surely disapprove.
Concerned legislators introduce a new bill in Congress that
would stand in conflict with the existing regulations.
If passed as introduced, the statute would force the
agency to promulgate a new set of more rigorous and publicregarding regulations which would eradicate the special interest benefits to the regulated industry. Legislators, influ194. See Petroski, supra note 50, at 497; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism:An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in
the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 779-80 (1995) (discussing
theory that use of textualist interpretation when reviewing agency interpretations is attributable to ideology or political preferences of judges); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, JudicialIncentives and Indeterminacyin Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DuKE L. J. 1051, 1067-72 (1995)
(arguing that when reviewing agency decisions courts are "results-oriented" despite Chevron doctrine); William S. Jordan, III, Deference Revisited Politicsas
a Determinant of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron
Consensus, 68 NEB. L. REV. 454, 486-90, 515 (1989) (arguing that politics of
judge influences judicial application of the Chevron doctrine).
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enced by lobbyists and campaign contributions from the affected industry, however, advance amendments rendering key
provisions of the bill vague and ineffectual. To secure passage through the maze of committees, sub-committees, and
both chambers of Congress, proponents of the bill must accede to many of the amendments. Because the statutory text
ends up ambiguous, the captured agency is able to adopt a
new set of regulations that only minimally diminish the special interest benefits, and that nonetheless are compatible
with a reasonable reading of the new statute. Under normal
Chevron doctrine interpretive rules, a court would uphold the
regulations. 5 At the end of the process, the bulk of the special interest benefits would remain intact. 196
The proposed canons of construction, however, would direct courts to read the norms in question not to avoid conflict
(as does the Chevron doctrine), but rather to embrace conflict
if conflict would result in nullification of the norm of substantially lesser democratic legitimacy. By interpreting the open
textured statute so that it stands in maximum conflict with
the special interest-benefiting regulations, the regulations
will be nullified and the special interest benefits eliminated
or at least minimized.
Like the multi-factor, presumption, institution prompting, and institution option alternatives, the interpretive
canon alternative would ask courts to engage in a task that is
at least formally new and perhaps unfamiliar: evaluate the
democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms.'97 However,
as already mentioned, since many courts already informally
195. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (holding that courts must uphold
agency statutory interpretation if reasonable).
196. This outcome assumes that a court would not manipulate the Chevron
doctrine, would find that the agency interpretation is not reasonable, and would
thereby strike down the special interest legislation. See supra note 43. It certainly is possible, however, that a court operating under the extant system
might manipulate the Chevron doctrine to find that the regulations do not constitute a reasonable interpretation of the new statute.
197. The consequences of such judicial evaluations, however, would differ
sharply under the various alternative systems. Under the multi-factor alternative, for example, a court would uphold whichever legal norm it finds to possess
greater democratic legitimacy. Under the institution prompting alternative, the
court would issue formal notice to the entity that created a norm of suspect democratic legitimacy. Under the interpretive canon alternative, the court would
apply one of the two proposed canons, which give the court license to bend the
meaning of legal norms to avoid what would otherwise be an anti-democratic
outcome.
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assess the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms
and bend (and sometimes even break) the meaning of legal
norms to avoid anti-democratic outcomes, the novelty and
transition period difficulty would be minimal.19 8 Like some of
the other alternative systems, the proposed canons constitute
one way of formalizing, legitimizing, and regularizing something that courts already informally do, to varying degrees,
under the guise of interpretive discretion.
The benefits of the proposed interpretive canons are
plain. First, formal adoption of the proposed canons would
homogenize, to some degree, judicial interpretation in cases
involving norms that potentially stand in conflict. Some
courts may currently be too hesitant to use their flexible interpretive discretion to avoid anti-democratic outcomes. The
proposed canons would signal courts that they need not be
hesitant. Unlike the extant system, the interpretive canon
alternative would minimize the Hobson's choice between interpretive manipulation and anti-democratic outcomes. The
anti-rule of law stigma of interpretive manipulation would be
removed (and indeed legitimized). As for courts currently too
willing to dishonestly twist interpretive rules in order to
avoid anti-democratic outcomes, the proposed canons would
signal that there are limits to such practices. The proposed
canons do not endorse outright judicial dishonesty or the
adoption of interpretations that do not find plausible support
in the text or intent of legal norms. They only endorse bending the meaning of legal norms within the range of plausible
meanings. Adoption of the interpretive canons would not
render courts fully identical or interchangeable in their treatment of cases involving potentially conflicting legal norms. It
could, however, narrow the range of inconsistency.
A second possible benefit of the interpretive canon alternative is that, like some of the other alternatives, it could enTo determine
hance transparency in judicial opinions.9
whether either of the canons is applicable, courts would be
forced to analyze, compare, and discuss the democratic legitimacy of conflicting legal norms. Any informal weighing of
such considerations currently employed must be camouflaged,
only to be expressed through biases and manipulation in the
198. See supranote 129 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 124; see also discussion supra pp. 283-84.
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interpretation of legal norms. The democratic legitimacy concerns that may drive judicial decisions would be brought out
into the open, would become a legitimate part of legal argument, and would be expressed on the face of the written opinion. Again, openness is always to be preferred over opacity.
Beneficial shifts in the incentives facing norm-generating
entities offer a third possible benefit. If such norms could be
easily changed, superordinate norm-generating entities would
have less incentive to create legal norms of suspect democratic legitimacy. The payoff for creation of a special interestoriented statute, for example, is far less when courts are instructed to interpret with a bias aimed at diminishing such
norms than when they interpret without this substantive
bias.
Moreover, the costs of securing special interest statutory
policy against dilution by subordinate norm-generating entities would increase. Only exceedingly precise and specific
statutory language would immunize the special interest oriented statute from dilution by courts and agencies wielding
the proposed canons of interpretation. In the face of a special
interest-oriented statute of ambiguous or open textured wording, an agency could promulgate a regulation that removes or
dilutes the special interest favors. Courts armed with the
suggested canons of interpretation would have a powerful tool
permitting them to legitimately uphold the agency regulation
as consistent with the statute.
In addition, the suggested canons would create powerful
incentives for subordinate entities to create norms of strong
democratic legitimacy. When an agency, for example, promulgates a regulation of strong democratic legitimacy, it will
know that courts will strive to protect that regulation by
reading any statutes of suspect democratic legitimacy as not
in conflict with the regulation. The creation of such a regulation would have the effect of narrowing the impact of statutes
of suspect democratic legitimacy. °°
200. Thus, an agency could create a new regulation that would conflict with
the already established and most natural interpretation of some statute. If that
statute is of suspect democratic legitimacy and the regulation is of strong democratic legitimacy, the agency can depend on a court to reshape the statute in
order to eliminate any possible conflict and accommodate the regulation. Similarly, if Congress passes a statute of strong democratic legitimacy, it knows that
courts will strive to interpret that statute, and any subsequent agency created
regulation that is of weak democratic legitimacy, to preserve the statute and
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A practical advantage of the interpretive canon alternative is that it stands a much better chance of adoption than
any of the previously discussed alternative systems. Legal
change usually occurs both incrementally and using existing
and known templates. Not only does the interpretive canon
alternative leave the extant axioms unchanged, it also builds
on the recognized template of existing substantive interpretive norms. Courts dealing with possibly conflicting legal
norms would merely read those norms with the substantive
bias suggested by the interpretive canon alternative. Alternative systems ranging from the multi-factor system to the
institutional option system, in contrast, would erect new formal processes and institutional arrangements. Even though
the new processes and institutional arrangements might
largely formalize and legitimize what already may informally
occur under the guise of interpretive discretion, they would
create many more substantial changes than would the interpretive canon alternative. °'
The interpretive canon alternative, like all possible systems, has potential drawbacks. First and foremost, it would
not improve on the performance of the extant system in the
most important cases. Return to the anti-spam regulation illustration. In that case, the only way to avoid nullification of
the popular regulation was to go beyond bending the meaning
of the norms to actually break interpretive rules and to engage in dishonest interpretation. The proposed canons would
not sanction that kind of judicial behavior. Courts facing
cases in which no plausible and honest interpretation of the
norms in question could avoid an anti-democratic outcome
would still face the Hobson's choice between dishonest interpretation and anti-democratic outcomes.
Second, the interpretive canon alternative would continue to grant courts primary control over the outcomes in
cases where norms of strong democratic legitimacy potentially stand in conflict with norms of suspect democratic legitimacy. Unlike the institution prompting alternative, for

nullify such regulations.
201. Moreover, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to fashion new rules
and presumptions of legal interpretation aimed at advancing substantive ends.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 285

(1994) (explaining that Supreme Court has created new substantive canons of
interpretation in recent decades).
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example, the interpretive canon alternative includes no formal mechanism for incorporating the input of coordinate
norm-generating entities.
Third, the proposed canons would (like the last several
alternatives) call on courts to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms. This turns out to be a central
issue. Rather than ask courts to undertake an evaluation of
the democratic legitimacy of legal norms, the extant system
strives to keep courts from engaging in this activity. It instead uses a simple metric-the democratic legitimacy of
One bottom line question is
norm-generating entities."°2
whether courts are better at assessing the democratic legitimacy of legal norms than this simplistic metric. At least in
the easy cases-easy because there exists a substantial disparity in the democratic legitimacy of two norms--courts employing the proposed canons probably would do a better job
than the extant system. Moreover, under the extant system,
in the easy cases many courts already informally do what the
canons would endorse.
Finally, the interpretive canon alternative would fail to
resolve a central dilemma of the extant system. Why bother
with the rigid, discretion-denying axioms if courts are offered
enough flexibility in interpreting legal norms to select outcomes in spite of the rigid, discretion-denying formalism of
the axioms? Because the interpretive canon alternative does
nothing to alter the rigid nature of the axioms, it does nothing
to address this basic dilemma. All this alternative would
really do is formally sanction the broad interpretive discretion
already used to counter the rigidity of the extant axiomatic
meta-norms.
If the rigid axioms produce too many unsatisfactory outcomes, it may be best to introduce a bit of flexibility into the
axioms themselves. This is what alternatives ranging from
the multi-factor system to the institution option alternative
would do. The interpretive canon alternative, in contrast, directs courts to apply the axioms of the extant system, but instructs courts to bend the meaning of the legal norms when
failure to do so would lead to an anti-democratic outcome. If

202. See discussion supra Part II.C. A simple measure of democratic legitimacy is that the law of higher norm generating entity is presumed to be of more
democratic legitimacy than norm of subordinate norm generating entity.
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we are willing to add new interpretive rules that would legitimize and regularize judicial bias and manipulation in the
interpretation of legal norms, we might as well avoid the
gamesmanship and simply alter the axioms themselves.
V.

CONCLUSION

A key difference between the extant system and most of
the alternative systems offered in this article relates to the
publicly enunciated content of judicial opinions. Several of
the alternative systems encourage courts to directly and publicly grapple with the democratic legitimacy of conflicting
norms. Courts operating under the multi-factor, presumption, institution prompting, institution option, and interpretive canon alternative systems would have to incorporate into
written opinions analyses of the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms.
The extant system, in contrast, discourages public analysis of the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms in
two ways. First, it reduces the democratic legitimacy issue to
the overly simplistic metric of the democratic legitimacy of
the entities that create norms. In so doing, the extant system
makes it all too easy for rule-following courts to decide cases
in accord with the axiomatic meta-norms, and to sidestep any
examination of the democratic legitimacy of the individual
norms involved. This can lead to outcomes that are, in all but
a formalistic sense, anti-democratic, such as a special interest-favoring statute trumping a public-regarding and popular
regulation.
Second, the extant system denies courts a way to publicly
admit and explain how and when the democratic legitimacy of
individual legal norms influences their decisions. Many
courts will bend over backwards to avoid judicial nullification
of norms of high democratic legitimacy. The rigidly formalistic and source-centric extant system forces these courts into
interpretive gamesmanship. Courts that are unwilling to nullify norms of strong democratic legitimacy are forced to rationalize their rulings with the obfuscatory language of neutral rules of norm interpretation. While the desire to avoid
an anti-democratic outcome may be a prime factor motivating
outcomes, the reasoning offered in judicial opinions to explain
outcomes avoid discussion of the issue and mention only the
rules of legal interpretation.
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Most of the alternative systems, in contrast, would encourage courts to publicly justify their decisions by explaining
the democratic legitimacy related factors that actually influence their decisions. In cases where courts see special interest statutes of dubious democratic legitimacy in conflict with
more public regarding regulations, for example, the alternative systems would require courts to discuss and explain how
this circumstance influences whether the court decides to nullify the public regarding regulation. Return to the Tenth Circuit's treatment of the "do not call" regulations discussed in
the Introduction." 3 Though we can never know for sure, it is
very possible that the strong negative public reaction against
lower court opinions nullifying the "do not call" regulations
was a key factor motivating the Tenth Circuit to uphold the
regulations. The extant system governing conflicts between
legal norms did not give the Tenth Circuit a legitimate way to
admit and discuss how the strong democratic legitimacy of
the regulations might have factored into its ruling. Most of
the alternative systems, in contrast, would have required that
the Tenth Circuit directly and publicly grapple with this issue. At the very least, we are left with the question of
whether the popularity of the "do not call" regulation influenced the Tenth Circuit's decision. We are probably better off
with systems that would allow courts to directly, openly, and
publicly discuss the factors that influence outcomes, than a
system which forces courts into interpretive gamesmanship
and leaves one wondering what really drives outcomes.
The crux of the problem with the extant system lies in
the following: The extant system's rigid formalism seeks to
deny courts discretion over the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms. At the same time, however, the flexible
and open-ended discretion afforded courts when interpreting
norms permits courts to surreptitiously factor the democratic
legitimacy of legal norms into their decisions. This coupling
of rigid formalism with open-ended anti-formalism is the
worst of all worlds.
Some will maintain that courts simply are not equipped
to assess the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms
and that courts should not allow such factors to influence
their decisions. The realities, however, are that such factors
203. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
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do influence judicial decision making, and flexible rules of legal interpretation do permit such factors to influence judicial
decisions. For those who believe that the extant system is
right to attempt to keep courts out of the business of assessing the democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms, the
policy prescription will call for less judicial discretion in interpreting legal norms. In short, if courts are using the back
door of flexible interpretive discretion to do what the extant
system tries to prohibit them from doing through the front
door, then the back door of flexible interpretive discretion
should be shut.
To my mind, however, the opposite path should be explored. Allowing courts a legitimized role in assessing the
democratic legitimacy of individual legal norms would, over
the run of cases, produce more outcomes that enhance or preserve the democratic legitimacy of law than does the extant
system. Moreover, we should structure the systems governing conflicts between legal norms in ways that encourage
courts to publicly enunciate exactly how the democratic legitimacy question influences their decisions. Courts will use
judicial discretion whenever, and in whatever form, it is made
available. Because courts are offered flexible interpretive discretion, the rigid axiomatic meta-norms governing conflicts
between legal norms fail to stop courts from exercising discretion on the democratic legitimacy issue. When a public regarding regulation runs up against a special interest statute,
courts can and do use their flexible interpretative discretion
to save the regulation from nullification by reading the norms
in ways that avoid any conflict. If courts are going to exercise
interpretive discretion, we are better off encouraging them to
publicly explain the factors motivating their decisions, than
forcing them to operate through the back door of flexible interpretive discretion. This is what many of the alternative
systems offered in this article would do.

